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Northern Gaza evacuation


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UPDATE 🔴 Footage from the Graz school shooting shows multiple gunshots as 11 people were killed.


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Perturbed Karen Bass Makes New Demands Of Trump At Monday Night Press Conference dailycaller.com/2025/06/09/kar… via @DailyCaller


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Reimagining College


These are trying times for higher education, and for more than temporary partisan reasons. Future demographic trends will exacerbate declining enrollment numbers. Facing budgetary shortfalls, colleges must cancel burdensome academic and athletic programs. Growing numbers of institutions will fail altogether, inflicting economic tragedy on the local communities that rely on them. There are no painless choices here; there will be losers in this readjustment process. But two new books present impending crises, new technology, and shifting consumer demand as opportunities for innovative reform.

Their provocative titles notwithstanding, Richard K. Vedder’s Let Colleges Fail: The Power of Creative Destruction in Higher Education and Kathleen deLaski’s Who Needs College Anymore? Imagining a Future Where Degrees Won’t Matter both articulate largely optimistic visions for higher education’s long-overdue course correction. Neither work will appeal deeply to readers who revere America’s traditional liberal arts undergraduate curriculum. Yet thoughtful and generous reading of both suggests creative and perhaps necessary means to harmonize new realities with an ancient heritage.

Russell Kirk once professed certainty that “if all schools, colleges, and universities were abolished tomorrow,” the young would nevertheless “find lucrative employment, and means would exist, or be developed, of training them for … work.” According to Kirk, the college exists not for vocational training per se, but for “liberal education,” which “defends order against disorder” by “cultivation of the person’s own intellect and imagination.” If pursued in this spirit, such education conduces to “order in the republic.” But much as lab-produced substitutes are an ineffectual mockery of real food, liberal education’s ancillary blessings cannot be reductively pursued as ends in themselves.

Even two generations ago, few Americans concurred with Kirk’s noble ideal. Today, six decades after Clark Kerr coined the term “modern multiversity” for their often conflicting array of interests, research universities are less coherent than ever. Kerr famously quipped at a meeting of Cal Berkeley’s faculty in 1957 that the major administrative challenges to the university were to “provide parking for the faculty, sex for the students, and athletics for the alumni.” For the typical large “R1,” this may be as complete a mission statement as possible. It is certainly the most honest. Even at many putative liberal arts colleges, the increasingly vocational focus of undergraduate education contributes to this confusion as both cause and effect. The three most common reasons given for college attendance in a recent New America survey—all with response rates above ninety percent—were “improve employment opportunities,” “make more money,” and “get a good job.” This is the consensus understanding of higher education’s purpose. But it may have been so for longer than we imagine.

Clayton Sedwick Cooper wrote Why Go To College? in 1912, spawning a subgenre now large enough to fill a library by itself. Cooper recounts the scene at an Ivy League graduation of a couple whose “homely” clothes, “deeply lined” faces, and “hard, calloused hands” identified them as farmers, watching with pride as their son led in the senior class. He imagined them “dedicating their lives to the task of giving [this] boy the advantages … they must have felt would separate him forever from their humble life.” Such scenes are a commonplace of American life. Attend any college’s commencement exercises; the families cheering loudest when their student’s name is read will be the spiritual descendants of those Yankee agrarians. Kirk’s noble admonition notwithstanding, America’s colleges have always served partly as entryways to its professional class. That is an essential function in a socially diverse, egalitarian republic. At any rate, people understand it as such—and in a democratic society, the people will have their way. Liberal education and vocational training must coexist somehow.

Consumer-driven schemes for vocational training may not be incompatible with a liberal education intended to cultivate moral imaginations.

Richard Vedder, emeritus professor of economic history at Ohio University, has long been among higher education’s foremost conservative critics. He is not, though, a wanton agent of chaos. Let Colleges Fail is less a celebratory paean to higher education’s imminent disintegration than a call for its renewal. Vedder does consider the possible value of “creative destruction” in higher education, noting that publicly subsidized colleges and universities “lack strong incentives to improve outcomes,” reduce overheads and prices. “Though we may mourn the loss of [individual] schools,” he writes, “we should accept and even rejoice in more closing in the years ahead as resources shift away from” failing institutions toward “educationally stronger ones.” In this vein, the book retreads some familiar ground on higher education’s excesses, abuses, and inefficiencies, though often with characteristically insightful data analysis. 

