MORE 🧵(1/3)⬇️: Iran has, in recent weeks, repeatedly attacked commercial shipping vessels that used alternative routes through the strait rather than the Iranian-designated traffic separation scheme. It has conducted these attacks to maintain Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian-dictated traffic lanes. Iran also responded to US strikes against more than 80 targets on July 7 (more on the US strikes below) by attacking US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Iranian response caused no casualties. US President Donald Trump has reportedly told his advisers that he will not “resume the war“ unless Iran kills US servicemembers. Iran’s willingness to flaunt the cease

MORE 🧵(1/3)⬇️: Iran has, in recent weeks, repeatedly attacked commercial shipping vessels that used alternative routes through the strait rather than the Iranian-designated traffic separation scheme. It has conducted these attacks to maintain Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian-dictated traffic lanes. Iran also responded to US strikes against more than 80 targets on July 7 (more on the US strikes below) by attacking US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Iranian response caused no casualties. US President Donald Trump has reportedly told his advisers that he will not “resume the war“ unless Iran kills US servicemembers. Iran’s willingness to flaunt the ceasefire by attacking shipping and risk US casualties by attacking US bases nonetheless demonstrates that Iran is willing to risk a resumption of large-scale operations.

The Iranian regime’s media apparatus has repeatedly emphasized the strategic importance of the strait, and that military action may be necessary to ensure Iran maintains control over the strait. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency argued on July 8 that Iran should respond to US actions by disrupting Gulf oil exports, damaging regional energy infrastructure, asserting control over Bab al Mandab, and conducting asymmetric attacks on US forces. Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, separately argued on July 8 that Iran would strike “enemy” targets at a minimum two-to-one ratio and close the Strait of Hormuz following any future strike on Iranian territory or interests. Regime-aligned outlets’ rhetoric intends to normalize a broader coercive campaign in the strait and signals that any US effort to challenge Iranian control over the strait can trigger costs against US forces, Gulf states, energy infrastructure, and other regional chokepoints.Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)NEW: Iran is willing to return to a large-scale conflict with the United States if necessary to secure its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s behavior after the latest US strikes indicates that the Iranian regime values control over the strait more than avoiding renewed escalation with the United States.

Other Key Takeaways:

The present pattern of US strikes does not appear to be changing Iran’s calculus on controlling the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 7 that it struck over 80 targets in Iran in response to repeated Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the strait.

Iran is attempting to coerce Gulf states and others to acquiesce to Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz after Iran failed to secure recognition of its control over the strait through diplomacy.

Iran is attempting to unilaterally impose a vision for the strait’s ”arrangements,” which are supposed to be created in dialogue with the Gulf states, not through coercing the Gulf states. Iranian coercion of the Gulf states is an effort to circumvent the intent of Clause 5, which administration officials noted was designed so that Gulf states would moderate Iranian positions about controlling the strait.

Iran is using the ceasefire to reconstitute its military capabilities, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.

The Lebanese government announced on July 8 that it will participate in negotiations with the US and Israel in Rome, Italy, on July 15 and 16. The Lebanese government earlier claimed that its participation in negotiations would be contingent on an Israeli withdrawal from “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.—  https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2075010813690057158