August 18, 2025 - The World Web Times - worldwebtimes.com

The Timeline below examines decades-long failures by federal law enforcement and oversight agencies—including the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the Department of the Treasury—in the handling of Jeffrey Epstein’s crimes: child sexual abuse and the sex trafficking of minors, as well as the sexual abuse of young adult women. These failures span Democratic and Republican administrations, and transcend party. They have taken place in the context of extreme wealth and influence which, together with gendered power dynamics and socioeconomic vulnerability, have shaped government inaction. Public officials—through neglect, minimization, or deliberate manipulation—blunted scrutiny, weakened victim protections, and enabled continued exploitation and abuse. While much of this “tale of national disgrace,” as the Eleventh Circuit en banc court put it, centers on powerful men, Ghislaine Maxwell’s role shows that direct complicity also crossed gender lines.

Accounts of the survivors of these crimes were frequently discounted or disbelieved, and their fundamental interests were often sidelined. But their actions and perseverance finally brought some justice.

This timeline focuses on public records, especially court filings and government documents. The aim is light, not heat—clear facts over indignation—to show, with as much precision as possible, how systems entrusted with protection failed children and young women, and what those failures reveal about power, class, gender, and justice.

Here’s what’s known from the public record.

Table of Contents

1. Maria Farmer reported Epstein’s abuse to the FBI twice on or around late August 1996, but the Bureau did not open an investigation until May 23, 2006—almost a decade later

2. Virginia Giuffre said Epstein/Maxwell effectively said, “We own the police”

3. May 2006: FBI opens an investigation into Jeffrey Epstein (“Operation Leap Year”)

4. DOJ/FBI mischaracterization and victim-blaming: Treating children as ‘prostitutes’ and failing to understand child sexual abuse

5. In 2007, the US Attorney for the Southern District of Florida stops the investigation of Epstein before its completion

6. 2005–2007: Federal failures to identify and investigate Ghislaine Maxwell

7. The terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA): Prelude to the “deal of a lifetime”

8. NPA negotiated in secret—then buried: prosecutors hid NPA talks from victims

9. Prosecutors misled victims about the investigation’s status—assuring them that the Epstein case was “currently under investigation” despite agreeing to the NPA

10. Prosecutors sought to hide the Florida state court plea hearing from the victims

11. Kept off the judge’s radar: NPA terms and timing withheld from the Florida state court

12. Before litigation, prosecutors represented to victims and defense that CVRA protections would ensure victim communications; after litigation started, they reversed that stance

13. The plea agreement: the “deal of a lifetime”

14. Epstein flew domestically, internationally, and to the Virgin Islands despite being a registered sexual offender

15. Failure to further investigate Epstein/Maxwell before November 2018 despite revelations in several court cases

16. Failure to further investigate/indict Epstein post-2007 NPA and before 2018-19, despite tips to the FBI and Treasury Department, including from JPMorgan

17. Federal law enforcement failed to investigate after 2007; trafficking persisted through at least 2017, and evidence seized in July 2019 indicates continued criminal conduct including child sexual abuse material (CSAM)

18. Deficiencies in the 2020 OPR report

19. Blocking DOJ Inspector General from investigating failures

20. Executive Branch handling of the Epstein file and Maxwell imprisonment in 2025

21. Congressional handling of the Epstein file and Maxwell imprisonment in 2025

1. Maria Farmer reported Epstein’s abuse to the FBI twice on or around late August 1996, but the Bureau did not open an investigation until May 23, 2006—almost a decade later

After contacting the NYPD’s Sixth Precinct on Aug. 29, Maria Farmer was advised to reach out to the FBI; NYPD provided her with the FBI’s phone number. She contacted the FBI twice, and on at least one occasion the FBI agent allegedly hung up on her. Neither call was followed up.

(a) Farmer v. United States, 1:25-cv-01709, (D.D.C.) Complaint (May 29, 2025)

“On August 29, 1996, she reported Epstein and Maxwell to law enforcement. … The NYPD explained that they could only address the local fire threats [made by Epstein] and that she needed to report her additional allegations to the FBI. They gave her the FBI’s telephone contact information[.] … Following the NYPD’s instructions … Maria promptly contacted the FBI, making at least two calls to two different offices. … Without notice or explanation, while Maria was in mid-sentence, the FBI abruptly hung up on her. … The FBI made no effort to meet with Maria or otherwise follow up.” ¶¶ 112–22 (emphasis added).

(b) NYPD Police Report Complaint #1996-0067241 (08/29/96) (Exhibit 1)

(d) FBI’s Nov. 14, 2006 interview notes record Farmer’s statement that, in 1996, NYPD’s Sixth Precinct told her to contact the FBI (p. 35).

According to Maria Farmer’s attorney and her civil complaint, FBI agents arrived unannounced at her North Carolina home on November 11, 2006, stated they were aware of her 1996 FBI complaint about Epstein, and told her they had tracked her down because of that earlier report.

(a) Maria Farmer Complaint (May 2025), ¶¶ 176-77

(b) Maria Farmer attorney Jennifer Freeman letter to FBI Director Wray, DOJ IG Horowitz, and AG Garland calling for a full investigation into the FBI’s handling of the Epstein case (May 2, 2023), pp. 5-6.

2. Virginia Giuffre said Epstein/Maxwell effectively said, “We own the police”

“Jeffrey and Ghislaine’s way of keeping us under his thumb, under his rule, under their control, were invisible chains. And it was that constant: ‘We own the police. You can’t run. You can’t tell anybody. We’ll never be held accountable for this.’” (NBC News video interview (2019) part 2, at 05:14 – 05:36)

3. May 2006: FBI opens an investigation into Jeffrey Epstein (“Operation Leap Year”)

May 23, 2006 — Federal investigation formally opened. Following initial discussions between FBI and AUSA Ann Marie Villafaña in early 2006, and a May meeting with the lead Palm Beach PD detective, Villafaña prepared the paperwork to open a USAO case file. The investigation, codenamed “Operation Leap Year,” was formally initiated that day with supervisory approval.

Source: Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigation into the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida’s Resolution of Its 2006–2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation, November 2020, pp. 16-18.

4. DOJ/FBI mischaracterization and victim-blaming: Treating children as ‘prostitutes’ and failing to understand child sexual abuse

(a) Maria Farmer Complaint (May 2025), ¶ 12:

“In addition, in violation of various federal laws, federal law enforcement denigrated victims, calling them ‘child prostitutes,’ and failed to provide notices of criminal processes or offer them victim services or protection.”

(b) In re Courtney Wild, No. 19-13843 (11th Cir. argued Dec. 3, 2020) (oral argument, at 35:38 – 35:47).

During the Eleventh Circuit oral argument on Dec. 3, 2020, a judge asked whether the government had affirmatively acknowledged that Courtney Wild was not a prostitute and invited Assistant U.S. Attorney Jill Steinberg to apologize for any contrary suggestion in the non-prosecution agreement. Steinberg agreed that “she’s not [a] prostitute” and that “minors cannot consent to sex,” noting “that’s the department policy” and “that’s the law,” but she did not offer the apology the judge requested.

“Lawyers representing the victims said that federal prosecutors didn’t seem to understand how to build a sensitive case involving someone who had power and money. ‘The prosecutors didn’t need two dozen girls to testify; all they needed was one or two,’ said lawyer Spencer Kuvin.

Kuvin said the FBI only interviewed one of his clients, and there were two other victims who would have helped their case.

‘What these girls were really looking for was for the criminal justice system to do what it was supposed to do,’ Kuvin said. ‘Every one of my clients wanted Epstein to go to jail.’ Some of the victims were even intimidated by the FBI agents and prosecutors, who at times seemed to treat the girls as if they had done something wrong. Prosecutors did little to help ease victims’ anxieties, pointing out that testifying against Epstein would be difficult on them and their families, who would likely be pulled into the spotlight in the event of such a high-profile prosecution. Ultimately, most of the victims were never formally interviewed by the FBI or federal prosecutors. And some of those who were interviewed were too uncomfortable to share all the details of Epstein’s abuse.

‘We knew the whole story had not been told,’ said Adam Horowitz, another one of the civil attorneys representing victims. ‘We knew there were many more victims and girls who had not yet contacted a lawyer.’

‘It was clear that prosecutors were uninformed about how to deal with victims of sex crimes,’ said Marci Hamilton, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania and an expert on crimes against children. ‘They clearly had no awareness about sex trafficking, how it starts and how it flourishes. Epstein was not engaging in individual sex abuse; he was creating an entire system.’ The FBI agents tailored their questions so narrowly that it seemed as if they didn’t want to know how deep the crimes were, and who was involved.

‘The FBI agents told them, “We just want the facts. We don’t want hearsay and opinions,” Kuvin said.

Jessica Arbour, a young lawyer who was hired by victims’ lawyer Jeffrey Herman to help with the case, said she spent most of her time fielding calls from the victims at all hours of the day and night. At the time, she was around the same age as the victims, and tried to act as a bridge between them and the legal system.

