Day: October 12, 2026

While the army of humanoid robots isn’t here yet, humans already successfully operate unmanned ground vehicles in some of the most challenging missions, including logistics, medical evacuation, and strike operations. The result? Ukraine has not only liberated its territory but has also done so while minimizing human losses. The use of UGVs reportedly helped save approximately 2,500 soldiers’ lives during Ukraine’s counteroffensive Operation Vivaldi.

In this edition:

• Gryphon Tactics: Innovative Combat Applications of UGVs in Operation Vivaldi;

• “The Development of Autonomy Can No Longer Be Stopped”: The Fourth Law;

• Trends in Ukraine’s Drone Industry;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

As my work now involves frequent travel and public engagements, I’ve decided to occasionally combine my Arms Trends in Ukraine and Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletters. This means that some Monday editions will cover both topics, including traditional and emerging military capabilities.

I also continue to publish Ukraine Drone Brief, a concise weekly roundup of drone-related developments exclusively for my VIP subscribers. I haven’t missed a single edition since launching it in April – consider subscribing!

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Gryphon Tactics: Innovative Combat Applications of UGVs in Operation Vivaldi

As time passes, more details about Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi are emerging. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have been playing a particularly important role in this operation, saving the lives of thousands of soldiers and carrying out a wide range of logistical and strike missions.

We are witnessing a gradual transformation in the role of unmanned technologies: they are increasingly being deployed to perform some of the most complex and dangerous tasks, allowing human soldiers to take on more specialized roles and enter combat at later stages of operations.

Yet humans remain at the heart of this evolution.

The NC-13 Strike UGV Unit of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has demonstrated that innovation is not just about developing new systems, but also about how these systems are employed, combined, and integrated into new tactics. This is something that cannot simply be stamped “battlefield-tested” and sold abroad. It underscores the critical importance of human capital, operational experience, and the ability to innovate on the battlefield.

The unit performs strike UGV missions exclusively: sabotage, assault, and defensive operations. Sabotage missions include operations that the unit carries out at a depth of more than 8 km into enemy territory. The unit relies exclusively on Ukrainian drones.

In his interview with Defender Media, the commander of the unit said that during Operation Vivaldi, UGVs carried out 94 assault and sabotage missions without risk to Ukrainian troops, and their deployment saved the lives of about 2,500 people.

UGVs supported deception operations, reinforced selected sectors, targeted command posts and ammunition or supply sites, and engaged Russian assault groups along logistical routes.

One of the most notable applications of UGVs during Vivaldi was the “Gryphon” tactic, in which strike UGVs were transported by heavy aerial drones and deployed deep behind Russian lines.

The ground robots, sometimes equipped with disposable grenade launchers, could be dropped as far as 10 kilometres into the Russian rear and then continue moving independently toward their targets.

Some UGVs carried two Bullspike grenade launchers. They approached Russian positions and fired on them before continuing toward enemy shelters, where the vehicles were then detonated.

The tactic was designed to create uncertainty about where and how Ukrainian robotic systems could appear behind Russian positions. Such missions were used to target Russian UAV operators, including personnel associated with the Rubikon unit, as well as company-level and higher command posts and troops moving along logistical routes.

In one reported case, the deployment of a UGV behind Russian lines contributed to the cancellation of a planned mechanized assault. Russian forces interpreted the presence of the robot as evidence that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group was waiting to ambush the advancing column.

The “Gryphon” tactic was named in honour of NC-13 servicemember Hryhorii Bach, callsign “Gryphon,” who went missing near Andriivka in the Bakhmut sector in 2023.

During the third phase of Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian forces also repurposed Soviet-era BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as kamikaze UGVs to strike Russian strongpoints.

Footage released by the unit indicated that the vehicles were packed with explosive material, including what appeared to be anti-tank mines, likely TM-62s. Then the vehicles were remotely driven toward fortified Russian positions. The adapted APCs were used as an improvised means of breaching key enemy strongpoints.

The use of converted BTR-60s illustrates another dimension of the operation’s ground-robotics approach: adapting legacy armoured vehicles into remotely controlled, expendable strike platforms for attacking fortified positions.

ISW wrote that it is notable that Ukrainian forces were able to field and drive APCs up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes. Analysts indicated that Ukrainian forces neutralized or otherwise negated Russian drone defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted extensive shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign to mitigate the threat from Russian drones and EW systems and achieve tactical drone overmatch, aiding Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.

ISW analysts concluded that Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction has completely disrupted Russia’s plans to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, forcing the Russian military to rebuild its forces and likely rethink its strategy.

Currently, there is no basis for assuming Russia could capture the rest of Donetsk Oblast in the near future, as Putin continues to claim.

Read my earlier report: Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation.

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“The Development of Autonomy Can No Longer Be Stopped”: The Fourth Law

“Drone autonomy could become the Manhattan Project of the 21st century. Like nuclear weapons, it could become a major deterrent: countries possessing the most advanced autonomous technologies may enjoy a significant security advantage. If a country’s technology is far ahead of its adversary’s, the adversary may be less inclined to attack,” said Maksym Savanevskyi, Communications Director at The Fourth Law, a Ukrainian company developing autonomous drone technologies, in his interview with LB.ua.
Here are some key points: