Day: June 17, 2024

The;Middle Corridor;AKA the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, is a multimodal transport corridor connecting China to Europe. At over 4,700 km (and 2,000km shorter than Russia’s Northern Corridor according to the;Caspian Policy Center), the Corridor is the;shortest route;and;most sustainable;transport corridor, between Europe and Western China. The Corridor ;received renewed ;attention after the start of the Russia-NATO war in Ukraine as it will enable Europe to trade with China and Central Asia while avoiding shipping goods via Russia and the;Northern Corridor, and avoiding the route via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal which is threatened by Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping.

Per the;World Bank: “The Middle Corridor links China, and Kazakhstan by rail through Dostyk or Khorgos/Altynkol, crosses Kazakhstan by rail to the Aktau Port, crosses the Caspian Sea to the Port of Baku/Alyat, and Azerbaijan and Georgia by rail to then either continue by rail to Europe through Türkiye or crossing the Black Sea.”

Of the five Central Asia states, only Kazakhstan has assumed a significant role in the Corridor by hosting rail lines, but the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway which;begins construction;in October 2024 will add another leg to the East-West corridor. But, according to;The Diplomat, the project is an “enormous undertaking with unclear financing” even though the;World Bank;reports it will “triple freight volumes and halve travel time by 2030.” One impediment to securing financing is that “it will remain mostly a regional corridor, with transcontinental trade representing a small fraction of the volumes,” according to the Bank.;

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development identified an ambitious menu of priority infrastructure investment needs in the Central Asia republics. Though the Bank says soft connectivity challenges are the greatest challenge to improved transport connections, eventually the bricks and mortar have to be paid for. Mr. Edward Chow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that it is “fanciful” to discuss the MC without considering a role for China as a large volume of goods is needed to finance the required infrastructure, so a project sold as a way to minimize Russian involvement in the region’s supply chain may instead be opening the door to more China.

Europe is shedding Russian natural gas and fertilizer and, without cheap energy, is facing a wave of;deindustrialization;as industrial capacity shrinks, most starkly illustrated by Germany’s contracting;chemical and heavy industry;sectors. And there’s another thing Europeans aren’t making more of – Europeans. Eurostat reports, “Almost 2 times fewer children born in the EU in 2022 than 6 decades ago” so Europe will have fewer workers and consumers in the future.

Europe’s limited prospects are opposed to Asia which will see an;increasing share;of global GDP rising from about 45% today to around 58% by 2030. And;Forbes;reports “Asia is expected to contribute about 60% of economic growth in 2024.”

And then there’s Africa which will be the “second-fastest-growing region after Asia,” according to the;African Development Bank. The Bank also notes that ten African countries “will be among the world’s top 20 fastest- growing economies in 2024, sustaining the trend of the past two decades,” though the outlook is mixed across the continent.

And the growth of;Africa’s population;will have the biggest impact on global demographics this century, increasing by a factor of almost five from 2000 to 2100. “GDP per person employed” as measured by the;World Bank;is vastly higher for Europe than for Africa, but a market of Africa’s size can’t be ignored.

Countries mostly trade with their;neighbors;and the Central Asia republics are no exception. Their challenge is that the neighbors include Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan, all targets of Washington’s enmity for unfinished business: Tehran, the 1979 revolution; Kabul, the 2021 defeat of NATO; and Moscow, the peaceful end to the Cold War.

And opportunities to the South are sizeable: Pakistan (population over 240 million), Iran (almost 90 million), India (1.4 billion), and the Arab Gulf petro states (Gulf Cooperation Council states are classified by the;World Bank;as “High income,” and Iraq is “Upper middle income”).

Turkmenistan and Iran share over 2,200 km of land and maritime borders. During the first half of 2022 their trade $233 million, a big jump over 2021 trade of $227 million.

Turkmenistan wants to be a Central Asia;transit hub;and can;link;Russia, Iran, the Central Asia republics, and India via the North-South Transport Corridor, which Ashgabat;joined in 2023.

Uzbekistan has publicly engaged with the Taliban;in 2018;and in 2022 hosted a 30-nation;conference;on the future of the region in the wake of the Taliban victory. Tashkent also wants improved relations with Iran and access to the seaports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. Uzbekistan’s president Shavkat Mirziyoyev;visited Iran;in 2023 and the two sides inked agreements in agriculture, energy, customs affairs, Chabahar port, the environment, industry, and tourism, and announced their intent to increase trade to $3 billion annually.

