MORE: Continued Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions will likely continue to force the Russian military command to choose between defending against and trying to reverse the effects of the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and material for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline, including the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine‘s Fortress Belt, which ISW assessed likely had begun as of March 19.Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)NEW: Ukrainian forces have intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure within roughly the last two weeks (since the night of March 22 to 23), focusing on the Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast critical to Russian oil exports.
Other Key Takeaways:
The limitations of available Russian air defenses and the challenges inherent in protecting large infrastructure facilities across thousands of kilometers of distance are hindering the Kremlin’s efforts to defend against Ukrainian long-range strikes.Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions continue to disrupt Russian efforts in the Pokrovsk direction and the Russian spring-summer offensive throughout the theater.
Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions continue to present the Russian military command with dilemmas that overstretched Russian forces appear challenged to meet.
Russia continues to use gas grenades in frontline chemical weapons strikes — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Russian forces launched 93 drones against Ukraine. (1/2)— https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2040942441474248792
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) Apr 6, 2026
The post MORE: Continued Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions will likely continue to force the Russian military command to choose between defending against and trying to reverse the effects of the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and material for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline, including the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine‘s Fortress Belt, which ISW assessed likely had begun as of March 19. first appeared on October Surprise 2016 – octobersurprise2016.org.
