Day: January 23, 2025

The analysis of available facts and phenomena indicates a low risk of a large-scale Azerbaijani attack on Armenia at this point, Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service said in its Annual Report on External Security Risks of the Republic of Armenia for 2025. The report, available in both Armenian and English, states in part:

“2024 was marked by frequency of bilateral high-level meetings, contacts and written communication, mainly touching upon the normalization of relations, the text of the peace agreement, border demarcation and delimitation, unblocking of infrastructure, humanitarian and other issues. In 2025, it is highly likely that bilateral formats of negotiations around various issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain the most effective of the ones used by the parties before.

Based on the analysis of various facts, information and phenomena, at the time of publishing of this report, the likelihood of a large-scale attack on Armenia by the Azerbaijani side is not assessed as high. Meanwhile, in the absence of a peace agreement and interstate relations, the risk of local tensions and escalation on the border will remain a part of Azerbaijan’s policy of the threat of use of force. A potential guarantee for addressing this risk can be the smooth continuation of the delimitation and demarcation process, started in 2024.

In this context, the task of our Service is to continuously assess whether Azerbaijan’s consistent development and financing of various harmful narratives against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia aim to “legitimize” its intention to use force against Armenia. Among those narratives are so-called “Western Azerbaijan and Western Azerbaijanis”, “Armenia’s militarization”, “revanchism” and the “Zangezur corridor”.

The delays in the process of normalization of relations and peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan significantly increase the uncertainty about the real intention of Azerbaijan for establishing lasting peace.

In general, the absence of a peace agreement and diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates a real risk for keeping interstate relations tense, which can deteriorate under the influence of realignments or transformations of historical alliances in the region.

The risks of preserving tensions in relations are increased also by Azerbaijan’s aggressive official rhetoric, attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia, as well as Azerbaijan’s steps to impose its own unilateral demands in the negotiation process by adding various artificial topics. In 2025, the probability of continuous application of this toolkit remains high.

In 2025, Azerbaijan will maintain the pace of development of its own offensive military capabilities by decreasing the time between the high-level political decision to initiate a military action and the launch of a military action on the ground. Within this framework, Azerbaijan will continue working on the transition to more mobile units, training of their reserve, acquisition and import of new armaments, as well as upgrade of military infrastructure.”

The analysis of available facts and phenomena indicates a low risk of a large-scale Azerbaijani attack on Armenia at this point, Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service said in its Annual Report on External Security Risks of the Republic of Armenia for 2025. The report, available in both Armenian and English, states in part:

“2024 was marked by frequency of bilateral high-level meetings, contacts and written communication, mainly touching upon the normalization of relations, the text of the peace agreement, border demarcation and delimitation, unblocking of infrastructure, humanitarian and other issues. In 2025, it is highly likely that bilateral formats of negotiations around various issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain the most effective of the ones used by the parties before.

Based on the analysis of various facts, information and phenomena, at the time of publishing of this report, the likelihood of a large-scale attack on Armenia by the Azerbaijani side is not assessed as high. Meanwhile, in the absence of a peace agreement and interstate relations, the risk of local tensions and escalation on the border will remain a part of Azerbaijan’s policy of the threat of use of force. A potential guarantee for addressing this risk can be the smooth continuation of the delimitation and demarcation process, started in 2024.

In this context, the task of our Service is to continuously assess whether Azerbaijan’s consistent development and financing of various harmful narratives against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia aim to “legitimize” its intention to use force against Armenia. Among those narratives are so-called “Western Azerbaijan and Western Azerbaijanis”, “Armenia’s militarization”, “revanchism” and the “Zangezur corridor”.

The delays in the process of normalization of relations and peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan significantly increase the uncertainty about the real intention of Azerbaijan for establishing lasting peace.

In general, the absence of a peace agreement and diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates a real risk for keeping interstate relations tense, which can deteriorate under the influence of realignments or transformations of historical alliances in the region.

The risks of preserving tensions in relations are increased also by Azerbaijan’s aggressive official rhetoric, attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia, as well as Azerbaijan’s steps to impose its own unilateral demands in the negotiation process by adding various artificial topics. In 2025, the probability of continuous application of this toolkit remains high.

In 2025, Azerbaijan will maintain the pace of development of its own offensive military capabilities by decreasing the time between the high-level political decision to initiate a military action and the launch of a military action on the ground. Within this framework, Azerbaijan will continue working on the transition to more mobile units, training of their reserve, acquisition and import of new armaments, as well as upgrade of military infrastructure.”