Vedder suggests many reforms, ranging in scale and consequence from minor and benign to the most sweepingly ambitious. “Reform efforts must … reduce market ignorance in higher education,” he writes. Other merchants, such as “big-box stores,” do not advertise one price, then charge each customer unique and undisclosed discounted prices—why should colleges be permitted to do so? Such commonsense proposals would meet little popular resistance, at least in principle. More controversial, perhaps, would be his scheme for voucher-style tuition aid, “converting subsidies given to schools to payments made to students’ directly.” Then there are Vedder’s most original suggestions, such as halving tuition costs by moving the academic year to three fifteen-week semesters, eliminating summer vacation, and condensing the bachelor’s degree into three years. In this plan, faculty base pay is increased, but large lecture sections are tripled in size, the number of tenured instructors is reduced, and faculty pay is moved to a sliding scale pegged to student enrollment in their courses. Pray for the poor dean who is tasked with presenting this plan at the next faculty meeting!

Vedder’s timeliest proposals are for the restructuring of research universities. Private companies that grow unwieldy, he writes, “are constantly spinning off operations that do not fit well with their core activities—shouldn’t universities do the same?” Do teaching hospitals, vocational schools, advanced research labs, and professional football teams still belong under the same institutional umbrella? Could inefficient, high-cost dormitories and dining halls be replaced with private boarding houses or similar free-market arrangements? Can independent laboratories not turn research grants into knowledge as well or better without campus bureaucracy? Wherever possible, Vedder urges institutions to shed distracting encumbrances to their core purpose of educating students.

Kathleen deLaski’s book, though, suggests that even this foundational mission may undergo revolutionary transformation in the near future. Who Needs College Anymore? explores the possibilities for education at the dawn of what she terms the “skills-first age,” in which the bachelor’s degree will no longer serve as the primary signifier of employability. Her book is a surprisingly engaging tour of the present state and likely direction of “the alternative credentials market.” Central to deLaski’s narrative is the “micro-credential,” a trendy catch-all term for industry-certified short-term training programs. Many, such as intensive “bootcamps” to learn software coding languages, offer direct, non-degree paths into remunerative careers. But such credentials and the traditional campus are not exclusive models. Some institutions—the 250,000-student University of Texas system, for example—subcontract third-party providers to give students access to thousands of skills-based credential courses alongside their degree curriculum.

Two institutions that embedded “alternative credential” programs within their curriculum at their inception offer particularly illustrative models. Chartered in 1997, Western Governors University pioneered “competency-based” curricula, in which students “move through [self-guided] online course material” without any real-time instruction, then take assessments “to demonstrate mastery.” Chartered in 1912, Northeastern University in Boston was an even earlier pioneer. From the beginning, its undergraduate curriculum has required completion of a months-long off-campus work experience placement. Students are prepared for professional work environments with a mandatory general education course covering resume curation, interview etiquette, and the like. In both examples, once-uniquely innovative ideas are now commonplace in higher education. All major accreditors permit credit-bearing off-campus apprenticeships and competency-based curricula. In the same way, deLaski believes, “as less expensive alternate pathways become clearer and surer,” traditional bachelor’s degrees “will seem impractical for a new majority of learners.” But she asks, “Why does the degree have to be the only product colleges sell?” Campuses offer many advantages that could help savvy institutions adjust to a changing education landscape. deLaski suggests various means for higher-education institutions to offer non-degree credentials within, alongside, or as alternatives to their existing programs. In short, “the degree may be in trouble, but colleges can survive.”

In a democratic society, the people will have their way. Liberal education and vocational training must coexist somehow.