Tashkent’s key regional initiative is the;trans-Afghan railway;to connect Central Asia to Pakistan, and to facilitate the exploitation of Afghanistan’s mineral resources, believed to be worth;$1 trillion. The $6.9 billion project will face engineering challenges but a bigger risk is unresolved Taliban-Pakistan tensions. But if Pakistan and the Taliban can’t resolve their dispute, Uzbekistan has Plan B, Iran’s ports and the North-South Transport Corridor.

Or, as;Andrew Korybko;has observed, even if the rail line gets no further than Afghanistan, that may allow Uzbekistan to backhaul the minerals for processing in Uzbekistan, or to export them to Russia or China.

Kazakhstan hosts the Middle Corridor but is also interested in Southern routes, in line with Astana’s;multi-vector foreign policy, reinforced in early 2024 when Kazakh president;Kassym-Jomart Tokayev;noted that the Middle Corridor complements China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Kazakhstan plans to;increase trade;with Iran, and in 2023 Kazakhstan’s prime minister noted that Iran is a;strategic partner;of Kazakhstan in the Persian Gulf. In 2022 Tehran and Astana inaugurated a;rail link;that connects Kazakhstan to Turkiye via Iran.

In November 2023, Tajikistan’s president Emomali Rahmon hosted a visit by Iran’s late president, Ebrahim Raisi, Raisi’s second visit in 18 months, in an effort to continue improving relations. In October 2023, Iran’s;defense minister;visited;Dushanbe, and in May 2022, Iran’s;chief of staff;of the armed forces arrived and announced the launch of local production of the Ababil-2 drone.

Tajikistan’s foreign trade is with Kazakhstan, Switzerland, China, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Russia. Tajikistan shares a 1,200 km border with Afghanistan that was a major smuggling route for Afghan opium before the Taliban banned opium harvesting so the countries have established transport route that can be repurposed to legitimate cargo.

The Central Asia republics value their ties to the U.S. but are uninterested in helping Washington with its “unfinished business” in Iran and Afghanistan, and would rather make up for the lost decades of the 2001-2021 American intervention in Afghanistan.

The republics will use the Middle Corridor to increase trade with Europe, but can’t ignore their neighbors to the South who unfortunately have been targeted by U.S., European Union, and United Nations sanctions. Washington can “tsk-tsk” all it wants but it won’t make up the lost opportunity that comes with ignoring trade with (and via) Iran and Afghanistan, or make up for the region’s “lost decades,” create jobs for their large youth populations, or manage potential rural-to-urban migration as a result of climate change-induced water shortages.

Trade with Afghanistan is part of being a good neighbor, and that trade will help Afghanistan find jobs for the;1.5 million Afghan refugees;who have returned from Pakistan and Iran. More jobs may lessen the appeal of fighting for the Islamic State of Al-Qaeda which will benefit the West, and satisfy a key objective of the Central Asian republics: stability along the border with Afghanistan.

And the republics understand they can’t ignore geography:;Tass;reports Afghanistan is ready to ink a;transit agreement;with Turkmenistan, Russia, and Pakistan; Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan plan to build a;logistics hub;in northwestern Afghanistan to facilitate the export of Russian oil to South Asia by road and rail. These projects will do more than generate cash; they will start integrating Afghanistan into the affairs of the region and teach the Taliban the local “rules of the road” and so build confidence between ;the governments of the region.

Washington’s economic warfare on Iran and Afghanistan is a tax on the region, with no offsetting benefits.  The completion of the Middle Corridor will please the Americans and will benefit the region, but it is an “and” solution not an “or” solution for Central Asia’s future connectivity and economic growth.

• This article was published at OilPrice.com

By Julio S. Amador III and Deryk Matthew N. Baladjay

One of the first policy directives given by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to his government is the “digitalisation of vital government services.”[1] However, this mandate is nothing new to the wider global economy. The ongoing process of digitalisation is swiftly reshaping the contours of business and trade, while intersecting with international politics. The evolution of innovative technologies facilitated the emergence of a world without conventional borders, albeit accompanied by a surge in intricate digital challenges. Noteworthy among these challenges are dilemmas associated with managing cross-border data flows, enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and safeguarding consumer welfare. These concerns, far from being confined within domestic borders, extend to regional domains and global ones, marking a paradigm shift in the complexity and interconnectivity of contemporary digital issues.[2]

