SUBSCRIBER+ EXCLUSIVE ANALYSIS — With all the attention being paid to Taiwan at the moment, the long-simmering situation in the South China Sea doesn’t always get the attention that it deserves. That’s changing after a spate of close calls and violent run-ins in the critical waterway, primarily involving China and the Philippines.
BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT
This month the two nations traded accusations over a collision between a Chinese coast guard ship and a Philippine supply vessel near the Second Thomas Shoal. Beijing said the Philippine ship had “illegally intruded” into the area and “deliberately and dangerously” approached the Chinese vessel; Manila, which calls the waterway the West Philippine Sea, described the incident as a “brutal assault” by the Chinese. The Philippine government released footage that showed the Chinese boat ram the Philippine vessel. Philippine officials said Chinese crew members armed with spears and knives boarded their vessel, and that several Filipinos were injured in the incident, including one sailor who lost his thumb.
On Friday, China demanded that the U.S. stop supporting “provocations” by the Philippines, after the U.S. expressed concern over China’s “destabilizing actions in the South China Sea.”
Past incidents in the South China Sea have included instances of China firing water cannons at Philippine boats and a mission by a Filipino civilian flotilla to sail to a disputed shoal. Other Southeast Asian nations – Vietnam in particular – have challenged Chinese claims in the contested waters as well.
The competing claims involve both sovereignty and competition over natural resources, and for more than a decade, China has carried out a major military buildup on various contested small islands. As The Cipher Brief has reported, experts and officials are now warning that tensions in the South China Sea may spark a wider conflict.
In the wake of the latest incident, The Cipher Brief turned to three experts to assess the risks. Writer Ethan Masucol spoke with Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong, former Vice Commander of the Philippine Navy; and Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke with a pair of Cipher Brief experts – Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, a former CIA Director of East Asia Operations, and Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
From their different vantage points, all three warned that the risks of escalation are great, and that a 73-year-old mutual defense treaty might draw in the U.S.
“If China physically attacks a treaty ally of the United States,” Montgomery said. “It’s going to put us in a very tough position because this isn’t like Ukraine and Russia, where Ukraine was not a treaty ally. This becomes a credibility issue for the United States.”
THE CONTEXT
- A Chinese coast guard ship rammed a Philippine boat attempting to supply a garrison of Filipino troops on the Sierra Madre, a grounded warship on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The atoll is within the Philippines’ 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
- Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. said Manila will not yield to “any foreign power,” but will not start a war. He added that the Philippines must “do more” than just protest China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea.
- The U.S. condemned China’s “escalatory and irresponsible” actions in the South China Sea and reaffirmed support for Manila.
- The Philippines and the U.S. have a Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in 1951. Updated by recent Bilateral Defense Guidelines, the treaty reaffirms that an armed attack in the Pacific against either country’s armed forces will invoke mutual defense commitments.
- Marcos Jr.’s advisors said the Philippines will not invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty in response to the latest Second Thomas Shoal incident.
- In April 2023, the U.S. and Philippines agreed to expand their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement, giving the U.S. military access to four additional military sites in the Philippines, to a total of nine.
THE EXPERTS
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Rommel Jude G. Ong
Rear Admiral Rommel Jude G. Ong retired in 2019 as Vice Commander of the Philippines Navy. He previously commanded Naval Forces West, Naval Task Forces 11 and 80, Naval Intelligence Security Force, and three commissioned naval vessels. He is currently serving as Professor of Praxis with Ateneo School of Government in Manila. He is a graduate of the Philippines Military Academy, the National Defense College of the Philippines, and the U.S. Naval War College.
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, where he previously served as executive director.
Joseph DeTrani, Former Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks with North Korea
Ambassador DeTrani served as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, ODNI. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.
Excerpts from these interviews have been lightly edited for brevity and clarity.
The Cipher Brief: Given the recent spate of activities in the South China Sea, how worried should we be? How dangerous a moment is this?
DeTrani: It’s a dangerous moment. I think back to the EP-3 incident, when I was the chief of East Asia operations in 2001 at CIA, and a Chinese jet slammed into a (U.S.) reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace and the Chinese lost their pilot. That became a major incident between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. So yes, incidents like this could flare up and escalate very quickly.
