The World Web Times - worldwebtimes.comRussian forces are being withdrawn from Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region, where they have been stationed as peacekeepers since the end of a war in 2020, officials of both countries said Wednesday. #russia #karabakh
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The recent attack by the Islamic Republic of Iran on targets within Israel has further intensified the instability and tensions in the Middle East. The extensive drone and missile strike by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), though initiated and concluded, cannot be considered resolved, as the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations suggested.
Answers to these ambiguous questions can aid in understanding the current situation and provide insight into the potential future of this crisis. In fact, there are three fundamental questions. First, was an attack absolutely necessary? Second, was the recent attack successful, and did it achieve its objectives? Lastly, the third question will focus on where the tensions after this attack are headed and what Israel’s response to the Iranian attack will be? This article attempts to answer all these questions.
Most international relations experts and researchers always strive to expand peace and cooperation using available tools. However, ideals are not always realized. Sometimes, the mere existence of stability and the absence of widespread war are also considered significant achievements. Preserving the foundation of a systemic environment, which would be regional order in relation to the Middle East, though weakened by tensions among rivals, and preventing transformation and change through a widespread regional war, although not ideal, would be desirable. Hence, there are theorists who prefer stability over peace and readiness to face power dynamics, even at the cost of creating tensions over widespread war.
For example, consider a city where thieves steal and remain unpunished. What guarantee is there that they will not repeat their actions; A situation that, if continued, might eventually force the victims to patiently endure reality and gradually lose everything, or ultimately opt for a one-time death and wail by turning to an all-out war against the thieves, if it’s not too late.
On the other hand, a war for survival is the most intense kind of war. In this case, one might ask whether, if the thieves had been punished for their first theft, they would have committed similar acts again? If they had, would it be with the same intensity and quantity? Perhaps more protection of assets should have been considered, making it harder for thieves to act, potentially deterring them from their actions. It is likely that there is also a view among them that should not have allowed this action to become a habit for them.
At a higher level of analysis, the field of international relations has been able to offer solutions for similar cases at international, regional, and global levels. The solution initially involves maintaining a balance of power and then deterrence. In terms of maintaining a balance of power, both sides must know that neither’s power is significantly superior to the other. In the second part, deterrence will take place. This means that neither side harbors the desire to attack the other. These two can have different tools and power-based components.
On Israel’s side, advanced offensive and defensive weapons, nuclear ambiguity, and a security umbrella from the United States and other Western and even regional allies exist. In contrast, Tehran benefits from a doctrine of asymmetric warfare, a significant missile and drone program, and also non-state regional allies. These elements must be adjusted so that, despite the ongoing competition, they ultimately prevent the initiation of any action by either side against the other.
Now consider if the equation suddenly changes and Israel is no longer restrained from acting differently against each other. The result of this weakness in deterrence is the attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria. Here, the deterrence formula between the two countries indicates its weakness. This way, either a new element must be added to it or the effectiveness of existing ones must be reminded as fragile; otherwise, there is no guarantee that Israel will not repeat the path it once took.
From this point of view, the attack by the Islamic Republic of Iran on Israel can be considered a compulsion in both field and theoretical dimensions. Such tensions are like foreshocks, which some believe can reduce the intensity of the main earthquake. Therefore, by virtue of deterrence, a reciprocal and deterrent action by virtue of maintaining or reviving deterrence can ultimately prevent a widespread international war for survival, and here, under the shadow of this necessity, the viral word strategic patience will not become very significant. However, whether the attack is direct and from the soil of Iran or the principle of proportionality is observed, these are other considerable topics.
In the field dimension, the nature of Iran’s attacks has been deterrent; however, efforts have been made to minimize the damage to Israel. As stated, the purpose of the deterrent action could be to send a message and remind the governing equations and formulas between the two not to spark an inevitable and large war.
It is clear that the power and accuracy of Israel’s three-tier defense and the capabilities of its air forces in tracking and destroying projectiles were overlooked. The air and defensive support of Israel’s partners in the attacks also significantly enhanced the defensive capability of this country, and Iran had a tough job for its avowed punitive purpose.
On the one hand, as mentioned, Iran also did not use all its capabilities in the field and operational dimension in the recent attack. Iran did not utilize all its drone and missile capabilities. In the drone sector, the simultaneous use of drones available in Iran’s arsenal could have increased the impact and success rate of combined operations in the drone part. On the other hand, more effective Iranian missiles like “Sejil” existed that could have been used. However, more than the choice of weapons, what is clear and evident is the tactic used by Iran in this attack, which can support the existing hypothesis regarding Iran’s reluctance to cause widespread destruction and non-observance of the principle of proportionality. Tehran either did not want or perhaps could not provide the necessary ground for the fruition of its ballistic missiles.
