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Day: December 31, 2025
MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals.
– The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
– The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations — conditions that will not last indefinitely.
– Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own battlefield air interdiction campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia. Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)MORE: ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers in Ukraine and regained roughly 473 square kilometers that Ukrainian forces had taken in Kursk Oblast in 2025. Russian gains in Ukraine amounted to 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Russian forces had seized 3,604 square kilometers in Ukraine in 2024.
Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces suffered 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for an average of 78 casualties per square kilometer seized in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast.
The average daily Russian rate of advance in 2025 was 13.24 square kilometers per day — higher than the daily average of 9.87 square kilometers per day in 2024. The Russian rate of advance has not been consistent throughout 2025, however. The Russian rate of advance was highest in November at 20.99 square kilometers per day, but this high came after one of the slowest months in 2025 — 8.8 square kilometers per day in October — and subsequently slowed to 15 square kilometers per day in December.— https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2006557238333182222
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) Jan 1, 2026
The post MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. – The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. – The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operati first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
The post MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. – The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. – The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operati first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. – The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. – The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operati first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929.
— SPIES&VESPERS (@SpiesVespers) Jan 1, 2026
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this!
— SPIES&VESPERS (@SpiesVespers) Jan 1, 2026
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals.
– The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
– The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations — conditions that will not last indefinitely.
– Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own battlefield air interdiction campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia. Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)MORE: ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers in Ukraine and regained roughly 473 square kilometers that Ukrainian forces had taken in Kursk Oblast in 2025. Russian gains in Ukraine amounted to 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Russian forces had seized 3,604 square kilometers in Ukraine in 2024.
Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces suffered 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for an average of 78 casualties per square kilometer seized in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast.
The average daily Russian rate of advance in 2025 was 13.24 square kilometers per day — higher than the daily average of 9.87 square kilometers per day in 2024. The Russian rate of advance has not been consistent throughout 2025, however. The Russian rate of advance was highest in November at 20.99 square kilometers per day, but this high came after one of the slowest months in 2025 — 8.8 square kilometers per day in October — and subsequently slowed to 15 square kilometers per day in December.— https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2006557238333182222
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) Jan 1, 2026
The post MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. – The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. – The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operati first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
The post MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. – The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. – The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operati first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929.
— SPIES&VESPERS (@SpiesVespers) Jan 1, 2026
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post Telegram from Dorothy Parker to Robert Benchley. Dec. 31, 1929. first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this!
— SPIES&VESPERS (@SpiesVespers) Jan 1, 2026
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
The post 2026 — Go into it Waffle House strong! My friends, you got this! first appeared on The World Web Times – worldwebtimes.com.
MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals.
– The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
– The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations — conditions that will not last indefinitely.
– Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own battlefield air interdiction campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia. Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)MORE: ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers in Ukraine and regained roughly 473 square kilometers that Ukrainian forces had taken in Kursk Oblast in 2025. Russian gains in Ukraine amounted to 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Russian forces had seized 3,604 square kilometers in Ukraine in 2024.
Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces suffered 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for an average of 78 casualties per square kilometer seized in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast.
The average daily Russian rate of advance in 2025 was 13.24 square kilometers per day — higher than the daily average of 9.87 square kilometers per day in 2024. The Russian rate of advance has not been consistent throughout 2025, however. The Russian rate of advance was highest in November at 20.99 square kilometers per day, but this high came after one of the slowest months in 2025 — 8.8 square kilometers per day in October — and subsequently slowed to 15 square kilometers per day in December.— https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2006557238333182222
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) Jan 1, 2026
The post MORE: The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. – The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. – The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operati first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
