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At the same time, prisoners at Ghezel Hesar Prison have continued a hunger strike opposing the use of capital punishment, particularly in drug-related cases, News.Az reports.

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The developments have renewed attention on Iran’s use of the death penalty, especially in cases linked to political dissent and anti-government demonstrations.

What happened in the latest executions and court rulings?

According to reports by the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), two prisoners were executed by hanging at Iranshahr Prison in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province. One of those executed, Abdolvahed Sangari, had been arrested in 2019 following a fatal altercation and was sentenced to death after being convicted of murder. The second prisoner, Meysam Irandegani, was convicted of a murder committed when he was 14 years old. He was initially held in a juvenile correction and rehabilitation center before being transferred to Iranshahr Prison, where the execution was carried out.

HRANA reported that neither execution had been officially announced by Iranian authorities at the time of publication.

At the same time, several protest-related legal cases reached significant milestones. A Revolutionary Court in Isfahan sentenced 22-year-old rapper Mehnam Navab Safavi to death on a charge of moharebeh (“enmity against God”). According to HRANA, prosecutors accused him of destroying public property, conducting propaganda against the state, assembly and collusion against national security, encouraging murder, and writing protest slogans during demonstrations that began in January 2026.

In another case, political prisoner Amirhassan Akbari Monfared was sentenced to death on a charge of baghi (armed rebellion) through alleged membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK). Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of Ahad Shokouhian, another defendant arrested during the protests, while overturning the death sentence of political prisoner Karim Khojasteh and ordering a retrial that ultimately resulted in a lengthy prison sentence instead.

Together, these cases illustrate the continued use of capital punishment both in ordinary criminal cases and in prosecutions connected to political unrest.

What are moharebeh and baghi under Iranian law?

Several of the recent cases involve charges that are specific to Iran’s Islamic Penal Code and are frequently used in politically sensitive prosecutions.

Moharebeh, often translated as “enmity against God,” is among the most serious offenses under Iranian law. Traditionally, the charge applies to individuals accused of using weapons or violence to create fear, threaten public security, or challenge the state. However, human rights organizations have argued that Iranian authorities have sometimes interpreted the offense broadly, particularly in cases involving political protests or opposition activities. A conviction can carry the death penalty.

Baghi, meaning armed rebellion, is another capital offense. Under Iranian law, it generally refers to participation in or membership of an armed group that rises against the Islamic Republic. Authorities have used the charge in cases involving alleged affiliation with armed opposition organizations, including the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK), which Tehran considers a terrorist organization.

Supporters of Iran’s legal system argue that these offenses are intended to protect national security and public order during periods of unrest. Critics, including numerous international human rights organizations, contend that the laws are sometimes applied broadly against political opponents and protesters, raising concerns about due process, access to legal representation, and fair trial standards.

Because convictions under moharebeh and baghi may result in execution, such cases often receive significant international attention and scrutiny.

Why are the protest-related cases attracting international attention?

The latest rulings are closely connected to nationwide protests that began in late 2025 and continued into 2026. Demonstrations reportedly occurred across multiple Iranian cities and involved a range of political, economic, and social grievances. As with previous periods of unrest, Iranian authorities responded with widespread arrests, criminal prosecutions, and investigations into individuals accused of organizing or participating in demonstrations.

Human rights organizations have closely monitored these proceedings because several defendants have received death sentences linked to protest-related allegations rather than ordinary criminal offenses. International observers have expressed concern about allegations involving limited access to lawyers, disputed evidence, reliance on confessions, and the broad application of national security laws.

The case of Ahad Shokouhian illustrates some of these concerns. According to HRANA, his family disputes the allegations against him, arguing that he was mistaken for another individual and that surveillance footage supporting his defense was not fully examined. Iranian authorities have not publicly accepted those claims.

The sentencing of rapper Mehnam Navab Safavi has also drawn attention because the reported allegations include writing protest slogans in addition to more serious security-related accusations. Cases involving artists, journalists, activists, and political prisoners often generate heightened international interest because they raise broader questions about freedom of expression and political dissent.

Iranian authorities, for their part, have consistently maintained that prosecutions connected to unrest are based on criminal conduct and threats to national security rather than peaceful political expression.

What is happening at Ghezel Hesar Prison?

Alongside the court rulings, prisoners at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj have continued a hunger strike protesting the implementation of death sentences. According to HRANA, inmates in Ward 2 entered the tenth consecutive day of their protest after six prisoners convicted in drug-related cases were transferred to solitary confinement ahead of planned executions.