Montgomery: We’re starting to get towards the “more likely.” There’ve been lots of incidents in the past, and in the past pretty much everyone has backed down to China. What’s different now is that the current leader, President Marcos of the Philippines, has decided to use a transparency initiative – as in, I’m going to do what I need to do to maintain my legitimate claims to the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. They take press with them sometimes, and it’s really putting the Chinese in a tough position because basically they’ve been a bully. And the last thing a bully likes to see is transparency.
This leads to the idea that it could escalate, that China will either have to be a bigger bully or back down – and China doesn’t have a practice of backing down. They are a bully to their neighbors and one of them is finally standing up.
Ong: We consider it an escalation from previous practices or previous actions [China has] taken in the West Philippine Sea, more specifically for Second Thomas Shoal.
Maybe their perception is their sense of control over the narrative and their control of the situation is being challenged, and their reaction might be one way of compensating for that perception.
The Cipher Brief: President Marcos said two seemingly different things in the aftermath of the latest incident. He said the Philippines has never started a war and has no intention to do so. He also said the Philippines has never and will never “yield to a foreign power.” Unpack those two statements for us.
DeTrani: The latter is right on the mark. He’s not yielding. He’s showing a great resolve. And that’s to be applauded. And they’ve not started a conflict. They’re providing resources to the Second Thomas Shoal. There are troops that are there, maintaining that element of Philippine territory.
Ong: I think it’s a very clear-cut statement. Number one, the Philippine government will not take actions that will start a conflict – but while it takes that position, which is consistent with the UN Charter, it doesn’t mean that we’re going to appease China or give up our sovereign rights in response to China’s actions. So I don’t see any conflict. It’s a very clear statement from a president defending the nation’s interest.
Montgomery: What this is saying is, Look, I’m going to continue to assert my legitimate claims. I’m not going to be the first one to strike an adversary’s ship. I’m going to force the Chinese to continue to act inappropriately if they want to prevent me from doing this. So they’ll continue maritime resupply, they’ll continue to try air resupply. They will maintain the Marines on board that rusting hulk of the Sierra Madre out there, which is an old U.S. landing ship that the Philippines beached there in 1999. But they’re going to maintain their footprint on the Shoal with their people, and they’re going to maintain their claim.
And this is going to be a problem for China. China is not used to having someone stand up to them. China has a definite view that, I’m a big country, you’re a small country, you will bend to my will.
The Cipher Brief: President Marcos’ advisors also said the Philippines was not prepared – on the basis of this or other run-ins with the Chinese in the South China Sea – to invoke the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). What’s in that treaty, and what does it compel in terms of a U.S. response if it’s invoked?
Montgomery: The treaty is from 1951. If one side is attacked, it does say that we’ll get together and come up with a comprehensive plan together. It is not a hair-trigger treaty, but it’s not quite a cup-of-coffee treaty either – like, just give me a call, we’ll have a cup of coffee. It’s somewhere in between.
As a result, we do exercises and war-gaming of events and issues. And we’re at a point where both countries are very willing to exercise elements of the treaty, both as a deterrent indication to China, but also to make sure that we understand each other’s processes and can efficiently and agilely come to a decision – mostly in hopes of deterring China from doing something stupid here.
Ong: The MDT is supposed to be an agreement that in case a (Philippine) government vessel – Navy, coast guard, or whatever – is attacked, then the treaty can be invoked. If a Filipino serviceman, meaning in the uniform service, dies because of actions, then that could be a condition for invoking the MDT.
DeTrani: If it is invoked, it really compels us to come to the aid of the Philippines, if indeed they’re attacked or invaded by a foreign power. So all the pieces come together here when we’re talking about the Second Thomas Shoal.