The drone and cruise missile attacks by Iran, which generally aimed to create gaps in the defensive system, also could not play an effective role in the course of the attacks. This high inefficiency applies not only to direct attacks from Iran but also to attacks from the south by Yemen, the east by Iraq, and the north by Hezbollah in Lebanon. From this, it seems that the objectives were not pursued in hits and explosions, but elsewhere.
Apart from the field dimension, the success of each side involved in this operation depended on two other essential factors. A significant part of this confrontation is psychological warfare, media warfare, and generally the war of narratives in such a way that what was most visible was the media coverage and related side issues of the attacks. The media sympathetic to Israel were trying to portray the Iranian attacks as fruitless and unsuccessful. Interception of many drones before reaching Israeli soil, destruction of 99% of them, questioning the accuracy of successful attack images, and ultimately their impact on insignificant areas are examples of these efforts.
The situation progressed in such a way that Israel, without observing additional precautionary measures, announced the general exit from shelters and published a picture of an Israeli F35 fighter landing at an airport that was reported to have been severely damaged due to the missile and drone attacks. Also, news from gas stations, stores, and the sudden increase in the exchange rate in Iran was published.
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran preferred to focus on the part of its action. In fact, a broad action in terms of quantity and milder in terms of quality with a huge dose of media propaganda was preferred over a limited but more effective action. This hypothesis was strengthened when Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahian formally announced the day after the attack that the regional countries had been informed of Iran’s action three days before the operation.
From Tehran’s perspective, what will remain are eternal images of missiles flying over the Knesset, Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the joy of people attached to resistance under a sky full of missiles. In addition, the publication of images of fear and terror in the occupied territories can also be a balm to the hearts of the terrified people in Gaza.
In the end, it can be inferred that the aggressive operation “True Promise” was more a power contest to shape narratives and psychological wars between Iran and Israel than a military operation aimed at destruction and harm. An arena that has always been a part of the competition between the two countries. The action against Israel, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, was intended to restore deterrence, which has become fragile due to the action (different or perhaps unprecedented) of one of the parties, and from this perspective, success in reviving deterrence is not based solely on destruction and reciprocal action but on a reciprocal action that has not been precedented before.
There is a high probability that Israel will take reactive action in response to the recent attacks on Iranian soil. However, both countries will attempt to manage tensions rather than de-escalate them. It seems that in response to the Iranian attacks, Israeli attacks will likely not be aimed at severe destruction for several reasons and will be unilateral and individual.
The first reason is that the balance of U.S. support in relation to Israel leans heavily towards defense. The United States and other Western allies of Israel, such as the United Kingdom and France, supported this country in defending itself against the Iranian attacks. However, as President Biden also mentioned, Washington will not be part of an offensive operation by Israel against Iranian soil. Previously, the United Kingdom and France had also expressed similar views. In addition, countries in the region have announced that they will close their airspace to attacking aircraft en route to Iran.
Secondly, despite having a reason for war with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel will not be willing to sacrifice the international support it has generated for itself for reciprocal action and warmongering. This country, due to the war in Gaza and its actions in this region, faces negative reactions and severe international pressures, even from some of its Western partners. However, after these attacks, Israel can rejoin the ranks of victimized and rightful countries with Western media support.
Moreover, Israel will try to further isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran internationally and regionally by pressuring the members of the Security Council to label the Revolutionary Guards as terrorists. In this way, just one limited attack based on international law with the goal of gaining prestige (the prestige of an attack on Iranian soil by a very small country) will be a legitimate reciprocal action and consolidate deterrence.
Finally, news published regarding Jordan’s support in the recent attack on Israel and action to intercept Iranian drones shows that Israel in this position can more easily mend its tarnished image and approach the Arabs.
The post Strategic Necessity Or Reckless Aggression? Iran’s Missile And Drone Attack On Israel – OpEd first appeared on The South Caucasus News.
Only this month, the near comatose US President, Joe Biden, made a casual, castaway remark that his administration was “considering” the request by Australia that the case against Julian Assange be concluded. The WikiLeaks founder has already spent five gruelling years in London’s Belmarsh prison, where he continues a remarkable, if draining campaign against the US extradition request on 18 charges, 17 incongruously and outrageously based on the US Espionage Act of 1917.