Participants reportedly refused prison meals and staged a sit-in to demonstrate their opposition to capital punishment. HRANA said the prisoners were specifically protesting executions in drug-related cases, although their broader message opposed the use of the death penalty more generally. Videos reportedly recorded inside the prison have shown aspects of the protest, though independent verification of such footage is often difficult.

Hunger strikes are among the few forms of protest available to prisoners inside correctional facilities. They are intended to draw public attention to concerns over prison conditions, legal proceedings, or government policies. Similar protests against executions have reportedly occurred previously at Ghezel Hesar Prison.

Iran has historically carried out a significant number of executions involving drug-related offenses, although legal reforms in recent years reduced the use of capital punishment for some narcotics crimes. Nevertheless, executions related to drug convictions continue under certain circumstances, and the issue remains controversial both inside Iran and internationally.

What could happen next?

Several of the cases remain within Iran’s judicial process. Defendants who have received death sentences may pursue additional legal appeals or seek other forms of judicial review where available under Iranian law. In some instances, higher courts may uphold, overturn, or order retrials, as occurred in the case of Karim Khojasteh, whose death sentence was ultimately replaced by a prison term following Supreme Court intervention.

Human rights organizations are expected to continue monitoring these cases closely and may issue further reports as new court decisions emerge. International governments and organizations could also respond through diplomatic statements or calls for greater transparency regarding judicial proceedings and the application of the death penalty.

Meanwhile, authorities may continue investigating activities linked to the protests that began in late 2025, resulting in additional court proceedings involving individuals accused of participating in demonstrations or belonging to opposition groups.

Inside Iran’s prison system, the hunger strike at Ghezel Hesar Prison could continue if inmates maintain their protest against executions. Prison authorities will likely monitor the health of participating prisoners while maintaining security within the facility.

Overall, the latest executions, protest-related death sentences, and prison demonstrations illustrate the continuing legal and political tensions surrounding Iran’s response to recent nationwide protests. The cases are likely to remain under close domestic and international scrutiny as judicial proceedings continue.

The post Why is Iran facing renewed scrutiny over executions and protest-related death sentences?​ appeared first on azeritimes.com.

According to Michael Kratsios, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, U.S. officials believe Moonshot conducted a “large-scale” effort to extract capabilities from advanced American AI systems, particularly those developed by Anthropic, News.Az reports.

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The allegations center on claims that Moonshot used a technique known as model distillation to reproduce the capabilities of proprietary U.S. AI models without authorization. Kratsios argued that while model distillation itself is a legitimate research method, secretly applying it on an industrial scale to replicate commercially protected technology constitutes intellectual property theft. He described the alleged activity as a covert effort to appropriate American innovation rather than develop original technology.

The accusations represent one of the strongest public statements made by the Trump administration against a Chinese AI company. Although no formal legal action has yet been announced, U.S. officials have indicated that investigations are continuing. The dispute also comes at a time when Washington is tightening restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports and expanding scrutiny of Chinese companies operating in strategic technology sectors.

Moonshot AI has not publicly responded to the allegations. Chinese authorities have consistently rejected previous accusations of technology theft, arguing that China’s rapid advances in artificial intelligence result from domestic research, investment and international scientific cooperation rather than unauthorized access to foreign intellectual property.

What is Kimi K3 and why has it attracted so much attention?

Kimi K3 is the latest large language model developed by Moonshot AI, one of China’s fastest-growing artificial intelligence startups. The model attracted considerable international attention after the company claimed it could compete with leading American AI systems developed by OpenAI and Anthropic in areas such as reasoning, coding, mathematical problem-solving and general language understanding.

The company has announced plans to release the model’s full weights, allowing developers around the world to download, modify and deploy the system for their own applications. Open-weight releases are becoming increasingly significant in the AI industry because they enable researchers, companies and governments to customize advanced models without relying on cloud-based commercial services.

If Moonshot’s performance claims prove accurate, Kimi K3 could strengthen China’s position in the increasingly competitive global AI market. Chinese technology firms have rapidly expanded their AI capabilities over the past two years, producing models that increasingly rival those developed by leading U.S. companies.

The launch has therefore attracted attention not only because of the model’s technical capabilities but also because it reflects China’s growing ambitions to become a global leader in artificial intelligence. Against that backdrop, allegations that the model may have relied on unauthorized use of American technology have intensified concerns within Washington about protecting U.S. technological leadership.

What is model distillation?

Model distillation is a widely used machine learning technique in which a smaller or newer AI model learns by analyzing the outputs generated by a larger, more advanced model. Rather than copying source code or internal model parameters, the student model studies responses produced by the teacher model and gradually learns to generate similar outputs.

