SSSG 2025 Report Talks of Alleged Attempts to Overthrow Government, Foreign Interference, Disinformation

The State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) released its 2025 annual report, speaking, among others, of alleged attempts to overthrow the government “by violent means,” as well as alleged efforts at “destabilization,” foreign interference, and propaganda and disinformation campaigns.

During the report’s coverage year, the SSSG had three leaders: Grigol Liluashvili, who headed the agency from 2019 to April 2025 and is now imprisoned on bribery charges; Anri Okhanashvili, who served from April to August; and Mamuka Mdinaradze, who has led the agency from September and is also set to be replaced.

The report’s release on April 21 coincided with Georgian Dream’s announcement of changes in the country’s law enforcement and security leadership, under which Mdinaradze will leave his post as the SSSG head to become “State Minister for Coordination of Law Enforcement Bodies,” a new position to be created in the Georgian government, while current Interior Minister Geka Geladze will succeed him.

The report described 2025 as a year when “the process of changing the world order and forming a new geopolitical reality intensified,” amid what it described as the “growing competition among major powers and shifting regional balances.”

It added that smaller states faced “increasing difficulty in protecting national interests,” as major actors “sought to limit the ability of countries considered within their sphere of influence to pursue sovereign policies,” including through “the gross interference” in their internal processes and what it called “the instrumentalization of international mechanisms.”

Against this backdrop, the SSSG said that Georgia continued to face “a high level of internal and external threats,” as well as “the possibility of instigation of destructive processes in the country and the creation of an unstable environment.”

Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region was again identified in this year’s report as the “greatest threat” to Georgia’s national security. The agency pointed to continued challenges, including “annexation, illegal detentions, and the illegal process of so-called borderization.”

The report said that in 2025, the SSSG carried out “active operations aimed at preventing destructive activities conducted through hybrid warfare tools by foreign special services and certain internal and external actors.” While the report did not name specific states, it added that “as a result of measures taken, an attempt to change the government by violent means was thwarted.”

The SSSG said it continued to deepen cooperation with international partners and acted “in accordance with the principles of the rule of law, political neutrality, proportionality, and the protection of human rights and freedoms.”

Occupied Territories

The report noted that in 2025, “the occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region and the accompanying destructive processes remained an existing challenge for Georgia,” noting that Russia conducted “the illegal militarization and military exercises,” in some cases with the involvement of unmanned aerial vehicles.

“The use of components of hybrid warfare continued, including illegal detentions and the so-called borderization, which aimed at damaging the humanitarian and security environment on the ground,” the report noted.

According to the SSSG, annexation efforts continued “with high intensity,” including through so-called educational programs and policies discriminating against ethnic Georgians in the occupied regions. The report also noted diverging local dynamics, pointing to growing anti-Russian sentiment in Abkhazia amid Moscow’s “direct involvement in ongoing processes,” while describing the socio-economic situation in the Tskhinvali region as “severe.”

According to the report, Russian forces stationed in the occupied regions, including the 7th and 4th military bases and Federal Security Service (FSB) units, conducted numerous military exercises, some involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). “At the end of 2025, a so-called training center for UAVs was opened in the Tskhinvali region, while in occupied Abkhazia, work was ongoing on the production of UAVs.”

“To maintain effective control over the occupied regions, Russia used energy, financial, and political levers,” the report said.

It noted that Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Head of Russia’s Presidential Administration, who oversees policy in the occupied regions, visited the regions nine times in 2025. According to the SSSG, his activities included providing “financial assistance” to the occupation regime in “various forms,” and continuing “pressure against persons critically disposed towards the annexation processes.”

“In particular, criminal prosecution was initiated against so-called opposition-minded individuals, including journalists, Russian citizenship was revoked, and they were entered into the register of foreign agents,” the report said, adding that “the occupying force attempted, through punitive measures, to isolate individuals who could promote anti-Russian sentiments and exert influence on the population.”

The report described further steps like “deliberate intensification” of transport and logistical links by air, rail, and sea. It also highlighted the reopening of the Sokhumi airport, which it said Moscow sought to sustain through subsidized flights.

At the same time, the SSSG said that ties between the occupied regimes and Russian federal entities deepened in 2025, with frequent mutual visits and consultations with Russian officials and ministries. Measures facilitating annexation included the simplified issuance of Russian driver’s licenses and simplified passports, with Russian State Traffic Inspectorate personnel working locally for this purpose.

The report further pointed to a policy of “Russification,” pursued through educational and youth-focused initiatives, particularly in the predominantly Georgian-populated districts of Gali and Akhalgori. These programs promoted study and professional opportunities in Russia and were accompanied by so-called cooperation agreements in education and youth affairs, according to the SSSG.

