Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran’s claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.
Iran sees this control as its primary means of imposing costs on the United States and compelling Washington to accept Iranian demands. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary for International Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani described the strait on July 21 as Iran’s “decisive leverage,” and argued that Iran must translate its military strength into political gains. Iran has repeatedly threatened and attacked vessels using the southern route to enforce this objective.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) reported on July 20 that unknown projectiles struck two vessels near Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which damaged one vessel’s steering gear and forced the crew of the second vessel to abandon ship. Kuwait identified the second vessel as the Kuwaiti tanker Kaifan and reported that the likely Iranian attack injured several crew members. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) separately claimed on July 20 that it attacked two tankers on July 20 because they attempted to use the southern Omani route.Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)MORE: The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21. The Houthis also emailed shipping companies on July 20 and warned them against loading or discharging cargo in Saudi ports on the Red Sea.
These threats and warnings have resulted in at least two vessels turning around in the Red Sea to avoid crossing the Bab al Mandeb and a third turning around rather than continuing its transit to a Saudi port. The Houthis have not yet attacked shipping, however. These efforts will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping goods through the Red Sea while also imposing high economic costs on Saudi Arabia specifically. The increase in costs globally and the economic impact on Saudi Arabia specifically supports both Iranian and Houthi objectives. The Houthis seek to discourage Saudi action against them, while the Iranians seek to extend the maritime shipping crisis and increase oil prices caused by Tehran’s efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian and Houthi interests align in this case, but the Houthis are not enforcing the blockade for Iran. Their actions benefit Iran while directly serving Houthi objectives against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis’ enforcement of the blockade, regardless of how it affects Houthi objectives in Yemen, supports Iranian efforts to degrade US willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iran’s demand to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Disruption in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb increases pressure on the United States and global markets more than disruption in either waterway alone. This pressure could help Iran force the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, assuming Iran is able to secure Saudi assurances that Riyadh will not strike Houthi assets and end the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia.— https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2079744487673270716
