Day: March 25, 2026

The post Azerbaijan boosts gas exports to Türkiye by nearly 30% early this year first appeared on The South Caucasus News – SouthCaucasusNews.com.

Analysis of Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports

In recent years, pro-government websites have frequently published formulaic news reports along the lines of: “In the first X months of this year, exports reached $Y million, an increase of Z%.” These figures are typically sourced from the State Customs Committee or the State Statistics Committee, and the language often repeats familiar terms such as “non-oil exports”, “diversification”, and “reforms.”

The positive aspect of such reporting is that the figures themselves are not fabricated; they are based on official statistics. For example, in 2025, exports of fruit and vegetables amounted to approximately $901 million, showing growth both in value and in volume compared to the previous year.

However, numbers alone do not tell a success story. When these figures are not accompanied by basic questions — “how much is that?”, “why did it grow?”, “who benefits?”, and “will it last?” — they can create the impression that “everything is going well”, while the real picture remains unclear.

This article explains, in simple terms, how to read such data-driven reports. What do these indicators actually mean? Why are they so widely promoted? What is left unsaid? And what could this mean for ordinary people?

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What do these figures actually mean?

The most basic question is: is “$901 million” a large amount? It may sound impressive, but on its own it says very little. Without comparing it to the country’s total exports, the figure lacks context.

According to customs data for 2025, Azerbaijan’s total exports amounted to around $25.0 billion. The same data show that 85.51% of exports came from the oil and gas sector. In other words, roughly $21.4 billion of that total was generated by hydrocarbons. Non-oil exports accounted for about $3.63 billion, or 14.49% of the total.

Seen in this context, fruit and vegetable exports — worth $901.5 million — made up just 3.60% of overall exports. However, within the non-oil segment, their share was much higher, at 24.85%.

It is also important to distinguish between value (in monetary terms) and volume (physical quantities, measured in tonnes). If both the value and the volume of fruit and vegetable exports are increasing, this may point to genuine growth in production and sales.

For example, such reports often highlight year-on-year growth compared to 2024: +27.3% in value and +23.2% in volume. While part of the increase in value may be explained by rising prices, the growth in volume suggests that the trend is not driven by prices alone.

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There are also reverse examples. In some cases, the headlines point to “growth”, but the underlying dynamics tell a different story.

For instance, last year’s hazelnut exports show this clearly. In 2025, Azerbaijan exported 18,972.7 tonnes of hazelnuts worth $170.7 million. According to calculations by Report.az, this represents a 32% increase in value but a 6% decline in volume compared to the previous year.

What this means in practice is simple: fewer tonnes were sold, but at a higher price. In other words, the reported “significant growth” reflects price increases rather than an expansion in production.

The same logic applies to construction materials. According to the State Statistics Committee’s report on socio-economic development for January–February 2025, production of cement clinker reached 612,900 tonnes, or 111.2% year-on-year (an increase of 11.2%).

This figure may point to increased construction activity, but it does not, on its own, prove that “the construction sector is booming”. At times, growth is driven by state-funded projects; in others, inventories may be building up — something the report itself also tracks through separate data on unsold stock.

The simplified table below helps to put the overall picture of 2025 into perspective:

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Why are these stories repeated so often?

The widespread circulation of such reports can be explained by three main factors.

First, they are a “ready-made product”.
State bodies regularly publish statistical data, and media outlets turn it into news with minimal processing. For example, a report on fruit and vegetable exports is often published almost verbatim, citing the State Customs Committee as its source.

Second, the figures align with the government’s official economic narrative.
In 2016, a presidential decree approved the “strategic road maps for the national economy and key sectors”. These documents place particular emphasis on “non-oil” areas such as agriculture, logistics and trade, tourism, and industry.

The language of these strategies — long-term development, competitiveness, and new sectors — is typically distilled in media coverage into a single, familiar concept: “diversification”.