Like readings of coffee grinds, his defenders took the remark as a sign of progress. Jennifer Robinson, a longtime member of Assange’s legal team, told Sky News Australia that Biden’s “response, this is what we have been asking for over five years. Since 2010 we’ve been saying this is a dangerous precedent that’s being set. So, we certainly hope it was a serious remark and the US will act on it.” WikiLeaks editor-in-chief Kristinn Hrafnsson found the mumbled comment from the president “extraordinary”, hoping “to see in the coming days” whether “clarification of what this means” would be offered by the powerful.
On April 14, the Wall Street Journal reported that Canberra had asked their US counterparts whether a felony plea deal could be reached, enabling the publisher to return to Australia. “Prosecutors and a lawyer for Assange have discussed a range of potential deals, including those that include pleading guilty to a felony under the espionage law under which he was indicted, and those of conspiring to mishandle classified information, which would be a misdemeanor, people familiar with the matter have said.”
Last month, the UK High Court gave what can only be regarded as an absurd prescription to the prosecution should they wish to succeed. Extradition would be unlikely to be refused if Assange was availed of protections offered by the First Amendment (though rejecting claims that he was a legitimate journalist), was guaranteed not to be prejudiced, both during the trial and in sentence on account of his nationality, and not be subject to the death penalty. That such directions were even countenanced shows the somewhat delusionary nature of British justices towards their US counterparts.
On April 16, Assange’s supporters received confirmation that the extradition battle, far from ending, would continue in its tormenting grind. Not wishing to see the prospect of a full hearing of Assange’s already hobbled arguments, the US State Department, almost to the hour, filed the assurances in a diplomatic note to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). “Assange,” the US Embassy in London claimed with aping fidelity to the formula proposed by the High Court, “will not be prejudiced by reason of nationality with respect to which defenses he may seek to raise at trial and at sentencing.”
Were he to be extradited, “Assange will have the ability to raise and seek to rely upon at trial (which includes any sentencing hearing) the rights and protections given under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” An obvious caveat, and one that should be observed with wary consideration by the High Court judges, followed. “A decision as to the applicability of the First Amendment is exclusively within the purview of the US Courts.”
The US embassy also promised that, “A sentence of death will neither be sought nor imposed on Assange. The United States is able to provide such assurance as Assange is not charged with a death-penalty eligible offense, and the United States assures that he will not be tried for a death-eligible offense.” This undertaking does not dispel the threat of Assange being charged with additional offences such as traditional espionage, let alone aiding or abetting treason, which would carry the death penalty.
In 2020, Gordon Kromberg, the chief Department of Justice prosecutor behind the case, told the Central Criminal Court of England and Wales that the US “could argue that foreign nationals are not entitled to protections under the First Amendment, at least as it concerns national defense information.” There was also the likelihood that Assange, in allegedly revealing the names of US intelligence sources thereby putting them at risk of harm, would also preclude the possibility of him relying on such protections.
That the zealous Kromberg will be fronting matters should Assange reach US shores is more than troubling. Lawyers and civil rights activists have accused him of using the Eastern District Court of Virginia for selective and malicious prosecutions. As Murtaza Hussain of The Intercept observed with bleak accuracy in July 2021, “[r]ather than being pushed into obscurity by these efforts, today he is serving as a key figure in one of the most important civil liberties cases in the world.”
The High Court also acknowledged Kromberg’s views at trial regarding the possibility that the First Amendment did not cover foreign nationals. “It can fairly be assumed that [Kromberg] would not have said that the prosecution ‘could argue that foreign nationals are not entitled to protections under the First Amendment’ unless that was a tenable argument that the prosecution was entitled to deploy with real prospect of success.” These latest assurances do nothing to change that fact.
A post from Assange’s wife, Stella, provided a neat and damning summary of the embassy note. “The United States has issued a non-assurance in relation to the First Amendment, and a standard assurance in relation to the death penalty. It makes no undertaking to withdraw the prosecution’s previous assertion that Julian has no First Amendment rights because he is not a US citizen. Instead, the US has limited itself to blatant weasel words claiming that Julian can ‘seek to raise’ the First Amendment if extradited.”
Whether the justices are duly satisfied by the latest diplomatic manoeuvre, one non-binding in any tangible or true sense on prosecutors and judges in the US, awaits testing in the hearing on May 20. For Assange, the wheels of judicial torture have been prolonged.
The post Faulty Assurances: The Judicial Torture Of Assange Continues – OpEd first appeared on The South Caucasus News.
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