The girls were very distrustful of the FBI, she said, because they showed up without any warning, knocking on their doors and questioning them in front of their parents and spouses. In some cases, the girls couldn’t even tell whether the agents were working for the government or whether they had been sent by Epstein.”

(d) Julie K. Brown, Perversion of Justice: The Jeffrey Epstein Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2021), p. 38:

“I found that the prosecutors in the case didn’t seem to understand the psychology behind childhood sexual abuse. Because some of the girls had returned and others had even fallen in love with Epstein, the state and federal prosecutors, for the most part, had dismissed them as willing partners, or even prostitutes.

What society wants is a victim who is a sweet, adorable, innocent angel that God sent from heaven—and an offender who is this evil horrible sexual predator, a “dirty old man in a wrinkled raincoat,” that’s what we prefer, but that’s not reality,’ [Kenneth] Lanning [a former FBI agent with two decades in the Behavioral Science Unit specializing in child sexual abuse] said. The Epstein case, he explained, was complicated by the fact that the girls, the victims, didn’t fit into the comfortable mold that the criminal justice system prefers. ‘The prosecutors who were looking at the case were saying “that’s not what she said, she changed her story” and the children, they look like adults. But they are mentally and emotionally immature, so it is normal for them to give differing accounts of the trauma they experienced. In fact, it would have been abnormal for them to tell the same story with the same exact details every single time. The child’s brain doesn’t work that way unless they are coached.”

(e) “Everyone Heard About Jeffrey Epstein’s Enablers. Few Listened to His Victims”, Fresh Air, NPR radio broadcast (July 20, 2021) (interview with Julie K. Brown).

Julie K. Brown: “You know, a number of the victims told me that. They said that they – when I was questioned not by the Palm Beach police – they weren’t in this category – but by prosecutors and the FBI agents, they said that – they said, look, I almost felt like I had done something wrong. And they were very scared because … the FBI was making them feel like they perhaps had broken the law. … And at the time that this case happened … there was still law on the books in Florida … that child prostitution was illegal … not on the part of … the pimps but the girls that were involved and the boys … What they were doing was illegal. So part of the thing that the prosecutors used to excuse the fact that they weren’t going after the case was they would tell the girls, look. You understand that what you did was illegal. And in a way, they sabotaged their own case because they made the victims feel like they could get in trouble. They didn’t want to cooperate as much as they would”

(f) Julie K. Brown, “How a Future Trump Cabinet Member Gave a Serial Sex Abuser the Deal of a Lifetime”, Miami Herald (Nov. 28, 2018).

“Despite substantial physical evidence and multiple witnesses backing up the girls’ stories, the secret deal allowed Epstein to enter guilty pleas to two felony prostitution charges. Epstein admitted to committing only one offense against one underage girl, who was labeled a prostitute, even though she was 14, which is well under the age of consent — 18 in Florida.

‘She was taken advantage of twice — first by Epstein, and then by the criminal justice system that labeled a 14-year-old girl as a prostitute,’’ said Spencer Kuvin, the lawyer who represented the girl.

‘It’s just outrageous how they minimized his crimes and devalued his victims by calling them prostitutes,’ said Yasmin Vafa, a human rights attorney and executive director of Rights4Girls, which is working to end the sexual exploitation of girls and young women.

‘There is no such thing as a child prostitute. Under federal law, it’s called child sex trafficking — whether Epstein pimped them out to others or not. It’s still a commercial sex act — and he could have been jailed for the rest of his life under federal law,’ she said.”

(g) Barry Levine, The Spider: Inside the Criminal Web of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell (Crown: 2020), p. 163:

“The FBI’s behavior was not above reproach either. One victim, Dainya Nida, was introduced to Epstein in June 2003 when she was a sixteen-year-old student at John I. Leonard High School, ten miles from Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion. Nida would later comment that neither FBI agents nor federal prosecutors seemed interested in her plight. The agents would come to where she was working to question her, making it appear as if she was the one who had done something wrong.” (citing Jane Musgrave, “Jeffrey Epstein Victim Goes Public: I Want to Know Why,” Palm Beach Post, January 31, 2020)

5. In 2007, the US Attorney for the Southern District of Florida stops the investigation of Epstein before its completion

(a) Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 2020 report faulted the US Attorney Alex Acosta for having “resolved the federal investigation before significant investigative steps were completed.” p. x, 284.