Third, such stories are visually and psychologically compelling.
Percentage growth is a powerful signal. When a headline features “+27%”, it is easily read as “the economy is growing”. What is often missing, however, is discussion of the base effect (what was last year’s figure?), as well as risks, costs, subsidies, and potential environmental or social consequences.

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Questions behind the numbers

When reading such reports, it would be wrong to say that “the figures are false”. But what lies behind these numbers — and what do they leave out?

One of the key issues is state support and subsidies.

In Azerbaijan, agriculture operates within a structured subsidy system. The Agrarian Subsidies Council sets coefficients for crops, yields, and seeds depending on the type of produce and the region, and determines base payments and subsidy rates per hectare.

In addition, there are mechanisms for concessional lending and leasing. Funds from the Agrarian Credit and Development Agency are reportedly used to finance agricultural projects and provide preferential access to inputs — such as machinery, irrigation systems, and breeding livestock — which are then distributed to businesses through authorised credit institutions.

What does this mean in practice?

First, part of the reported growth is driven by state funding, incentives, and organisational support.

Second, when a report states that “exports have increased”, it is worth asking what share of that growth was made possible by subsidies and preferential schemes. This question, as a rule, is left unanswered.

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Import dependence and market risks

Another issue that receives relatively little attention is dependence on imports. For example, local media reports citing an audit by the Chamber of Accounts on the efficiency of the seed sector highlight a “persistently high dependence on imported seeds” — particularly in areas such as vegetables, melons, potatoes, horticulture, and cotton.

This has clear implications. When a report states that “tomato exports have increased”, it is equally important to ask: what share of the seeds, fertilisers, plant protection products, and packaging used for those tomatoes is imported? And how do farmers’ incomes and product prices change as these input costs rise?

Market risks are especially significant in the fruit and vegetable sector. Government documents explicitly identify Russia as the main market for agricultural exports. The same documents note that up to 90% of primary agricultural products are exported to former Soviet countries, primarily Russia.

According to the breakdown of non-oil exports by country for 2025, published by the State Customs Committee, Russia ranks first with a share of 32.37%.

This points to a high concentration of risk: changes in regulations or demand in a single market can affect the entire system.

Information from the Food Safety Agency also makes clear that products failing to meet Russian standards cannot be exported there.

Processing and value added

Another aspect that often remains outside the spotlight is processing and value added. A strategic agricultural document covering the period 2001–2015 states that 44% of exported agricultural and food products are primary goods, while 56% come from the processing industry.

However, a closer look at current reporting on “fruit and vegetable exports” tells a different story. According to customs data for 2025, fresh vegetables and fruits account for 24.85% of non-oil exports, while processed fruit and vegetable products make up just 1.04%.

In practical terms, this suggests that:

The country predominantly exports raw or fresh produce, while processing remains far less developed.

With limited processing, there are fewer high-paying jobs, less technological development, and lower long-term value creation.

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What does this mean for an ordinary citizen?

First of all, sectors such as agriculture and construction materials can create jobs. However, the key questions concern the quality of that employment — whether it is seasonal or permanent, the level of wages, and how evenly jobs are distributed across regions.

Statistical growth figures do not address these issues.

Second, rising exports can reduce supply on the domestic market and push prices up.

Conversely, oversupply can lead to falling prices.

To understand which scenario is unfolding, data on domestic prices, logistics costs, and intermediary margins are needed. A simple statement that “exports have increased” does not provide a clear answer about future price trends.

Third, heavy reliance on a single market — such as Russia — creates significant risk.

If regulations tighten, if restrictions are introduced due to plant diseases, or if political or trade tensions arise, exports can fall sharply. In such cases, both farmers’ incomes and regional economic activity are likely to suffer.

When reading such reports, it is worth asking a few basic questions:

• Is the percentage growth driven by higher volumes or by rising prices?
• Can this sector function without state subsidies and concessional financing?
• Are export markets diversified, or is there dependence on a single country?
• Is the share of processed goods increasing, or does raw and fresh produce still dominate?

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Analysis of Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports

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