The digital sector, buoyed by robust government support, serves as a substantial driver of the Philippine economy. As of 2020, the estimated value of the Internet economy within the Philippines amounted to USD 7.5 billion. Projections indicate a noteworthy annual growth rate of 30 percent, with expectations set for the sector to expand significantly, reaching an estimated escalation to USD 28 billion by 2025. This trajectory underscores the pivotal role played by government backing in fostering the growth and sustainability of the country’s digital landscape.[3] Bilateral partners also play a significant role in supporting the Philippines’ digital transformation.[4] Of all countries with much stake in the Philippines’ digitalisation, none has matched the promise and ambition of China’s economic presence in the country.[5] Through its Belt and Road Initiative or other informal channels, Beijing and Manila continue to hold economic engagement in high regard. China is flooding the Philippine market with its technologies. To recall, China has been and continues to provide cheap and competitive technology alternatives to Filipinos;[6] its 5G technology is dominating the telecommunications sector;[7] it has begun introducing cloud-based technology[8] and financial technologies;[9] and Beijing has even nearly funded and operated a city-wide surveillance initiative.[10]

While the entrance of Chinese technology into the Philippine digital injects innovation and competition, concerns loom over data security, privacy, and potential economic dependencies. The expanding footprint of Chinese tech giants raises questions about the implications for the nation’s digital sovereignty and the need for a robust legal framework to address these complex issues. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s links with private companies,[11] and the presence of domestic laws that allow the PRC government to request people’s data from private entities, states and peoples have rightly expressed concern over China’s involvement in technology.[12] China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious global infrastructure project, and its Digital Silk Road (DSR) extension further complicate the digital landscape in the Philippines. The Digital Silk Road, focusing on digital interconnectivity, introduces the Philippines to the complexities of international digital cooperation, requiring careful consideration of its implications on national security, technology standards, and regulatory frameworks.[13]

Major challenges for the Philippines include a potential lack of institutional capacity to negotiate complex agreements, manage the cybersecurity risks associated with increased digital interconnectivity, and ensure that economic benefits are distributed equitably. As the country seeks to balance between embracing technological advancements and safeguarding its interests, the importance of strategic planning, international collaboration, and domestic capacity building cannot be overstated.

As the Philippines grapples with the influx of Chinese technology and participation in BRI-DSR, the need for a stronger legal and policy framework becomes increasingly apparent. The existing laws have proven insufficient in addressing the intricate challenges posed by the digital age; what is required is a comprehensive and adaptive legal infrastructure that safeguards national interests, ensures data privacy, and promotes fair competition. In navigating these uncharted waters, the Philippines requires astute policy decisions, legal fortification, and diplomatic acumen. This comprehensive examination of the evolving digital landscape in the Philippines encompasses not only economic and technological considerations but also geopolitical and legal dimensions.

THE PHILIPPPINES’ DIGITALISATION EFFORTS

The Philippines is embracing the digital age, as signalled by recent policy pronouncements from the Marcos Jr. administration. However, despite a longstanding ambition for a digital presence, ​​it was not until the onset of the coronavirus pandemic that major service sectors were prompted to embrace digital technologies.[14] Spearheading the country’s digitalisation efforts is the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT), established in 2017.[15] The DICT is mandated to enhance ICT policy and planning, improve public access to technologies, facilitate intra-agency resource-sharing and capacity-building, ensure consumer protection, and foster ICT industry development.

The Philippine government cannot create and implement effective and efficient digitalisation projects and programmes without digital-focused and up-to-date legislation and regulations. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, the Philippine government took a regulatory and preventive approach[16] when it passed several of its digital-focused legislation, such as the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of 1995,[17] the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998,[18] and the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007.[19] Subsequently, the country pioneered legislation relevant to the changing digital landscape, with the Electronic Commerce Act[20] and the Data Privacy Act of 2012[21] being among the first of their kind in the ASEAN region. Soon after, legislation began to focus on the rapid facilitation of digital adoption in the Philippine government. Laws began to focus on encouraging foreign direct investments, inviting international interlocutors, and facilitating the ease of doing business among market players.