Financial dependence on Russia also remained significant, as the report said the so-called 2025 budget of the Tskhinvali region amounted to approximately USD 118.6 million, of which about 80% was funded by Russia. In Abkhazia, the budget stood at around USD 252 million, with roughly 38% (USD 97 million) financed by Moscow.

According to the report’s estimates, 34 illegal detention cases were recorded in the Tskhinvali region, while 40 cases were observed in Abkhazia. Charges were often based on “fabricated accusations,” including “espionage, so-called smuggling, possession of narcotic substances, and others.”

By the end of 2025, 15 Georgian citizens remained in illegal detention, including long-term detainees Kristine Takalandze and Kakha Muradov. Several others were released during the year following Tbilisi’s efforts, including Irakli Bebua, Ivane Lutidze, and Nika Mamastarashvili.

The report highlighted specific cases, including the detention of Shalva Khizanishvili in Abkhazia on fabricated “espionage” charges and the detention and subsequent expulsion of activist Tamila [Tamar] Mearakishvili.

It also noted continued impunity for past killings, including Tamaz Ginturi (2023), and unresolved cases involving Archil Tatunashvili, Giga Otkhozoria, Irakli Kvaratskhelia, Davit Basharuli, Vitali (Temur) Karbaia, and others.

The so-called borderization process continued during 2025, particularly in the Tskhinvali region, where 55 cases were recorded (compared to 3 in Abkhazia). This included installation of “various artificial barriers, fences, barbed wire, and so-called border-marking banners” as well as surveillance systems, and trenches.

The report said these actions were accompanied by an “aggressive disinformation campaign” aimed at portraying occupation regimes as independent actors and creating an “image of the enemy,” thereby undermining Georgia internationally.

“The occupying force actively attempted to present the occupation regimes instead of Russia as a ‘party’ to the Russia-Georgia conflict, which it attempted to do, among other means, by pushing for the signing of so-called delimitation-demarcation and so-called ‘non-use of force’ agreements,” the report said.

The document also noted that persons “who had left Georgia’s occupied territories” continued to take an “illegal part” in the Russia-Ukraine war. Various types of illegal activities were recorded in connection with Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia, including the sending of certain inventory, according to the report.

According to the report, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) hotline mechanism remained a key tool for incident response, activated 1,960 times during the year: 1,657 times in the direction of the occupied Tskhinvali region, and 303 times in the direction of occupied Abkhazia.

State Security and Counter-Intelligence

The SSSG said the security environment surrounding Georgia continued to be “significantly influenced” by the Russia-Ukraine war and the “processes unfolding in the Middle East.”

“As in previous years, during the reporting period, the level of hybrid threats originating from certain external and internal actors in the country remained high,” the report said, adding, “Using so-called soft power, covert operations, and information warfare tools, various active measures were carried out against the country’s national interests.”

“These included attempts to destabilize the political environment in Georgia and to change the government through violent means,” the report said.

A major incident cited in this regard is the October 4, 2025, election-day tensions in Tbilisi, when a group of protesters, following a call by organizers, attempted to occupy the presidential palace in central Tbilisi but were dispersed by police. Dozens of participants, including the organizers, were arrested in the following days.

The report said that “a certain group of individuals operating within Georgia and abroad planned to provoke civil unrest and destabilization in the country, with the ultimate goal of changing the government through violent means.” It added that alongside what it called “the organized group violence” and an attempt to seize the presidential palace, “plans were in place to carry out acts of sabotage.”

• 05/10/2025 – SSSG Says Arms Cache Found, Links to October 4 Unrest, Ukraine
• 20/10/2025 – October 4 Continues to Haunt Georgia as Questions Persist

“As a result of measures taken by the State Security Service, in coordination with the relevant state agencies, the development of destructive processes in the country and the attempt to change the government by violent means on October 4, 2025, were averted. The individuals involved in violent actions and the organizers were detained and charged,” the report said.

It added that eight criminal investigations were launched in 2025 on charges including sabotage and assisting foreign actors, and 15 additional cases were initiated by counter-intelligence units, and 13 individuals were prosecuted.

Disinformation and Propaganda

According to the report, “a growing trend of disinformation and propaganda campaigns against Georgia persisted” in 2025. The report said that “alongside foreign special services, certain groups operating in Georgia, as well as representatives of various countries and international and regional institutions and media, were actively involved in it.” The report argued that youth, alongside ethnic and religious minorities, were the “main targets” of these campaigns.