The technique is commonly used throughout the AI industry because it allows developers to create smaller, faster and less expensive models while preserving much of the performance of larger systems. Universities, research laboratories and technology companies regularly employ distillation as part of legitimate AI development.

However, the controversy arises when developers allegedly use proprietary commercial models without permission. According to the White House, Moonshot did not merely employ standard research practices but instead carried out large-scale automated interactions with American AI systems to extract valuable capabilities that were then incorporated into Kimi K3.

The distinction is important because U.S. officials argue that legitimate distillation generally occurs with the consent of the model owner or within an organization’s own AI systems. Conducting unauthorized large-scale extraction of proprietary outputs, they argue, crosses the line from scientific research into intellectual property infringement.

Whether the alleged activities violate existing laws will ultimately depend on legal interpretations, contractual terms governing AI usage and evidence produced during any future investigations.

Why is Anthropic involved in the dispute?

The allegations primarily concern Anthropic, one of the leading American artificial intelligence companies and the developer of the Claude family of large language models. According to the White House, Moonshot AI allegedly relied on technology derived from Anthropic’s systems while developing Kimi K3.

Anthropic has previously accused Moonshot of creating fraudulent user accounts that generated more than 3.4 million interactions with Claude AI models. The company alleges those interactions focused on advanced capabilities such as software development, logical reasoning, data analysis and computer control, suggesting that the activity may have been intended to systematically study Claude’s behavior.

Although Anthropic has not publicly disclosed all evidence supporting its claims, the allegations have become part of broader U.S. concerns regarding the protection of American AI technologies. Companies developing frontier AI systems invest billions of dollars in computing infrastructure, engineering talent and research. As a result, protecting proprietary models has become a major commercial and national security issue.

The dispute also reflects growing tensions over how AI companies should prevent automated extraction of their models’ capabilities while continuing to provide legitimate access to customers, researchers and developers.

Why are Nvidia chips part of the controversy?

In addition to allegations involving model distillation, the White House claims that Moonshot AI obtained access to advanced computing hardware powered by Nvidia’s GB300 Blackwell processors, despite U.S. export controls designed to restrict China’s access to cutting-edge AI chips.

Modern artificial intelligence systems require enormous computational resources during training. Nvidia’s most advanced graphics processing units (GPUs) dominate the global AI hardware market because they are specifically designed to handle the complex mathematical operations required by large language models.

The United States has imposed increasingly strict export controls aimed at limiting China’s access to the most advanced AI processors. Washington argues that restricting high-performance chips helps prevent potential military applications while slowing China’s ability to develop frontier artificial intelligence systems.

According to U.S. officials, Moonshot may also have accessed comparable hardware through infrastructure located in Thailand, potentially circumventing existing export restrictions. The White House has not yet presented public evidence supporting these claims, and Moonshot has not commented on the allegations.

If investigations determine that export control rules were violated, companies involved could face sanctions or other regulatory penalties under U.S. law.

What actions could the United States take?

The allegations come as the Trump administration adopts a more aggressive approach toward protecting American artificial intelligence technologies. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently stated that U.S. authorities are examining whether Chinese AI companies have relied on stolen American intellectual property while developing their systems.

If investigators conclude that Moonshot violated U.S. laws or export regulations, the company could face several possible measures. These include financial sanctions, restrictions on business with American companies or placement on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List, which significantly limits access to American technology and suppliers.

Being added to the Entity List has previously affected several major Chinese technology companies by restricting their ability to purchase advanced semiconductors, software and manufacturing equipment from U.S. firms. Such restrictions can substantially slow technological development and complicate international business operations.

The administration could also strengthen export controls, increase scrutiny of cloud computing services used by Chinese AI developers and expand cooperation with allied governments to prevent circumvention of existing restrictions.

Although no formal enforcement action has yet been announced against Moonshot AI, the investigation signals Washington’s determination to closely monitor foreign access to advanced American AI technologies.

What does this dispute mean for U.S.-China AI competition?

The allegations against Moonshot AI illustrate the increasingly strategic nature of artificial intelligence in the broader competition between the United States and China. AI is now widely viewed not only as a commercial technology but also as a key factor influencing economic competitiveness, military capabilities and geopolitical influence.

Both countries are investing heavily in AI research, semiconductor manufacturing and digital infrastructure. The United States continues to lead in frontier AI models, advanced semiconductor design and cloud computing, while China has rapidly expanded domestic AI development through substantial government support and private-sector investment.

As Chinese AI models become more competitive internationally, concerns in Washington about technology transfer, intellectual property protection and export control enforcement have intensified. At the same time, Beijing argues that U.S. restrictions represent efforts to contain China’s technological development rather than protect legitimate security interests.