This would be cold comfort to Russell Kirk. But consumer-driven schemes for vocational training may not be incompatible with a liberal education intended, as Kirk wrote, to cultivate “the person’s intellect and [moral] imagination, for the person’s own sake.” A few institutions already offer suggestive examples for combining the two. Affectionately known as “Hard Work U,” Missouri’s College of the Ozarks’ work-study model enables every student to gain in-house job skills and graduate debt-free. Its robust general education curriculum includes required two-part course sequences in Christian Worldview, American history and civics, and Western Civilization. Another intriguing example is LeTourneau University in Longview, Texas—a private, religious, four-year vocational college. Typical major programs include various branches of engineering, computer science, nursing, and business. But since 2015, LeTourneau’s Honors College has offered an excellent slate of liberal arts courses. Roughly five percent of students complete the full nineteen-credit concentration, but a greater number take a few honors courses as electives.

These are rare and modest examples. But if technological change and consumer demand augur seismic change for higher education, they may hold out hope to those who cherish the old liberal education. Market forces, legislatures, or both may, as Vedder recommends, require large public universities to reorganize, shedding non-core functions and renewing their focus on undergraduate education. We should hope so. Selective liberal arts colleges may continue more or less unchanged. But what of non-elite smaller institutions lacking the mysterious appeal of “prestige” or the security of large endowments? Imagine a struggling four-year, private institution with low admissions standards, reliant on athletics and vocational majors to drive recruitment. In a world of readily accessible, rapidly adaptive short-term credential programs, why enroll in a four-year vocational degree whose curriculum is updated rarely and belatedly? Such programs may appear increasingly cumbersome and costly, chiefly benefiting their tenured faculty. Suppose this college abandoned the bachelor’s degree and replaced its numerous putatively pre-professional and vocational major programs with a single liberal arts associates degree. Imagine a three-year program, the first two years devoted primarily to a “great books” curriculum alongside some foundational vocational training and summer internship options. In year three, the focus shifts primarily to job-specific training gained through the latest micro-credential courses, perhaps taken online or through intensive “bootcamps” off-campus. Students would receive guidance from a corps of counselors with up-to-date training in the “alternate credentials market”—a much expanded role for the “drop-in” career centers presently an afterthought on many campuses. In less time and with lower cost than the current bachelor’s degree, graduates of such a college might attain a “skills-based, job-ready” resume while also forming their minds and imaginations in a college-level liberal arts core curriculum.

This may be a fanciful hope. But if Kathleen deLaski is correct, new technology and probable consumer demands will permit such ambitious reimagination of college education very soon. How many administrators have the vision and courage to try such things? Richard Vedder suggests they may have no choice.


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What Economists Understand About Tariffs


I have tremendous respect for Gene Callahan. His writing, especially on economics, has received well-deserved praise, and rightly so. In a recent essay at Modern Age, however, he joins the rancor of people accusing economists of just not understanding something when it comes to tariffs and the discussion surrounding them. He begins with an analogy of someone who, after being offended, is considering giving the offender “a good punch in the nose.” The man asks his friend, who happens to be a physicist, for moral advice. The friend instead describes the kinetics involved in a fist colliding with a face based on “the masses and velocities involved.” The physicist has obviously answered a question, but not the question that was asked. 

The implication here is that economists speaking about tariffs are much like the physicist: we give precise, rationalistic answers to the outcomes of tariffs and then move from those answers to proffering advice to the practical question of “what should we do?” Callahan doesn’t advocate specific policies or endorse President Trump’s trade actions, but instead he urges economists to adopt a more open, civil approach to discussing tariffs. Fair enough—civil discourse is valuable and some economists, myself included, have occasionally been less than diplomatic on the topic. 

By chiding economists for being too rationalistic in our approach, however, he overlooks the simple fact that the same can be said about tariff proponents: they believe that they can 1) identify substantive social outcomes that “we” want, such as certain types of jobs in certain locations (e.g. manufacturing jobs in the Rust Belt), national economic “independence,” or increased tax revenues, 2) that they alone possess the knowledge of which policy buttons to push to bring about these assertedly desired outcomes, and 3) that the sequence of policy changes they advocate will bring about those outcomes. In doing so, they present their own rationalistic answers and similarly move from those to answering “what should we do?”