“The federal government was uniquely positioned to fully investigate the conduct of an individual who engaged in repeated criminal conduct in Florida but who also traveled extensively and had residences outside of Florida. Even if the Petite policy had applied, OPR has little doubt that the USAO could have obtained authorization from the Department to proceed with a prosecution under the circumstances of this case.” p. 171

“OPR concludes that Acosta’s decision to resolve the federal investigation through the NPA constitutes poor judgment. … [T[he NPA was a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest that caused the government to open its investigation of Epstein. … he resolved the federal investigation before significant investigative steps were completed.” pp. x, 284 (emphasis added).

(b) The OPR report states that the failure to complete the investigation meant investigators “did not know the full scope of Epstein’s conduct … or whether the additional victims might implicate other offenders”:

“Yet, Acosta made the decision to resolve the case through a state-based resolution and extended that proposal to Epstein’s defense attorneys before the investigation was completed. As the investigation progressed, the FBI continued to locate additional victims, and many had not been interviewed by the FBI by the time of the initial offer. In other words, at the time of Acosta’s decision, the USAO did not know the full scope of Epstein’s conduct; whether, given Epstein’s other domestic and foreign residences, his criminal conduct had occurred in other locations; or whether the additional victims might implicate other offenders. In addition, Villafaña planned to approach the female assistants to attempt to obtain cooperation, but that step had not been taken.” p. 175 (emphasis added).

“Although the FBI interviewed numerous employees of Epstein and Villafaña identified three of his female assistants as potential co-conspirators, at the time that the USAO extended the terms of its offer, there had been no significant effort to obtain these individuals’ cooperation against Epstein.” (p. 175 n.252)

(c) The OPR report (pp. 175-79) includes a detailed analysis of the DOJ’s responsibility in failing to obtain Epstein’s computers and hard drives before stopping the investigation and entering the non-prosection agreement.

“There was good reason to believe the computers contained relevant — and potentially critical — information; and it was clear Epstein did not want the contents of his computers disclosed. Nothing in the available record reveals that the USAO benefitted from abandoning pursuit of this evidence when they did, or that there was any significant consideration of the costs and benefits of forgoing the litigation to obtain production of the computers. Instead, the USAO agreed to postpone and ultimately to abandon its efforts to obtain evidence that could have significantly changed Acosta’s decision to resolve the federal investigation with a state guilty plea or led to additional significant federal charges. By agreeing to postpone the litigation, the USAO gave away leverage that might have caused the defense to come to an agreement much earlier and on terms more favorable to the government. The USAO ultimately agreed to a term in the NPA that permanently ended the government’s ability to obtain possible evidence of significant crimes and did so with apparently little serious consideration of the potential cost.” p. 178 (emphasis added).

6. 2005–2007: Federal failures to identify and investigate Ghislaine Maxwell

By 1996—and certainly by 2006—law enforcement had notice of Ghislaine Maxwell’s connection to Epstein and her potential involvement in exploitation and abuse. The FBI was told directly about Maxwell’s role in 1996 and again in 2006; and Palm Beach authorities (PBPD/State Attorney) documented her central involvement in their 2005 files, including contemporaneous interviews.

(a) Maria Farmer Complaint (May 2025), ¶¶ 112-19, 180, 185.

In 1996, Maria Farmer reported to NYPD (Complaint #1996-0067241) and then the FBI that both Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell had sexually abused her and others. She described an ongoing child-exploitation scheme (including explicit images kept in a safe), putting law enforcement on clear notice of Maxwell’s role. In 2006, during an FBI home visit in North Carolina, she again identified Maxwell’s direct role—stating (at ¶ 180) that “Maxwell would frequently ‘go get girls’ for Epstein’s sexual desires.”

(b) Sworn Statement of Juan P. Alessi (Epstein’s house manager of Palm Beach mansion), Nov. 21, 2005 (Palm Beach Police Department)

Alessi referenced Maxwell several times including saying she was always with Epstein. He confirmed that Maxwell was Epstein’s “girlfriend” and that during his 11 years as house manager it was Maxwell that he would communicate with regarding Epstein and Maxwell visiting the Palm Beach mansion and making any arrangements (p. 6). He stated that “most of the time it was Ms. Maxwell that traveled with him all the time” (p. 8). Alessi described her as Epstein’s “boss, girlfriend” and said she was the house staff’s “immediate superior” (pp. 8–9). He observed Ms. Maxwell going upstairs in the direction of the bedroom quarters (pp. 10–11). He further explained that the “standard” procedure when cleaning up sex toys often left on Epstein’s sink was to store them “in a basket inside Ms. Maxwell’s closet” (pp. 12–13).

(c) Det. Joseph Recarey’s 2006 PBPD notes tie Maxwell directly to recruitment/coordination through interviews with women who provided massages and/or reported sexual abuse:

One of the victims, Johanna Sjoberg said “Ghislaine Maxwell…approached her…[saying] they needed some girls to work at the house,” and that she “would be notified by Maxwell” when Epstein came to Palm Beach.