The dispute could also influence broader diplomatic relations. The allegations emerged shortly before an expected meeting later this year between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, adding another contentious issue to an already complex bilateral agenda that includes trade, semiconductors, tariffs and national security.

Regardless of the outcome of the current investigation, the case demonstrates that artificial intelligence has become one of the central arenas of strategic competition between the world’s two largest economies.

The post What is behind White House’s accusation against China?​ appeared first on azeritimes.com.

The Armenian National Committee of America, or ANCA, has rushed to celebrate what it presents as a major victory on Capitol Hill. On July 22, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 44–7 to adopt Amendment No. 143, introduced by Democratic Representative Brad Sherman of California, to H.R. 9087.

The amendment states that, in the view of Congress, Azerbaijan should “immediately and unconditionally release all Armenian prisoners of war and political prisoners.” It was supported by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast, a Republican from Florida.

In Baku, this wording is bound to provoke serious objections. Azerbaijan does not regard the individuals concerned as prisoners of war or political prisoners. Its position is that they include people prosecuted or convicted for crimes committed during the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, the years of armed conflict and the activities of the former separatist entity in Karabakh.

Source: azernews

Attempts to portray all of them exclusively as victims of political persecution disregard Azerbaijan’s judicial proceedings and its sovereign right to prosecute alleged crimes committed on its internationally recognised territory.

ANCA nevertheless described the committee vote as an important political breakthrough. Its executive director, Aram Hamparian, went considerably further than the actual language of the amendment. He declared that the release of Armenian detainees, the return of Armenian refugees to Karabakh and the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from what ANCA calls Armenian territory should be treated as non-negotiable preconditions for peace.

These additional demands, however, are not contained in the Sherman amendment. They represent ANCA’s political agenda rather than the text approved by the committee.

This distinction matters. The campaign is not merely about the legal status of particular detainees. It is also an attempt to consolidate within the American political establishment a version of the post-conflict reality that is favourable to Armenian advocacy organisations.

That narrative largely excludes the decades-long occupation of Azerbaijani territories, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis, the destruction of towns and villages, the continuing danger posed by landmines and the question of accountability for crimes committed against Azerbaijani civilians.

More importantly, the committee’s decision has been presented in a manner that exaggerates its practical significance.

The Sherman amendment is a “sense of Congress” provision. It expresses the political opinion of the committee but does not, by itself, create a legally enforceable requirement. It does not order the White House to impose sanctions, does not compel the Azerbaijani government to take any action and does not overturn decisions made by Azerbaijani courts.

Even more significantly, H.R. 9087 itself failed to advance.

After considering and adopting numerous amendments, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 23–28 against reporting the amended bill favourably to the House of Representatives. In other words, the underlying legislation to which the Sherman provision had been attached was rejected by the committee.

ANCA itself acknowledged this inconvenient fact in its public statement, conceding that H.R. 9087 had not cleared the committee in its current form. Nevertheless, the organisation sought to portray the adoption of the amendment as a decisive victory because it had placed committee members formally on record on the issue.

The result is therefore best described as a victory “on credit.” The language was approved, but the legislative vehicle carrying it was not. Unless the provision is revived through another bill, added to a future legislative package or reintroduced separately, it will have no direct legislative effect.

ANCA’s enthusiasm is understandable from a public-relations perspective. The organisation has experienced setbacks in Congress and has invested considerable political and organisational resources in keeping the issue of Armenian detainees on the American agenda. A 44–7 committee vote offers material that can be presented to supporters, donors and Armenian-American voters as evidence that lobbying efforts are producing results.

But a successful lobbying headline is not the same thing as an enacted law.

The author of the amendment, Representative Brad Sherman, is one of the most consistent advocates of Armenian causes in Congress. He serves as a vice chair of the Congressional Armenian Caucus and has long supported stronger US-Armenian relations, increased assistance to Armenia and political pressure on Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

His involvement was therefore entirely predictable. ANCA regularly praises Sherman as one of its most dependable allies on Capitol Hill, while Sherman openly identifies Armenian-related issues as an important part of his foreign-policy work.

Such cooperation is not unusual within the American political system. Lobbying is legal, deeply institutionalised and practised by ethnic, commercial, ideological and foreign-policy groups across Washington.

The problem emerges when the preferences of one lobbying network are presented as though they automatically coincide with the national interests of the United States.

Washington’s policy in the South Caucasus cannot be based solely on the demands of one ethnic constituency. The United States must also consider regional stability, energy security, transportation connectivity, relations with Central Asia, the containment of Iranian influence and the future of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process.

