Day: July 6, 2024

In a significant turn of events, reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian has emerged victorious in Iran’s presidential election, defeating his hard-line rival, Saeed Jalili. The results were announced after Pezeshkian secured 53.3 percent of the more than 30 million votes counted, compared with Jalili’s 44.3 percent. This pivotal vote comes at a critical juncture marked by heightened tensions both domestically and internationally. Does the election outcome have far-reaching implications for Iran’s internal political landscape, as well as its foreign policy and relations with the global community?

First, it is essential to highlight that the voter turnout was 49.8 percent, which is historically low. The low turnout reflects several underlying issues, such as widespread public dissatisfaction with the economic situation and political process, potential disenchantment with the candidates, and perhaps a broader sense of apathy or disillusionment.

Pezeshkian has navigated two distinct career paths in medicine and politics. As an Iranian heart surgeon of Azerbaijani and Kurdish heritage, he was actively involved in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, not only sending medical teams to the front lines, but also serving as a combatant and physician. After the conflict, he furthered his medical studies, focusing on general surgery at Tabriz University of Medical Sciences, and obtaining a subspecialty in cardiac surgery from Iran University of Medical Sciences in 1993. His surgical expertise led to his appointment as president of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences in 1994, a role he held for five years.

In 1994, a car accident resulted in the tragic loss of his wife, Fatemeh Majidi, and one of his daughters. In 1997, Pezeshkian transitioned into politics by joining Mohammed Khatami’s administration as deputy health minister. He was promoted to health minister in 2001, a position he held until 2005. Since then, he has been a significant figure in the Iranian parliament, representing Tabriz for five terms, and serving as the first deputy speaker from 2016 to 2020.

Pezeshkian is often categorized as a reformist or moderate within Iran’s political landscape for several compelling reasons. Similar to former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, he stands for fostering improved relations with Western nations, notably the US. His advocacy for stronger diplomatic ties is rooted in the belief that such relations could lead to the lifting of sanctions, bolstered trade opportunities, economic enhancement and, ultimately, a stronger Islamic Republic.

Moreover, Pezeshkian has not shied away from criticizing the Iranian government, particularly regarding its handling of protests. He has voiced concern over the authorities’ stringent measures against demonstrators, particularly highlighting issues surrounding women’s rights and the enforcement of the hijab rule. He said: “We will respect the hijab law, but there should never be any intrusive or inhumane behavior toward women.”

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Pezeshkian has consistently shown strong support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, criticizing the US for designating it as a terrorist organization. His past public display of wearing the IRGC uniform in parliament further underscores his alignment with this stance.

In addition, his approval by the Guardian Council to run for the presidency and his sustained career in Iranian politics indicate his loyalty to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the foundational revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic. Pezeshkian appears to be advocating for policies such as improving Western relations not as a challenge to the system, but as a means of enhancing its resilience and effectiveness. Like other figures considered moderates or reformists, he seeks to strengthen the Islamic Republic through different strategies, while maintaining its core principles.

The international community should temper its expectations regarding Pezeshkian’s potential to bring about fundamental changes in Iran. The reality is that the country’s domestic and foreign policies are primarily controlled by the supreme leader and the senior leadership of the IRGC. These entities wield significant authority, often overshadowing efforts by reform-minded figures, such as Khatami, in the past. History has demonstrated that even those labeled as reformists have been constrained by the overarching influence of the supreme leader and the IRGC, whose decisions hold sway in Iranian governance and strategic direction. Thus, while individuals such as Pezeshkian may advocate for certain reforms or policies, their ability to enact substantial change remains limited.

In other words, Iran’s stance on regional policies, support for proxies, and approach to nuclear and ballistic missile programs are unlikely to change. Historically, when a so-called reformist assumes office, it often triggers a reactionary response from hard-liners who intensify crackdowns domestically. This serves as a clear signal to Iranian society that despite any electoral changes, the hard-liners maintain authority and control. Thus, while there may be shifts in rhetoric or emphasis, particularly on issues such as domestic reform or international relations, the core strategies and policies of Iran are typically upheld by the entrenched hard-line power structures within the country.

In conclusion, while Pezeshkian’s victory as a reformist or moderate may signal potential for nuanced policy approaches, particularly in diplomacy with the West and criticisms of domestic governance, it remains clear that fundamental shifts in Iran’s core policies — such as regional strategies, support for proxies, and nuclear ambitions — are unlikely under the prevailing influence of the supreme leader and the IRGC.

This continuity suggests that while Pezeshkian and others may advocate for change, the entrenched power structures within Iran will continue to shape the country’s direction, maintaining stability according to their established principles. In addition, the low voter turnout underscores broader public disillusionment and raises questions about the election’s legitimacy. Thus, while the election outcome may appear to introduce new dynamics, it underscores the enduring dominance of Iran’s conservative elements in determining its trajectory, both domestically and on the global stage.

Although there is a tendency for most religious people to blame whole nations or tribes for killing Prophets, while in reality it is political rulers who have the power over life and death.

Nimrod is a figure mentioned in the Hebrew Bible, specifically in the Book of Genesis. He is described as a mighty hunter and the king of Shinar (a region in Mesopotamia), known for establishing cities like Babel (Babylon) and Erech. Nimrod was a priest-king and was an empire-builder who worshiped a fertility goddess based on a deified Eve.

Prophet Ibrahim came to (King) Numrud and they had a famous debate that is related in the Qur’an: “Have you not looked at (King Nimrod) the one who argued with Abraham about his Lord, because Allah had given him (Nimrod) a kingdom?