Another victim, Christina Venero said she met “Ghislaine Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein” through a friend; she “only provided massages and that was it” and “never was approached for anything else;” while she massaged Epstein’s “guests and assistants,” it is unclear whether Maxwell received a massage, though “Maxwell and Epstein have commented negatively about her tattoos previously when she has provided massages”—which suggests Maxwell was at least present in the room during some of those massage sessions.

(d) PBPD and Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office (SAO) files (here, pp. 60, 66-70; here, pp. 93-95) includes Colonial Bank/“DDA Statement” bank records naming “JEFFREY E EPSTEIN OR GHISLAINE MAXWELL” and a “GHISLAINE MAXWELL OR ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ — HOUSEHOLD ACCOUNT,” showing late-2004/early-2005 activity: $10,000 incoming wires and repeated teller-cashed checks ($1,000–$5,000) annotated “Petty Cash” and “To J.E.” These records place Maxwell as a co-holder on a household account used for cash withdrawals and payments tied to Epstein—documentary evidence PBPD/SAO had by early 2005.

(e) OPR Report: DOJ acknowledged Maxwell but excluded her as a co-conspirator

“Villafaña acknowledged that investigators were aware of Epstein’s longtime relationship with a close female friend who was a well-known socialite, but, according to Villafaña, in 2007, they ‘didn’t have any specific evidence against her.’ Accordingly, Villafaña believed that the only ‘co-conspirators’ of Epstein who would benefit from the provision were the four female assistants identified by name.” p. 167.

“The FBI had interviewed one victim who implicated the female friend in Epstein’s conduct, but the conduct involving the then minor did not occur in Florida.” p. 167 n.239.

The FBI failed to question victims about Ghislaine Maxwell in 2007, and DOJ now admits it was not aware of her involvement at the time of the NPA.

(a) The Department of Justice has stated that “the government was not even aware of [Maxwell’s] role in Epstein’s scheme at that time” of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The Government made this statement most recently in the U.S. Solicitor General’s written submission to the U.S. Supreme Court on July 14, 2025:

“But there is no evidence that the parties to the NPA intended for the coconspirators clause to benefit petitioner. […] The government was not even aware of petitioner’s role in Epstein’s scheme at that time.” p. 15.

(b) Carolyn Andriano, one of the victims, testified that in her 2007 FBI interview, she was never asked about Maxwell (pp. 1553-54; pp. 127-8 of Exhibit):

“Q. In 2007, were you interviewed by the FBI about Jeffrey Epstein?
A. Yes.
Q. During that interview, did you tell the FBI that you noticed an older lady with short black hair and an accent at Epstein’s residence the first time you went there with
Virginia?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was that?
A. Maxwell.
Q. During your interview with the FBI in 2007, did you mention the other details of your interactions with Maxwell?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I wasn’t asked about Maxwell.”

As early as 2000, major outlets publicly flagged Epstein’s close relationship with Ghislaine Maxwell—some of which featured in the Palm Beach investigators’ case files. These accounts flagged a close Epstein-Maxwell partnership and social circles of very young women, and hinted at her facilitation role years before the 2005–2007 investigations.

(a) New York Post (Page Six) (December 2000) reported that Epstein “likes the company of attractive young women” and that Maxwell was “on some kind of retainer,” adding she’d been “very good about introducing him to some of her pals.” (See PBPD/PB County State Attorney’s 2005 file clipping, p. 49).

(b) The Evening Standard (January 2001) detailed Maxwell’s and Prince Andrew’s close relationship and her role as his “fixer” including introducing him to Epstein and the three of them taking five breaks together over the past 12 months.

(c) New York Magazine (October 2002) reported that Epstein had “for more than ten years…been linked to…Ghislaine Maxwell,” noting gossip-column speculation about “the true nature of his relationship” with her and quoting a society journalist who called them “soul mates” who “serve each other’s purposes.” (See PBPD/PB County State Attorney’s 2005 file clipping, p. 49).

(d) Vanity Fair (March 2003) portrayed Maxwell as Epstein’s “most public companion of the last decade” and “best friend,” describing her summoning young women to Epstein’s townhouse and hosting parties (incl. one with Prince Andrew) filled with young Russian models—scenes some guests found “horrified.” (See PBPD/PB County State Attorney’s 2005 file clipping, p. 31).