The unfortunate reality is that tariffs, which are intended to help the poor, often have the exact opposite effect and simply enrich the already-rich.

So in truth, we do not have the hyper-rationalist economists telling people what they should do versus cosmopolitan thinkers pondering bigger, moral questions. Instead, what we see are economists questioning each of the three points above, with an admittedly particular emphasis on the question of whether the policies will bring about the results their advocates claim.

Still, I will cede Callahan’s broad point that economists qua economists should cease proffering answers to normative questions, just as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan argued. We should absolutely not allow, however, for the folk economics to grow and fester that Paul Rubin warned us about and that Frederic Bastiat and Henry Hazlitt provided panaceas against. In that respect, economists have a unique and necessary role to provide a “prophylactic to popular fallacies.”

Tariffs: Means, Not Ends

Economists excel at analyzing means to achieve given ends, though the economist qua economist is incapable of judging the ends themselves. With respect to tariffs, the Trump Administration has put forth five ends they contend tariffs will achieve: bolstering national security, raising revenue, repatriating jobs, reshaping supply chains, and negotiating better trade deals. With these ends in mind, economists can analyze their efficacy.

First, tariffs are often justified as protecting national security. This is especially true when they are unilaterally enacted by a president, even though recent court cases have rendered this less certain than they were a few weeks ago. No serious economist denies the possibility that tariffs and other forms of trade restrictions can enhance national security. Even staunch free-trade advocates such as Don Boudreaux acknowledge this possibility. Economists do raise two concerns that are often overlooked by non-economists, however: first, reducing trade barriers may actually strengthen national security more than raising them. Second, the national security argument may be abused. Are foreign films or Apple’s overseas investments really threats warranting tariffs? 

The right question isn’t whether tariffs in general can promote security but whether they do in particular circumstances—a question economists are well-equipped to analyze. For example, decades of protectionist policies—special tax abatementsprotective tariffs, and mandatory purchasing agreements—have done little to save the domestic steel industry, with US Steel and Cleveland-Cliffs, among other steel companies, reporting loss after loss each year. At some point, the problem with the domestic steel market is not the supposed scourge of foreign competition. 

Second, tariffs are proffered as a means of generating revenue. Recently, Trump and advisors such as Pete Navarro have claimed that tariffs could replace income taxes or generate $600-700 billion annually. Revenue collected through tariffs falls squarely within the realm of economists, namely, that of public finance economists. While calculating tax revenue is a seemingly straightforward task (simply multiply the effective tax per unit by the number of units sold), the reality is more nuanced. Because tariffs are taxes, both the buyers and the sellers will bear some of the burden of the tax. This means that the price that buyers pay for this good will increase by at least some amount because of the tariff. How much it increases and the subsequent decrease in the amount purchased will depend on decidedly economic factors.

Additionally, there is the further complication of determining how much of the economic incidence will be paid by the sellers and how much will be paid by the buyers. President Trump has famously (and repeatedly) claimed that it is the foreign country that will pay all the tariffs. He said this with respect to building the wall on America’s southern border during his first term and again with the tariffs he’s imposed during his second term. But more recently, Trump admonished Walmart on social media and told them to “eat the tariff.” And yet if tariffs were entirely paid by foreign entities, then there should be nothing for Walmart to “eat” here.

Third, the promise that tariffs can “bring jobs back” ignores key facts. Specifically, that US manufacturing output is near record highs, that most of the jobs that were “lost” in manufacturing were lost due to productivity gains not offshoring, that few people want to do the manufacturing jobs themselves, or that there are at present plenty of manufacturing jobs open does nothing to sway those who fetishize the idea that we need to “bring back” manufacturing jobs. The “New Right” champions tariffs to revive these jobs, but their arguments recycle failed protectionist ideas. Economists focus on trade-offs: tariffs may protect some jobs but raise costs for other industries, costing them jobs. The net effect on jobs of this is, for reasons economists particularly understand, negative.