Montgomery: If China physically attacks a treaty ally of the United States, it’s going to put us in a very tough position because this isn’t like Ukraine and Russia, where Ukraine was not a treaty ally. This becomes a credibility issue for the United States with Japan, with Korea, to some degree with Taiwan, and even with our NATO allies. There are questions out there about the reliability of the United States as a partner. They stretch back to the Trump administration, but the Biden administration’s performance in the withdrawal from Afghanistan did nothing to make people think, well, this is a one-party issue in the United States. Both parties have trouble maintaining credible commitments to allies and partners.
And here, in the middle of Asia, you need to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and here’s a 73-year-old treaty. You need to look like you’re serious if you’re the United States.
I think the Philippines are right to not have said that this event was cause for invocation of the treaty, but we’re much closer today than we were three or four months ago to getting to the point where at a minimum, the Philippines ask for meetings in accordance with the treaty to discuss the increasing threats. The United States is obviously desperately hoping that this doesn’t occur. Part of our public statements about the treaty and our reaffirmation, is to say to China, Look, we’re serious. While at the same time, saying to the Philippines, Please don’t make us do this.
Ong: I think there are many layers or many lenses with respect to MDT here in the Philippines. Of course, the general public, ordinary Filipinos, would say, “OK, we have problems. We need the U.S. We’ll invoke the MDT.”
But from a policy perspective, I think we share the same view with the U.S. government that it’s not something that you invoke outright. And you have to calibrate that. The MDT is a deterrent and it’s like your proverbial nuclear button. Once you push it, then it loses its effect. I think among the policymaking elites, they’re not really that keen on invoking the MDT. As much as possible, the Philippines would like to address the problem alone, because we want to counter the Chinese narrative that this is a U.S.-China problem and that the U.S. is using the Philippines as a pawn.
Our posture has been that we have sovereign rights over the use of our exclusive economic zone. The capacity issue is, we do not have the resources to actually secure the entire exclusive economic zone. So the challenge for the Philippines is actually how do we plug those holes? That’s why we’re looking at working with the U.S. and other strategic partners, to mitigate the gap that we have in terms of capacity, in addressing those challenges to our exclusive economic zone.
The Cipher Brief: When we talk about the South China Sea, there are all these bits of land – islands, outcroppings, rocks, reefs. What are we talking about in terms of actual pieces of territory?
Montgomery: A good deal of these are not islands that generate territorial waters, or exclusive economic zones. They are features that at high tide have no exposure and at low tide have some exposure. China went around and did reclamation with sand and big diggers, and it did this at a number of different islands initially – and they’re not the only country. Vietnam’s done some reclamation as well.
An international tribunal on the law of the sea had a ruling in 2016. The Philippines brought a case against China, and while sovereignty wasn’t decided, China’s nine-dash line (claiming some 80% of the South China Sea) was thrown out.
Second Thomas Shoal is reasonably close to the Philippines and would be naturally in its exclusive economic zone. The waters underneath it and resources around it naturally fall to the Philippines, which is why China’s being so belligerent about this. Scarborough Shoal is a little farther offshore, but they’ve had the same attitude there. This kind of behavior is unacceptable. It runs contrary to international law.
DeTrani: We’re talking about very important pieces of territory. Over 60% of global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. So this is an important area and it’s also rich in minerals and oil and natural gas and fisheries. And this is a territory that for China, goes back to the Han Dynasty, on up to the Qing dynasty to 1911. China’s saying this has always been our turf, we’ve always been in control of the South China Sea. Why are you all concerned about this issue? This has been our territory for centuries.
The Cipher Brief: How much of the South China Sea dispute is really about territory and sovereignty, versus natural resources?
Montgomery: First I would say that sovereignty or misplaced sovereignty is a pretty compelling cause for war. And if we need any examples of that, we can look at Russia and Ukraine and see how misplaced demand for sovereignty from the Russians has led us to this point.
But second, right behind sovereignty, there are economic resources there. There’s a more compelling case when you look at the Chinese-Vietnamese fight over water because there’s known oil and natural gas fields to exploit. But there’s a presumption of resources in what should normally be considered the Philippine exclusive economic zone, the area 200 miles or so off their coast. And there’s fishing, although the Chinese have done a lot to damage the fishing there with their illegal reclamation of islands, of shoals throughout the South China Sea. But there’s still fishing there. There’s still natural resources to be extracted from the seabed. And so there’s value in that. I put that a strong second, but number one is still sovereignty.