7. The terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA): Prelude to the “deal of a lifetime”

(a) The NPA included the following elements highly favorable to Epstein:

Government to give Epstein’s attorney a victim list after sentencing (Term 7, p. 4)

“The United States shall provide Epstein’s attorneys with a list of individuals whom it has identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement and been sentenced.”

Keep the NPA out of public record; FOIA notice to Epstein (Term 13, p. 5)

“The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making that disclosure.”

Epstein to approve and pay for attorney for victims (Term 7, p. 4; Term 7C, Addendum to Term 7)

“Upon the execution of this agreement, the United States, in consultation with and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein’s counsel, shall select an attorney representative for these persons [the victims], who shall be paid for by Epstein. Epstein’s counsel may contact the identified individuals [the victims] through that representative.”

“Epstein has agreed to pay the fees of the attorney representative[.] … This provision … shall not obligate Epstein to pay the fees and costs of contested litigation … if … an attorney representative elects to file a contested lawsuit … the … obligation … to pay the costs of the attorney representative, as opposed to any statutory or other obligations to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs such as those contained in § 2255, shall cease.”

Victims must proceed exclusively under § 2255 (Civil remedy for personal injuries; waiving other damages) to trigger Epstein’s capped no-contest on jurisdiction, liability, and damages; non-admission preserved (Term 8, p. 4)

“If any of the individuals [the victims] referred to in paragraph (7) … elects to file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civil remedy for personal injuries), Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida… and waives his right to contest liability and also waives his right to contest damages up to an amount as agreed … so long as the identified individual elects to proceed exclusively under § 2255, and agrees to waive any other claim for damages … Notwithstanding this waiver … [these] waivers … are not to be construed as an admission of any criminal or civil liability.”

Co-conspirator immunity (named and unnamed individuals) (post-terms paragraph, p. 5)

“[I]f Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova.”

Suspend the federal grand-jury investigation; hold subpoenas in abeyance (post-terms paragraph, p. 5)

“[U]pon execution of this agreement and a plea agreement with the State Attorney’s Office, the federal Grand Jury investigation will be suspended, and all pending federal Grand Jury subpoenas will be held in abeyance unless and until the defendant violates any term of this agreement. … Upon the successful completion of the terms of this agreement, all outstanding grand jury subpoenas shall be deemed withdrawn.”

(b) The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals en banc decision, addressing the NPA’s victim-handling provisions described these terms as:

“An odd set-up—and one that, it seems to us, was likely calculated to quickly and quietly resolve as many victim suits as possible.” (In re Courtney Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. en banc 2021), p. 5 n.1. (emphasis added).

“[Acosta] agreed to several unusual and problematic terms in the NPA without the consideration required under the circumstances.” p. x (emphasis added).

“This broad provision promising not to prosecute ‘any potential co-conspirators’ is troubling and … OPR did not find evidence showing that the subjects gave careful consideration to the potential scope of the provision or whether it was warranted given that the investigation had been curtailed and the USAO lacked complete information regarding possible co-conspirators.” p. 168 (emphasis added).

“[T]he USAO did not have a sufficient investigative basis from which it could conclude with any reasonable certitude that there were no other individuals who should be held accountable along with Epstein or that evidence might not be developed implicating others. Prosecutors rarely promise not to prosecute unidentified third parties. The rush to reach a resolution should not have led the USAO to agree to such a significant provision without a full consideration of the potential consequences and justification for the provision.” pp. 185-86.

8. NPA negotiated in secret—then buried: prosecutors hid NPA talks from victims

(a) The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals en banc decision, in 2021, described months of secrecy and defense-coordinated negotiations designed to keep victims uninformed and the finalized NPA concealed. (In re Courtney Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc)).

“Worse, it appears that prosecutors worked hand-in-hand with Epstein’s lawyers—or at the very least acceded to their requests—to keep the NPA’s existence and terms hidden from victims.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 5) (emphasis added).

“[A]t approximately the same time that the sides concluded the NPA, they began negotiating about what prosecutors could (and couldn’t) tell victims about the agreement. Seemingly in deference to Epstein’s lawyers’ repeated requests, the government held off—for nearly an entire year—on notifying Epstein’s victims of the NPA’s existence.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, pp. 5-6) (emphasis added).

“[T]he government’s efforts appear to have graduated from passive nondisclosure to (or at least close to) active misrepresentation.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 6) (emphasis added).

“If secrecy was the goal, it seems to have been achieved—there is no indication that any of Epstein’s victims were informed about the NPA or his state charges until after he pleaded guilty.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 6) (emphasis added).