Fourth, tariffs are also pitched as a means of diversifying supply chains and reducing our reliance on countries like China, a concern that was starkly brought to light during the late pandemic’s supply shortages. But to assert that tariffs simply will work, with no relevant unintended consequences, is to deny history. From the tire tariffs the US placed on China in 2009, for example, we can plainly see that the tire industries in Taiwan and Mexico were able to grow and mature into the sectors of their economies they occupy today. This sounds like a win. However, because of the higher prices for tires, trucking companies in particular shifted to using retreaded tires. Just how many additional accidents this will cause on the highway, as trucks experience more complete tire blowouts with the retreaded tires than with brand-new tires, is an empirical question. Its link to the tire tariffs is not.

Finally, we come to the consideration of tariffs as a negotiating tactic. Here, we can turn to Adam Smith, who provided perhaps the most cogent defense of this strategy in his Wealth of Nations. To summarize, Smith points out that tariffs and other trade restrictions (or the threat thereof) can be used to convince other nations to lower their barriers against us. However, they should not be a permanent state of affairs, and they should only be used in situations where they are likely to work. Trump goes far beyond this and, in doing so, is actively pushing other nations away, which will lower their overall effectiveness as a negotiating tool.

Economists and the Good Life

In his Modern Age piece, Callahan argues economists miss the value of contentment over endless consumption. Yet, economists understand trade-offs in personal choices, too. Many, including myself, choose lower-paying academic jobs over lucrative private-sector roles because we value the sense of meaning we achieve through our work. Furthermore, many of us will retire at some point; surely, the quest for “more and more” is not served by ceasing to earn income. Though some, like the excellent Walter Williams, joke that “if I should ever die, I want to have taught that day.” But in doing so, people like Williams demonstrate not their consumerist desires, but their great love for their craft of teaching.

Likewise, when Callahan criticizes Mike Munger for describing wealth as “the ability to obtain high quality, low cost products,” he again misses the mark. The implication is not that all people should always and everywhere zealously pursue maximizing their ability to buy more stuff. Munger is making the simple claim that, all else being equal, a person is wealthier when they can purchase more things. If we want people to have more access to the things that allow them to live healthier and wealthier (however they choose to define those terms), then we should eschew policies that make that more difficult. This is especially true of tariffs, which are widely recognized as being regressive in their application, even by members of the New Right such as Michael Lind.

Callahan’s call for economists to engage other disciplines is certainly reasonable, but even fostering an interdisciplinary spirit can never justify bad trade policy.

The unfortunate reality is that tariffs, which are intended to help the poor by bringing back low-skill jobs and boosting the wages of low-skill workers, often have the exact opposite effect and enrich the already-rich at the direct expense of the poor. Tariffs open the door for cronyism, one of the most pernicious forms of the transference of wealth from the poor to the rich. Autarkist utopianism may be well-intentioned, but it is just as misguided as socialist utopianism. The facts do not support the dreams of tariff proponents, and economists have both the ability and duty to speak up.

Callahan’s call for economists to engage other disciplines is certainly reasonable, but even fostering an interdisciplinary spirit can never justify bad trade policy. Economists understand tariffs’ mechanics and historical failures better than most. Trump’s “Tariff Man” rhetoric paints them as a cure-all, but economic analysis reveals their true limits. Great economists such as Mises and Hayek warned our field against narrowness, and we should heed their advice. But on tariffs, our skepticism is grounded in evidence and expertise. Far from misunderstanding tariffs, economists are uniquely positioned to clarify their costs and benefits for a public often swayed by political promises.

Trade policy does need to be guided by more than knowledge of the past or theoretical understandings. It requires prudence, good judgment, and discernment. Economists can (and should) contribute to these discussions owing to our specialized knowledge of how markets work and how they respond to policy changes. With the specific ends in mind that the Trump administration has espoused, the reality is that protectionism failed in the past, is failing us now, and, because of the very forces that economists readily understand, will fail us in the future.

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