From that perspective, a policy built around unilateral pressure on Baku would be strategically questionable. It could undermine relations with a country that occupies an important geographical position and plays a central role in east-west energy and transportation routes.

The amendment also reflects a broader problem in congressional debates concerning Azerbaijan: the selective use of human-rights language.

Those demanding the unconditional release of Armenians held in Baku rarely devote comparable attention to the fate of missing Azerbaijanis, the location of mass graves, the destruction of Azerbaijani cultural and religious sites, the rights of Azerbaijanis expelled from present-day Armenia or the long-term consequences of the occupation.

This selectivity weakens claims that the initiative is based on universal legal or humanitarian principles. Human rights should not be treated as a political instrument that applies only when it serves the interests of a particular lobbying group.

The seven Republican members of the committee who voted against the Sherman amendment were Andy Biggs of Arizona, Tim Burchett of Tennessee, Randy Fine of Florida, Anna Paulina Luna of Florida, Scott Perry of Pennsylvania, Keith Self of Texas and Joe Wilson of South Carolina. Their names are confirmed by the official committee voting record and the House of Representatives member directory.

Their opposition deserves attention not because they necessarily share identical views on Azerbaijan, but because their votes demonstrate that ANCA does not exercise complete control over congressional debate.

Some of these lawmakers have supported efforts to repeal Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, a provision restricting direct US government assistance to Azerbaijan.

Representative Anna Paulina Luna introduced H.R. 6534 in December 2025 to repeal Section 907. The bill was subsequently supported by several Republican co-sponsors, including Randy Fine.

ANCA strongly opposed Luna’s initiative and launched a nationwide campaign urging Armenian Americans to contact lawmakers and resist the repeal of Section 907. The organisation has also publicly criticised individual members of Congress who supported the legislation.

Citizens contacting their elected representatives is a legitimate and routine part of American democracy. Congressional office telephone numbers and email addresses are generally public precisely so that constituents can communicate with lawmakers.

For this reason, describing the publication of official congressional contact information as criminal doxing would be legally questionable unless genuinely private data or threats were involved.

The more relevant issue is political rather than criminal. Organised lobbying campaigns are intended to increase the reputational and electoral cost of opposing a group’s agenda. By mobilising supporters against particular representatives, ANCA seeks to demonstrate that votes against its priorities will provoke a coordinated response.

The July 22 vote shows that such pressure has its limits. Seven lawmakers still voted against the amendment, while the underlying H.R. 9087 ultimately failed to secure committee approval.

The Armenian lobby’s principal miscalculation is its continued reliance on an outdated perception of Azerbaijan. Its strategy often appears to be based on the assumption that Baku can be compelled to abandon its legal and political positions through congressional letters, non-binding resolutions and lobbying campaigns.

That assumption no longer corresponds to regional realities.

Source: APA

Azerbaijan has restored control over its internationally recognised territory and pursues an increasingly independent foreign policy. Baku remains interested in constructive relations with the United States, the European Union and other major international actors, but it has repeatedly made clear that it will not accept relations based on ultimatums.

No resolution adopted by a foreign parliamentary committee can automatically invalidate the decisions of an Azerbaijani court. Questions surrounding the detainees must be addressed through legal procedures, negotiations or sovereign political decisions—not through the assumption that a lobbying organisation in Washington can dictate the outcome.

This does not exempt Azerbaijan from the obligation to ensure transparent judicial proceedings consistent with its laws and international commitments. On the contrary, credible evidence, access to legal representation and procedurally sound trials are the strongest response to politically motivated accusations.

But assessments of individual cases should be based on facts and legal standards, not on the political sympathies of particular members of Congress.

ANCA’s celebration is therefore premature.

The committee adopted a non-binding amendment, but rejected the bill to which it had been attached. The provision does not impose sanctions, does not create a mandatory course of action for the US administration and does not compel Azerbaijan to release anyone.

What happened on Capitol Hill was a political signal—not a legislative breakthrough.

Armenian advocacy organisations may continue spending money and political capital on lobbying, media campaigns and pressure on lawmakers. Yet such activities cannot reverse the new balance of power in the South Caucasus or place the preferences of an ethnic lobbying network above Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.

Azerbaijan has repeatedly expressed its readiness for peace. But a durable settlement cannot be built by rewriting the history of the conflict, ignoring crimes committed against Azerbaijanis or demanding that decisions made in Washington take precedence over Azerbaijani law.

For now, ANCA has little reason to declare victory. The 44–7 vote was merely one episode in a much broader lobbying campaign—and its practical impact is far more limited than the celebratory headlines suggest.

The post ANCA’s “victory on credit”: Why the congressional vote changes little​ appeared first on azeritimes.com.