When Abraham said (to King Nimrud); “My Lord is the one who gives life and causes death.” Nimrud said, “I give life and cause death.” Abraham said, ” Allah causes the sun to rise from the east; so cause it to rise from the west.” So the disbeliever (King Nimrud) was utterly defeated. And Allah does not guide wrongdoing people.” (Qur’an 2:258)

And Prophet Moses had a difficult time with the tens of thousands of recently freed slaves: “So they quarreled with Moses and said, “Give us water to drink.” Moses replied, “Why do you quarrel with me? Why do you put the Lord to the test?” But the (Jewish) people were thirsty for water there, and they grumbled against Moses. They said, “Why did you bring us up out of Egypt to make us and our children and livestock die of thirst?”

Then Moses cried out to the Lord, “What am I to do with these people? They are almost ready to stone me.” (Exodus 17:2-4)

And there was the harassment of earlyMuslimsinMecca. So Prophet Muhammadtold his followers to emigrate to the city of Yathrib,some of whose residents had pledged to protect him.To attract less attention, Muslims left Mecca in small groups, throughout the summer of 622CE,while Prophet Muhammad remained behind in Mecca to organize and encourage the emigration. The Meccan clan leaders then decided to murder Prophet Muhammad before he could escape.

The plan was for a group of warriors, one from each Meccan clan, to jointly kill Prophet Muhammad together, to forestall and prevent retribution from Muhammad’s clan, theBanu Hashim. An informant disclosed the assassination plot. To foil their plans, Muhammad’s young cousinAli ibn Abi Talibrisked his life and slept in Muhammad’s bed that night instead of him. Prophet Muhammad safely left Mecca under the cover of darkness. This was not the first or the last Arab plot to kill Prophet Muhammad.

The Qur’an does not say the Arabs in Mecca should be blamed for attempting to kill Prophet Muhammad but states simply: “And [remember, O Muhammad], when those who disbelieved plotted against you to restrain you, or kill you, or evict you [from Mecca]. But they plan, and Allah plans. And Allah is the best of planners. (8:30)

People should learn from this verse in the Qur’an; that it is a terrible slander to blame a whole people or religion for the horrible sins of some political leaders, or even the sins of lots of individual people. As the Qur’an states: “Why, when you heard it, did you not say: ‘It is not for us to speak of this. Exalted are You; this is a great slander?’”[Quran 24:16]

For slander is worse than adultery, because slander ruins the basis of unity, compassion, intimacy and good opinion in society, which damages our human society severely.

As the rabbis say: “Slander is worse than the three cardinal sins of murder, forbidden sexual relationships and idol worship.” (Talmud Arakhin 15b) So “Whoever slanders has no place in the world to come.” (Pirkei Derabi Eliezer 53, 127a) Thus the following prayer from the Talmud (Berakhot 17a) is recited three times a day, all year long: “O Lord, Guard my tongue from evil and my lips from speaking guile.”

The Qur’an itself states the wide-spread rejection of Allah’s Prophets: “The people of Noah denied [the Prophets sent] before them, and the companions of the well, and Thamud, and ‘Aad, and Pharaoh; and the brothers of Lot, the companions of the thicket, and the people of Tubba’. All denied the messengers, [sent to them] so My threat was justly fulfilled [and they were destroyed]” (50:12-14)

The UN voiced deep concern on Friday at the increase in the intensity of exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, which separates Lebanese and Israeli armed forces.

The latest escalation, which occurred on Thursday, “heightens the risk of a full-scale war”, the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General said in a note to correspondents.

“Escalation can and must be avoided. We reiterate that the danger of miscalculation leading to a sudden and wider conflagration is real,” it added, stressing that a political and diplomatic solution is the only viable way forward.

It further noted that on Thursday, the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, met with the country’s officials, including Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, underscoring the need for de-escalation across the Blue Line.

“We echo the appeals of UNSCOL and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) urging the parties to immediately return to a cessation of hostilities and to recommit to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701,” the note added.

Nine in 10 displaced in Gaza

Meanwhile, nine out of 10 people in Gaza are now reported to be internally displaced, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT).

In a humanitarian bulletin on Friday, OCHA cited estimates indicating that the number of people internally displaced within Gaza has risen from 1.7 to 1.9 million people.

“Mass displacement has been predominantly driven by evacuation orders issued by the Israeli military, extensive destruction of both private and public infrastructure, restricted access to essential services, and the persistent fear of ongoing hostilities,” OCHA noted.

It added that Israeli bombardment from the air, land, and sea continues to be reported across much of the Gaza Strip, resulting in further civilian casualties, displacement, and destruction of houses and other civilian infrastructure.

Major hospital ‘empty’

OCHA also reported that on 1 July, Israeli military issued the second largest evacuation order since October 2023, urging residents of 71 residential blocs in eastern Khan Younis and Rafah to immediately evacuate westwards to what the military defines as a “humanitarian zone” in Al Mawasi.

Though the authorities clarified the next day that the order did not apply to the European Gaza Hospital (EGH), most medical staff and patients there – including those who were on their beds with drips, hastily fled in fear that it would become non-functional based on past experiences at hospitals that were in areas slated for evacuation.

EGH was completely empty by that evening and all 320 medical personnel and patients had left, OCHA said.

Most patients were referred to Nasser Medical Complex, which reached full capacity with more than 350 inpatients, amid critical shortages of medications and supplies for surgeries.

Severe lack of fuel

Furthermore, lack of fuel is exacerbating the provision of healthcare.

“Further disruption to health services is imminent in Gaza due to a severe lack of fuel,” Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the UN World Health Organization, warned in a post on X, formerly Twitter.

“Only 90,000 litres of fuel entered Gaza yesterday. The health sector alone needs 80,000 litres daily, forcing the UN, including WHO and partners to make impossible choices,” he added.

Limited fuel has also affected water and sanitation infrastructure, worsening living conditions and complicating aid operations across the war-ravaged enclave.