The report said that the “propaganda narratives coming both from within the country and from abroad” had a “political component” while also contributing to “the polarization of society in the country and to the discrediting of Georgia’s image as a state carrying democratic and Western values,” as well as “the growth of public distrust and dissatisfaction toward state institutions.”

They “encouraged attempts to change Georgia’s constitutional order and state authorities through unconstitutional means, and caused damage to Georgia’s partnership relations with its strategic allies,” the report said.

It further claimed that “disinformation and double-standard information campaigns originating from Western countries and institutions have contributed to both certain public and political groups operating in Georgia and foreign special services conducting effective anti-Western propaganda, fostering nihilism toward Western institutions among parts of society.”

In this context, the report referred to the BBC investigative report that suggested that Georgian authorities may have used a chemical compound “camite” to disperse protests in late 2024, following which the State Security Service (SSSG) announced the opening of an investigation into alleged abuse of office and “assistance to a foreign organization in hostile activities.”

The report said that BBC report “in a way, became part of the disinformation campaign against our country and could have caused negative consequences in the country,” adding that with “the timely response of the state and the State Security Service, expressed in conducting prompt investigative actions on this issue and proactively informing the public, the negative outcomes that the aforementioned disinformation report aimed at were prevented.”

The report then made several allegations, claiming that “on the order of foreign powers” and “in exchange for material compensation,” certain journalists, experts, and political analysts were producing materials of a “tendentious and propagandistic nature, including on political and other significant topics.”

It further alleged that some representatives of “foreign-funded media” outlets organized cultural and educational events that, in the agency’s words, “served to conduct propagandistic activities in the interests of the commissioning state.” The report also claimed that diaspora organizations operating abroad “continued to remain within the sphere of interest of foreign countries’ special services.”

The agency added that throughout the reporting period, it was “continuously monitoring” what it describes as propagandistic campaigns conducted as part of a broader “information war.” It said to have identified social media accounts being used for the “incitement of discord and nationalist sentiments in the regions of Georgia and that it took “corresponding measures provided for by legislation” in response.

In terms of cybersecurity, the SSSG said it responded to “177 computer security incidents of varying severity, among which 14 particularly significant incidents were identified and eliminated, the majority of which revealed the interests of foreign special services and/or cyber-criminals associated with them.”

Fight Against Terrorism

The report outlined a range of terrorism-related risks, including potential attacks by supporters of international terrorist organizations, the possible return of Georgian fighters affiliated with ISIS and Al-Qaeda operating in Syria and Iraq, and the use of Georgia as a “transit route” by terrorist groups.

It also cited “possible attempts to finance or otherwise support terrorist organizations from Georgia,” and “possible recruitment of foreign or Georgian citizens present in Georgia by members/supporters of terrorist organizations.”

• 20/04/2026 – SSSG Arrests Two on Terrorism Allegations Linked to Islamic State

According to the SSSG, up to 15 Georgian citizens and their family members remained in prisons and detention camps in Syria in 2025, noting that “in case of attempts to return them to Georgia, the Counterterrorism Center will provide an appropriate legal response within the framework of an investigation.”

The report noted that no terrorist attacks occurred in Georgia in 2025. It said that Georgia continued to fulfill its international obligations, including the implementation of the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). Two additional Georgian citizens convicted on terrorism charges were added to the national sanctions list.

According to the report, 14 terrorism-related criminal investigations were conducted in 2025, including six initiated directly on terrorism charges. Criminal prosecution was launched against 11 individuals, three of whom were charged under terrorism-related provisions.

Fight Against Corruption

The SSSG described corruption as one of the key “national security matters,” noting that in 2025, 54 criminal investigations were launched by its Anti-Corruption Agency, and 104 individuals were charged with offenses including bribery, abuse of official authority, excess of power, money laundering, and official forgery.

It also reported the return of 126,362 sq.m. of “illegally obtained land” valued at GEL 1,086,410 to the state, release of 28 individuals from liability under amnesty laws. Whistleblower reports increased to 156 cases, reflecting what the agency describes as “growing public awareness.”

“Of these, investigations were launched into 15, three were consolidated with existing criminal cases, 48 were forwarded to relevant agencies, 22 were found to contain no indicators of a criminal offense, 66 are still under review, and two matters were already being examined by another agency and were not granted further proceedings.”

Also Read:

• 30/04/2025 – SSSG 2024 Report Takes Aim at Western “Disinformation,” “Discreditation”, Broaches Planned “Liquidation” of GD Leadership
• 21/04/2024 – State Security Service 2023 Report
• 07/07/2023 – State Security Service of Georgia Issues 2022 Report
• 18/04/2022 – State Security Service Issues 2021 Report