Day: July 17, 2026

Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections produced a result that was analysed carefully in neighbouring Azerbaijan. The ruling Civil Contract party of Nikol Pashinyan captured a 60.95% legislative majority. Enough to rule alone and to unilaterally amend Constitutional Laws, but not a 2/3 majority, which is required to change the constitution and remove the reference to ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ as part of its territory. A nonnegotiable demand from Baku to continue the peace negotiations, but a claim rejected by Armenia. Is lasting peace still possible?

By Arthur Blok
Three political forces will be represented in Armenia’s National Assembly: Civil Contract (64 seats) versus a fractured opposition consisting of the Strong Armenia bloc (29) and the Armenia bloc (12). This outcome is a reassurance that the post-Karabakh war political landscape remains resilient, fostering hope for continued progress despite challenges.

Following the White House meeting of August 2025, it was Azerbaijan’s practical gestures that gave Pashinyan’s electoral campaign based on the peace agenda material substance: the border with Armenia was stabilised and calm maintained; transit restrictions on Armenian goods through Azerbaijan’s territory were lifted, opening access to third-country markets; bilateral contacts in civil society and institutional channels resumed; and the aggressive rhetoric that had defined the preceding period was deliberately set aside.
 
Yet the election result did not, by itself, guarantee an easy task in cementing the formal peace treaty between the two nations. Azerbaijan insists it cannot be signed until Armenia’s constitution is amended. Baku wants the disputed text on Nagorno-Karabakh, inherited from the 1990 Declaration of Independence, removed.

This demand hangs like a Sword of Damocles over the ongoing peace negotiations, is rejected by Yerevan, and is impossible to meet with the current election results. In their turn, Azerbaijani media outlets and experts miss no opportunity to reiterate that this is ‘the last obstacle towards signing peace’

The constitutional hurdles are critical: Amending the constitution requires a two-thirds majority (70 out of 105 MPs) in parliament, followed by a national referendum. Despite its election victory, the Civil Contract, with 64 MPs, is short of the 70 needed. This legal barrier directly hampers Armenia’s capacity to meet Azerbaijan’s demand for constitutional changes, delaying the peace process.

Optimism despite constitutional hurdles
Benyamin Poghosyan, senior fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI), remains optimistic despite constitutional hurdles. “The ruling Civil Contract is six seats short, despite its election victory to amend the constitution. On the other side are the opposition parties who firmly reject changing the constitution under foreign pressure. Without constitutional changes, a final peace agreement remains unsigned.”

Poghosyan foresees three possible scenarios.  In the first scenario, he explained, the US (possibly with EU support) intervenes to persuade Baku to sign a peace agreement without constitutional amendments. This relies on external pressure and the influence of a powerful actor, like US President Donald Trump.

The second scenario constitutes a no-war, no-peace with TRIPP Implementation (the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity is a 43-kilometre transportation and infrastructure project in southern Armenia that connects mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave).

“No peace agreement is signed, and full Armenia-Turkey normalisation does not occur, while TRIPP is implemented. This provides Azerbaijan with its desired access and establishes an American presence in the South Caucasus, but leaves Armenia still under a form of blockade”, said Poghosyan.

The third scenario, he elaborated, is a complete deadlock: “No peace, no normalisation, no TRIPP. This is the most pessimistic scenario, in which all efforts are blocked, and Russia and Iran actively work to prevent the implementation of TRIP, viewing the US presence in their traditional sphere of influence (the South Caucasus) and near Iran’s border as undesirable.

Precondition for Peace
Is Azerbaijan’s constitutional demand reasonable, or does it close the door to lasting peace and undermine the positive spirit that has surrounded the talks since Trump’s interference? For Armenia, the 1990 Declaration of Independence is part of its national identity. To break the deadlock, Pashinyan even proposed adopting a new constitution rather than amending the existing one.

The Armenian Constitutional Court recently ruled that the Declaration’s text is not part of the constitution and thus lacks constitutional force. Areg Kochinyan, President of the Armenian Council Research Centre, emphasised. He is less optimistic about the future of the peace process but remains pragmatic in his analysis.

“To remove the constitutional reference, a two-thirds majority in the Armenian parliament is required for a referendum. Pashinyan’s party does not hold this majority, making the demand currently impossible to implement. It is as simple as that. Therefore, given the election results, Baku’s demand is unrealistic and could also be a deliberate tactic to obstruct the peace agreement”, Kochinyan said.

He added: “Separate negotiations on border delimitation and demarcation are ongoing and are not directly connected to the signing of the peace agreement, while discussions on unblocking regional connectivity are also proceeding. It is not even necessary, look at Russia and Japan, who maintain economic and infrastructural ties after the Second World War, but lack a formal peace agreement due to unresolved historical disagreements.”

In the background, old foe Turkey plays a silent role. Kochinyan: “They outsourced their foreign policy on this matter to Azerbaijan, stating that it will not normalise relations with Armenia until Azerbaijan achieves a peace agreement.”

Senior fellow Poghosyan calls it a vicious circle: “Baku’s demand for constitutional change prevents a peace agreement. The absence of a peace agreement gives them leverage to pressure Turkey, thereby blocking Armenia-Turkey normalisation. At the same time, we can not meet their constitutional demand due to legal requirements and political opposition.”

Armen Petrosyan, a senior expert at the Orbeli Centre, which is affiliated with the prime minister’s office, is more hesitant to predict the future. Highlighting the complexity of predicting long-term scenarios for the Armenia-Azerbaijan relationship, noting that the situation extends beyond bilateral or even trilateral (Armenia, Azerbaijan, US) frameworks.

“Future developments depend heavily on broader global and regional events, such as the war in Ukraine and the US-Iran confrontation, as well as Armenian domestic political dynamics. These factors directly impact the positions of major global actors in the South Caucasus”

The scenario where the US exerts pressure is unlikely to work. Petrosyan: “It is also possible that the Azerbaijani leadership, after assessing global and regional developments, may itself decide to abandon its demand for constitutional changes in Armenia. To keep the momentum.”

Petrosyan said that it is equally possible that such a decision will not be made. This could mean that in the medium term, the situation could end up in a no-war, no-peace scenario.

He concluded: “The most important issue for Baku is TRIPP, which is of strategic significance. If it is implemented according to a scenario that is acceptable to Baku, then I believe they will, most likely, adopt a more flexible approach in other areas as well.”

The post Armenia’s Parliamentary elections and the peace process with Azerbaijan: A view from Yerevan first appeared on The Liberum.