“But it wasn’t until July 2008—during the course of this litigation—that petitioner learned of the NPA’s existence, and until August 2008 that she finally obtained a copy of the agreement.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, pp. 6-7)

“U.S. Attorney’s Office secretly engaged in discussions with Epstein’s defense team regarding the forthcoming federal criminal charges. (dissenting opinion by Judge Branch, p. 101) (emphasis added).

“As the Agreement was being signed, Epstein’s attorney Jay Lefkowitz e-mailed AUSA Villafaña, requesting: ‘Marie – Please do whatever you can to keep this [Agreement] from becoming public.’ (emphasis added by judge). AUSA Villafaña assured Lefkowitz that the Agreement would be kept confidential.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Branch, p. 103 n.6)

“Instead, for nine months after the September 2007 execution of the Agreement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office continued to negotiate with Epstein’s defense team about the extent of crime victim notifications—a course of action which the U.S. Attorney’s Office now admits is a deviation from the government’s standard practice.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Branch, pp. 103-04) (emphasis added).

(b) The Eleventh Circuit’s prior panel opinion mirrored—word for word—many of the en banc criticisms and also offered further observations. (In re Courtney Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1220 (11th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2020))

“[A]s already explained, the undisputed facts show … federal prosecutors in the Southern District of Florida negotiated ‘a secret non-prosecution agreement” with Epstein, and that ‘[f]rom the time that the FBI began investigating Epstein through the consummation of the secret NPA, the Government never conferred with Epstein’s victims about the NPA [or] even told them that such an agreement was under consideration.’” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 15) (emphasis added).

“Shockingly though, the [U.S. Attorney’s] Office then (1) conducted many days of extensive plea negotiations with Epstein’s attorneys and secretly entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement (‘NPA’), granting Epstein federal immunity in return for his plea to two state prostitution-solicitation charges, (2) never conferred one minute with the victims about the NPA or told the victims that such an agreement was under consideration, (3) worked closely with Epstein’s lawyers to keep the NPA’s existence and terms hidden from the victims, … and (5) never informed the victims about the NPA until after Epstein pled guilty in State Court and the secret sweetheart deal was done.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, pp. 60-1) (emphasis added).

“Pre-charge, the [U.S. Attorney’s] Office spent days conferring and negotiating with Epstein’s defense team, but had not a minute for the victims.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 64) (emphasis added).

“[T]he [U.S. Attorney’s] Office cleverly entered into a sweetheart plea deal with Epstein.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 62)

“[T]he parties made great efforts to keep that secret from the victims and the public, too.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 71) (emphasis added).

“[T]he [U.S. Attorney’s] Office misrepresented to the victims that ‘this case’ was still under investigation, advised them ‘to be patient,’ and never disclosed the government’s NPA with Epstein.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 74)

“[T]he Office admitted that it was a deviation from the government’s standard practices to negotiate with defense counsel about the extent of crime victim notifications.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 75) (emphasis added).

“[T]he lack of consultation was part of a series of government interactions with victims … reflected poorly on the Department as a whole, and is contradictory to the Department’s mission to minimize the frustration and confusion that victims of a crime endure.” pp. x-xi, (emphasis added).

9. Prosecutors misled victims about the investigation’s status—assuring them that the Epstein case was “currently under investigation” despite agreeing to the NPA

(a) In re Courtney Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc):

“[O]nly to be left in the dark—and, so it seems, affirmatively misled—by government attorneys.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 2) (emphasis added).

“And to be clear, the government’s efforts appear to have graduated from passive nondisclosure to (or at least close to) active misrepresentation. In January 2008, for example, approximately four months after finalizing and executing the NPA, the government sent a letter to Ms. Wild stating that Epstein’s case was ‘currently under investigation,’ explaining that ‘[t]his can be a lengthy process,’ and ‘request[ing her] continued patience while [it] conduct[ed] a thorough investigation.’ The government sent a similar letter to another victim in May 2008, some eight months after inking the NPA.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 6) (emphasis added) (italics in original)

“[A]dding insult to an already grievous injury, government prosecutors (by their own admission) affirmatively misled Ms. Wild— and dozens of others like her—regarding the status of their criminal investigation. Shameful all the way around. The whole thing makes me sick.” (majority opinion by Judge Newsom, p. 68) (emphasis added).

“[T]he U.S. Attorney’s Office affirmatively misled victims for months concerning the Agreement and the resolution of the federal case. For example, … on January 31, 2008, Wild met with AUSA Villafaña, FBI agents, and another federal prosecutor, provided additional details of Epstein’s sexual abuse of her, and expressed her hope that Epstein would be prosecuted. During that meeting, however, the federal prosecutors and FBI agents still did not disclose the Agreement to Wild. Then, in mid-June of 2008, Bradley Edwards, the attorney for Wild and several of Epstein’s other victims, discussed with AUSA Villafaña the possibility of federal charges being filed against Epstein in the future. AUSA Villafaña failed to mention the Agreement or its terms.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Branch, pp. 104-05) (emphasis added).