Ong: When you talk about sovereign rights, that means the exercise of rights to exploit resources within your exclusive economic zone. So Chinese presence in our areas hits us in two critical points: energy security and food security.
For energy security, we’re talking specifically about Reed Bank. There’s a service contract area there that we’re supposed to explore and tap as a potential replacement for the Malampaya gas, which is expected to be depleted by 2027.
The second is food security. The best representation of that would be Scarborough Shoal, which is a source of protein, at least for the northern part of the Philippines that sources fish there. It might not be substantial in terms of GDP, but just the same, Chinese presence in Scarborough represents impacts on our sense of food security.
The Cipher Brief: What’s a pathway to de-escalation? Are there ways to lower the temperature recipe here?
Montgomery: First of all, in the short term, and from the Philippines point of view, is to try their hardest not to let this escalate at this moment. But in the background has to be this long-term effort, which is where the United States and the Philippines enhance and grow their military relationship and their economic partnership. For the Philippines, China is its first or second largest exporter and importer, and the United States is another big player. But we need to step up and make our economic access easier for the Philippines, to begin to displace China as the economic partner of choice and have strong security arrangements.
We have been growing under the enhanced cooperation defense agreement. About eight years ago, we identified five military bases, and about two years ago, identified four more and continue to develop those.
You create in the mid to long term, a deterrence condition based on economic and security relationships that deter China and enable the Philippines. But in the short term, I think the Philippines’ best role here is to resupply but continue to be the adult, to do it in a non-escalatory way. And I know that sounds crazy, that the Philippines needs to be the adult in the relationship with China when one of them has a GDP that’s like 30 times the other’s. But that’s probably where we’re at.
DeTrani: I was in a track-two dialogue about two months ago with former senior Chinese government officials from the People’s Liberation Army, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, et cetera. And we were talking about flashpoints. What are some of the key areas that we have to be mindful of because we don’t want another 2001 EP-3 incident, where we could see our two countries having an incident and then escalating?
My view was, we have to look at Taiwan very closely because we are committed there. But they pushed back on that and said, No, you have it wrong. It’s the South China Sea that could flare up very quickly. So this is an area that China is resolute on. I think Xi Jinping is very resolute on this. He’s not budging and indeed the United States is not budging on freedom of navigation, and supporting our allies and partners in East Asia, like the Philippines. And I applaud that. So if diplomacy has a role, this is where diplomacy really has to kick in.
We just haven’t been talking to China. I mean, we saw President Biden have a good meeting with Xi Jinping in San Francisco a number of months ago. That was good. Now we see that we have the military-to-military dialogue at the highest levels, but that’s very nascent. That really hasn’t kicked in diplomatically. I just don’t think we have that dialogue.
Ong: I think before we can deescalate, we need to establish some form of trust. Mutual trust has been a casualty of the propaganda war (against the Philippines) for the past year, and it didn’t help that Chinese diplomats, who are supposed to provide a medium for useful exchanges, benign exchanges, have also become vectors of Chinese propaganda. So they have to sort out their house first, and the onus is on them to actually reach out and we go back to the trust-building process.
A second option would be a third party or a disinterested interlocutor, trying to find ways for both parties to maintain this and start talking again. But China is driven by propaganda. We are driven by distrust. We need to create that safe space for diplomatic conversation, which is nonexistent right now.
DeTrani: We need to sit down with China and talk about all these security issues that affect both our countries and our allies and partners, and certainly in the case of the South China Sea. So we need to be tete-a-tete. We need to be sitting down with them and walking through the particulars. And I think that what came out of one of our most recent track-two dialogues about this was that we need to have greater dialogue on these issues. We really need to be doing deep dives into these national security issues so that at least we tee it up to our leadership, so that we don’t stumble into conflict as we almost did with the EP-3 in 2001.
The Cipher Brief: Did you leave that track-two session feeling any better?
DeTrani: Not really. But at least we were talking about it, right?
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