In spite of new laws and regulations, the Philippine Government lags in ensuring that its earlier established laws remain relevant and updated. This has resulted in a corpus of antiquated laws regulating new technological breakthroughs. The chasm that exists between the two has slowed the Philippines’ digitalisation push which began as early as the late 1990s. For instance, the 1995 Public Telecommunications Law, which is still in effect, is designed to focus on traditional telecommunications and does not include substantial provisions on the internet. While technological breakthroughs are very fluid and dynamic, legal responses and regulatory approaches have been reasonably short-sighted.[22] Because of the chasm, the Philippines had delayed policy responses to important technological novelties such as AI,[23] cloud technology,[24];quantum computing,[25] and many more. Innovation was bolstered by the passing of the Philippine Innovation Act in 2019.[26] Addressing legal gaps had largely been a wait-and-see strategy, based on systematically learning from international best approaches and adopting a tailored approach unique to the country, as done with the Data Privacy Act of 2012 which drew heavy inspiration from the European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive and the subsequent proceedings on the General Data Protection Regulation that began as early as June 2011.[27] What the Philippines cannot properly address legally and has raised alarm among certain sectors is the dual nature of technologies entering the country.

CONTENDING WITH CHINESE TECHNOLOGY

Since late 2013, China’s BRI has put the country in a leading global role in economic development. Starting with only nine countries, BRI has captured the attention of both developed and developing nations. This momentum rapidly accelerated,[28] resulting in a total of 148 countries signing memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with China. As an integral component of BRI, China initiated the DSR in 2015. This sets itself apart from the BRI not only in its thematic emphasis but also in terms of the involved Chinese stakeholders, contract types, and geographical scope.[29] Today, through the DSR, China has invested in the Philippines along certain critical fronts including digital infrastructure (both hard and soft infrastructures), major smart city projects, financial technology, and the Philippine supply chain.

China’s engagement in telecommunications, both terrestrial and subsea projects, has also been a focal point. The duopoly of Smart Communications and Globe Telecom, powered by Huawei, has played a central role in this domain, with the entry of new players like DITO Telecommunity and Converge ICT disrupting the industry.[30]

Surveillance technology export is another noteworthy aspect, with China’s influence extending to the installation of monitoring systems in major Philippine cities.[31] Projects like the “Safe Philippines” initiative, backed by China, involved the deployment of thousands of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras.[32] China’s export of surveillance technology has faced scrutiny and public opposition, leading to the discontinuation of some projects.[33]

The DITO[34] and Safe Philippines[35] projects raise significant national security concerns, particularly in light of the Chinese National Intelligence Law of 2017.[36] As a joint venture between a China state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a Philippine private company, DITO may bear the brunt of the requirement to provide data to the Chinese government, and this arrangement has direct implications for national security. Entrusting control of parts of the Philippines’ national telecom infrastructure to Chinese SOEs presents clear risks. China’s well-documented use of cyber-attacks for strategic and economic advantages adds an additional layer of concern. Given the Philippines’ existing vulnerability to cyber-attacks, relinquishing control over cyber-infrastructure could potentially compromise the country’s ability to defend itself. TikTok, a social media platform owned by Chinese company ByteDance, is immensely popular in the Philippines,[37] ranking as the most downloaded entertainment app despite controversies. The surge in TikTok usage is noted to be correlated to an increase in China-related disinformation in the Philippines,[38] prompting discussions on potential security risks associated with the platform.

Overall, China’s evolving economic interests in the Philippines underscore a strategic pivot towards digital domains, encompassing a wide spectrum of sectors from infrastructure and telecommunications to energy, surveillance technology, and entertainment platforms. Undeniably, the shift toward a digital economy offers the potential to enhance efficiency, innovation and productivity, and generate new job opportunities. However, trust and confidence in China’s BRI has taken a toll on account of slow delivery of promised gains.[39] This shift in the Philippines’ disposition towards the BRI not only reflects geopolitical considerations but also highlights increasing concerns about China’s economic deceleration,[40] property market crises, and the associated challenges tied to foreign investments. For the Philippines, China’s engagement[41] seems to be characterised by a form of diplomacy often referred to as a “pledge trap”, that involves strategic concessions in the South China Sea in exchange for promises of investment which have not, for the large part, materialised.[42]

Moreover, concerns arise about BRI-DSR projects being coupled with authoritarian tendencies, enabling governments to use centralised power to control citizens through digital tools and technology.[43] Some democracies, like the Philippines, are worried that China might spread its model of;technology-driven authoritarianism.[44] This concern comes as Chinese firms get involved in building 5G networks and infrastructures in recipient countries, setting technology standards. This involvement raises fears of spying and coercion. Already, PRC-based hackers are attempting to breach the websites of Philippine political leaders and national security organisations, aggravating an already volatile security relationship with China.[45] Additionally, the DSR, along with technology norms pushed by other states, offers ways for countries to control their internet through measures like filtering, content moderation, data localisation, and surveillance. What is more worrying is that the CCP’s tightening of its control over PRC tech companies encourage values and practices that can lead to a more divided global internet.[46] This divide emerges[47] as some democracies opt for internet control while others stick to preserving internet freedoms.

CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The country’s archipelagic nature necessitates digital transformation of all its regions, not simply of the major city hubs. The Philippines will have much to do in terms of connectivity and infrastructure, its regulatory and innovation environment, and digital literacy. Taken together as part of a whole, these point to an overarching goal of building up internal resiliencies, so that the Philippines can safely harness technologies.

The Philippines’ deployment of diverse technologies for digital infrastructure, including fixed lines, wireless mobile, satellite internet, and underwater cables. However, acquiring and establishing these technologies is a difficult task, particularly in the absence of sufficient funds for infrastructure investment. Failure to address the connectivity issue will exacerbate the digital divide, particularly due to rapid technological advancements. Findings have indicated that access to adequate internet speeds diminishes in the rural areas of the Philippines.[48]

The Philippine government must also be equipped with relevant policies to facilitate its digitalisation initiatives and adapt to emerging technologies. Unfortunately, many of these regulations are antiquated and lack prompt and clear solutions to the demanding and swiftly evolving requirements posed by Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. As per the International Telecommunication Union, the Philippines is the third most expensive provider of ICT services among all ASEAN countries,[49] considering various ICT price categories. Furthermore, the Philippines’ complex and tedious bureaucratic processes deter many possible investors and competitors from participating in its digital ecosystem, impeding its development.

Connectivity reforms are capital-intensive. The government needs to engage with a wider range of foreign investors from different countries to facilitate and encourage direct foreign investments. Telecommunication companies play a big role in connectivity initiatives, and enabling and supportive network of laws, such as Executive Order No. 32,[50] will streamline the permitting process for the construction of telecommunications and internet infrastructure. Private sector linkages are also important. By partnering and coordinating with relevant actors in the private sector, the government can establish strategies and frameworks to motivate them to participate, stimulate investments, and jumpstart digital infrastructure in the country.

Regulation is a double-edged sword, and it must facilitate innovation. The Philippines will need to update legislation by developing custom-made reforms taken from international best practices in consultation with domestic and foreign partners. The digital transformation of regulatory processes needs to be supported as well. For instance, the roll out of the novel Electronic Business One-Stop Shop (EBOSS) system[51] by the DICT, ARTA, and the DILG require resources and support to ensure that national government agencies and local government units have the human and physical capacity to fully integrate it. This would also propel its efforts to establish ease of doing business for the business community. The government needs to support projects that promote good regulatory principles. The Philippine-Business Regulations Information System (PBRIS)[52] for example aims to cultivate and practise good and sound regulatory principles among government agencies, such as conducting regulatory impact assessments before agencies introduce or revise new regulations.

Advancing digitalisation in the Philippines poses challenges for stakeholders due to several factors. Given the country’s limited capacities and its association with China, ongoing collaboration in digital development is unavoidable. However, to mitigate the possible risks that come along with engaging with Beijing, the Philippines must equip itself with the necessary tools and mechanisms to maintain a balance between advancing its digital development and ensuring digital security. President Marcos Jr.’s renewed push for digitalisation is a good signal as significant digital reforms begin taking shape. However, much like with past administrations, reforms only hold if there is impetus and political will.

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

• About the authors: Julio S. Amador III is Senior Fellow at the Ateneo Policy Center and Philippine Lead Investigator for the NORM Project. Deryk Matthew N. Baladjay is Research Associate for the NORM Project. This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway as part of the project ‘Shaping the Digital World Order: Norms and Agency along the Digital Silk Road in Southeast Asia (NORM)’, under grant number 325129. For more information on the NORM project, please visit: https://www.prio.org/projects/1920.
• Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS)

The post Актриса Джессика Альба поделилась личным секретом крепкого брака first appeared on The News And Times.

Идея организовать работу «Медвежьих патрулей» была озвучена впервые на встрече с президентом РФ Владимиром Путиным в январе 2024 года.