“Given the OPR Report, it is hardly surprising the victims continue to pursue this civil suit to discover and unravel the mystery of why the prosecutors … signed such a sweetheart plea … in secret and then for nearly a year took great efforts to hide the Agreement by affirmative misrepresentations to the victims and their counsel too.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 182 n.10) (emphasis added).

“[T]his case is about how the U.S. prosecutors fell short on Epstein’s evil crimes. Mysteries remain about how Epstein escaped federal prosecution and why, for nearly a year, the government made affirmative misrepresentations to the Florida victims of his serious sex crimes and to the victims’ counsel.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 184) (emphasis added).

(b) OPR Report, p. xi:

The letters sent by an FBI agent to victims after the NPA had been signed “risked misleading the victims and contributed to victim frustration and confusion by failing to provide important information about the status of the investigation. The letters also demonstrated a lack of coordination between the federal agencies responsible for communicating with Epstein’s victims and showed a lack of attention to and oversight regarding communication with victims.” (emphasis added).

10. Prosecutors sought to hide the Florida state court plea hearing from the victims

OPR Report:

“Acosta exercised poor judgment when he failed to make certain that the state intended to and would notify victims identified through the federal investigation about the state plea hearing. His decision left victims uninformed about an important proceeding that resolved the federal investigation, an investigation about which the USAO had communicated with victims for months. It also ultimately created the misimpression that the Department intentionally sought to silence the victims. Acosta failed to ensure that victims were made aware of a court proceeding that was related to their own cases, and thus he failed to ensure that victims were treated with forthrightness and dignity.” p. xi, 285 (emphasis added).

“[T]he failure to reevaluate the strategy prior to interviews of victims and discussions with victims’ attorneys occurring in 2008 led to interactions that contributed to victims’ feelings that the government was intentionally concealing information from them. … After examining the full scope and context of the government’s interactions with victims, OPR concludes that the government’s lack of transparency and its inconsistent messages led to victims feeling confused and ill-treated by the government; gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein’s counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims; and undercut public confidence in the legitimacy of the resulting agreement. The overall result of the subjects’ anomalous handling of this case understandably left many victims feeling ignored and frustrated and resulted in extensive public criticism. … In sum, OPR concludes that the victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity expected by the Department.” p. xi, 286 (emphasis added).

11. Kept off the judge’s radar: NPA terms and timing withheld from the Florida state court

In re: Courtney Wild, No. 19-13843 (11th Cir.) (Apr. 14, 2020): 955 F.3d 1196

“AUSA Villafana responded: ‘A non-prosecution agreement would not be made public or filed with the Court, but it would remain part of our case file.’” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 71) (emphasis added).

“In an e-mail to Lefkowitz, dated September 16, 2007, AUSA Villafana suggested strategies to conceal portions of the plea deal from the courts, stating that a prosecutor had ‘recommended that some of the timing issues be addressed only in the state agreement, so that it isn’t obvious to the judge that we are trying to create federal jurisdiction for prison purposes.’ AUSA Villafana added: ‘I will include our standard language regarding resolving all criminal liability and I will mention “co-conspirators,” but I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all of the other crimes and all of the other persons that we could charge.’” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 71 n. 4) (emphasis added).

“To this date, the U.S. Attorney’s Office has presented no evidence that it or anyone else told the State Court, either before or during Epstein’s state hearing, about the secret consideration Epstein had negotiated with the federal government—federal immunity for him and all co-conspirators—if the State Court accepted his state plea.” (dissenting opinion by Judge Hull, p. 76) (emphasis added).

12. Before litigation, prosecutors represented to victims and defense that CVRA protections would ensure victim communications; after litigation started, they reversed that stance

(a) In re Courtney Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc). p. 4; pp. 100–01 (communicating CVRA protections to victims); p. 104 (prosecutor–defense communications).

(b) In re Courtney Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated on reh’g en banc, 967 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2020). p. 68 (communicating CVRA protections to victims); pp. 77–78 (prosecutor–defense communications); see also pp. 65, 81–82.

13. The plea agreement: the “deal of a lifetime”

Despite extensive evidence supporting federal sex-trafficking charges, DOJ leaders instead negotiated what became known as the “deal of a lifetime.”

By May 2007, the lead federal prosecutor Ann Marie Villafaña prepared a 82-page prosecution memo and