Пострадавший сопровождал мужчину на военно-врачебной комиссии.

washington — Washington and Seoul have expressed alarm about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s upcoming visit to Pyongyang, while Beijing says it has no intention of interfering with the cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

Putin will pay a state visit to North Korea on Tuesday and Wednesday, the North’s official KCNA news agency announced on Monday. His trip to Pyongyang will be followed by a two-day state visit to Vietnam, where discussions will touch on trade and economic cooperation, the Kremlin said Monday.

The South Korean Foreign Ministry said it opposes Moscow and Pyongyang deepening their military cooperation through Putin’s trip to the country.

“All cooperation and exchanges between Russia and North Korea will need to abide by relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and contribute toward the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula,” a spokesperson told VOA’s Korean Service on Monday.

Putin’s visit to the country, the first in 24 years, comes amid increased military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.

North Korea has transferred approximately 10,000 containers that could hold nearly 5 million artillery shells to Russia to fight against Ukraine, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said in an interview with Bloomberg News on Friday.   

All arms exports and imports by North Korea are sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council.

Both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied any arms dealings between them.

Putin’s trip to Pyongyang is expected to increase military cooperation that officially kicked off when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia in September 2023. Kim invited Putin to Pyongyang during his visit to Russia.

“We discourage any government from receiving President Putin,” a State Department spokesperson told VOA’s Korean Service on June 12.

“If he is able to travel freely, it could normalize Russia’s blatant violations of international law and inadvertently send the message that atrocities can be committed in Ukraine and elsewhere with impunity,” the spokesperson said.

Deepening cooperation between Russia and North Korea poses concern for the Korean Peninsula as well as for Ukraine as it defends its “freedom and independence against Russia’s brutal war,” the spokesperson added.

After the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023 for Russia’s alleged war crimes in Ukraine since its unprovoked invasion of the country in February 2022, Putin is limited in his international travels to allied countries.

Since his new presidential term began in May, Putin has visited Belarus, China and Uzbekistan.

In the meantime, Liu Pengyu, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, told VOA on Thursday that “China has no intention [of] interfer[ing] with the exchange and cooperation between two sovereign countries.”

He said, “Both DPRK and Russia are China’s friendly neighbors.” North Korea’s official name is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

China and Russia, both veto-wielding permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have supported North Korea at council meetings held in the past several years by opposing new U.S.-led resolutions condemning North Korea’s ballistic missile launches banned by the U.N.

In March, Moscow vetoed a resolution granting the annual extension of a U.N. panel of experts that monitors sanctions on North Korea while Beijing abstained.

Michael Kimmage, who served on the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff on Russia and Ukraine from 2014 to 2016, said, “Putin wishes to forge a long-term relationship with North Korea, and this would be reflected” in his visit to Pyongyang.

“Not only does North Korea supply Russia with weaponry to use in its war against Ukraine, but a more radical North Korea will pin the resources of Russia’s archenemy, the United States, in East Asia, helping to create a third zone of difficulty for Washington, in addition to Europe and the Middle East,” Kimmage said.

Kimmage, currently the chair at Catholic University of America’s history department, added that Russia’s other partner, China, may not want Pyongyang to be more provocative and may not be pleased with deepening ties between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Earlier this month, Putin threatened to arm the West’s adversaries with long-range missiles that could target the West in response to NATO members, including the U.S., allowing Ukraine to use Western-supplied weapons to target inside Russia.

Evans Revere, a former U.S. State Department official with extensive experience negotiating with North Korea, said Putin’s meeting with Kim in Pyongyang “could reveal the details of Russian support for North Korea.”

“Pyongyang is reportedly interested in missile guidance, engine and fuel technologies, avionics upgrades for its aircraft and assistance with its nuclear program,” he said.

Revere added, “Russia has a significant strategic and tactical interest in complicating the security calculus of the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia. Putin’s visit will soon demonstrate how far Moscow is prepared to go in pursuing that interest.”

VOA’s Soyoung Ahn contributed to this report.

The European Union granted official candidate status to Georgia last year, but analysts say that led by the country’s richest man, the government has turned toward Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Critics warn that Georgia’s democratic future is at stake in October’s elections. Henry Ridgwell reports from Tbilisi.

Второй конференции по Украине не будет, так как первый саммит уже показал свою несостоятельность.

Kansas AG sues Pfizer over ‘misleading’ COVID-19 vaccine claims  WKRC TV Cincinnati