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Analysis | Checking Georgia’s Anti-EU Drift


Since Georgia regained its independence in 1991, the ruling elites and the broader public have converged around a shared aspiration to integrate Georgia into the European political, legal, cultural, and economic space. This decades-long convergence came to an end when Georgia’s governing party, Georgian Dream, abandoned democracy and the path toward EU integration at the very moment it became a realistic possibility for the country.

As elite-driven Euroscepticism continues to harden and could eventually erode public support for EU integration, the breakdown of representative politics, a fragmented and poorly adaptive pro-democracy space, and widespread societal political apathy pose the greatest structural threats to Georgia’s democracy and its EU aspirations. Addressing these challenges should be the top priority on the political agenda for both established and emerging political actors alike.


Irakli Sirbiladze is a foreign policy analyst and visiting lecturer at Tbilisi State University, and a ReThink.CEE Fellow 2023 of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.


The Public, Ruling Elites, and EU Integration

For decades, the Georgian public and its governing elites were aligned in their support for EU integration. Time-series datasets such as Caucasus Barometer (2011-2024) and Knowledge of and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia (2009-2023) have consistently shown that a credible majority of Georgians support EU membership. On numerous occasions, Georgians have protested in large numbers to defend the country’s European future.

Source: Caucasus Barometer, Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset Georgia, 2011-2024

Georgians see both benefits and concerns associated with EU accession. According to the 2025 poll commissioned by the EU, most Georgians associate the EU with the benefits of peace and security, a better future for their children, and an improved quality of life and living standards, as well as with the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. The top concerns include the risk of emigration, the impact on relations with Russia, and the potential loss of traditions, culture, and national freedom. Overall, as the graphs below illustrate, a majority of Georgians believe that EU accession offers more advantages than disadvantages. The time-series dataset Knowledge of and Attitudes toward the EU shows largely similar responses.

Source: EU NeighboursEast, Annual Survey 2025, Georgia, p.16

Elite-led decisions regarding EU membership relied on and enjoyed public support. All governments in Georgia embraced the country’s European identity and took steps to that effect both on paper and in practice.

On paper, strengthening Georgia’s ties with the EU and NATO became a constitutional obligation for state institutions in 2017. In practice, Georgia achieved major milestones in its relations with the EU, including signing the Association Agreement and the DCFTA and securing visa-free travel to the Schengen Area. In 2021, the Georgian government joined Ukraine and Moldova in asking the EU to recognize Georgia’s European Perspective.

However, despite these efforts, Georgia’s path to EU membership remained aspirational due to the so-called “enlargement fatigue” within the Union. Russia’s war in Ukraine brought enlargement back to the agenda, making Georgia’s EU membership path politically more realistic than ever before.

Paradoxically, as Georgia was granted candidate status at the end of 2023, Georgian Dream reneged on public preferences for EU integration.

Paradoxically, as Georgia was granted candidate status at the end of 2023, Georgian Dream reneged on public preferences for EU integration. Throughout 2024 and 2025, the ruling party adopted repressive laws targeting civil society and independent media, held widely-disputed parliamentary elections in October 2024 and what many saw as sham local elections in October 2025, paused EU accession for four years, and jailed or harassed individual protesters and a significant number of its political rivals. Furthermore, it threatened to ban major opposition parties and stifled civil society organizations.

In 2025, the European Commission declared Georgia a „candidate country in name only“, and a major tangible outcome of ties with the EU – visa-free travel in the Schengen area – is now under threat due to Georgian Dream’s turn away from democracy.

As Georgia’s EU accession moved from being aspirational to a real possibility, accepting the EU’s democratic conditionality would have threatened Georgian Dream’s hold on power.

Georgian Dream’s dramatic transformation from a pro-democracy and pro-EU party into an anti-democratic and anti-EU political project is driven by concerns about regime survival. As Georgia’s EU accession moved from being aspirational to a real possibility, accepting the EU’s democratic conditionality would have threatened Georgian Dream’s hold on power. Yet, the party did not formally abandon the idea of EU integration; instead, it turned it into a strategy for its political survival.

Lacking internal and external legitimacy, it has constructed an image of the European Union as an external enemy, portraying it as a threat to Georgia’s security, sovereignty, and traditional way of life. By doing so, it has pursued a populist narrative and sought to maintain the illusion of commitment to European integration, convincing its support base that Georgian Dream seeks EU membership without compromising Georgia’s security, sovereignty, or traditional values.

Triangle of Sadness in Georgian Politics

Georgian politics faces at least three structural problems: the onset of authoritarianism and the breakdown of representative politics; fragmentation and a lack of political vision among pro-democracy actors; and societal-level apathy and mistrust toward politics and political parties.

Georgia is now an electoral autocracy, where politics is a top-down, elite-led exercise that leaves no space or will to accommodate public preferences. In 2024, the reputable V-DEM Institute categorized Georgia as an electoral autocracy.

Over the years, Georgia’s governing party has closed all institutional avenues through which public preferences could be articulated. Whereas street protests once compelled Georgian Dream to make political concessions, peaceful protesters are now subject to harassment and repression. State institutions implement a partisan agenda, political pluralism is under threat, civic space has shrunk, and independent media and universities are targeted. Checks and balances have been eroded, as parliament acts as a rubber stamp and courts remain loyal to the governing party.

Despite existential threats to Georgia’s democracy and statehood, political parties have underperformed in three core areas: unity, vision, and outreach.

In short, politics in Georgia reflects the preferences not of its citizenry, but of the Georgian Dream party and its patron, Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Fragmentation and a lack of political vision among pro-democracy and pro-EU actors add to the challenge. Despite existential threats to Georgia’s democracy and statehood, political parties have underperformed in three core areas: unity, vision, and outreach. They have failed to forge a unified political front against the autocratizing Georgian Dream party. They have also proven unable to articulate a political vision that offers credible solutions to the mounting challenges faced by the public. Finally, they have failed to meaningfully engage with citizens, especially beyond the capital city, to rebuild trust in politicians and politics.

While it is true that the ruling party’s repressive measures, including the arrest of major opposition leaders, have rendered them vulnerable, some of the failures are of their own making.

Societal-level political apathy and mistrust of political parties are also causes for serious concern. The Caucasus Barometer (2012-2024) and Knowledge of and attitudes toward the EU in Georgia (2009-2023) time-series datasets show that trust in political parties is below 15%, with a plurality of Georgians either distrustful of political parties or neutral; and while half of Georgians are interested in politics, the plurality is not. According to the EU-commissioned 2025 opinion poll, political parties are the least trusted institutions in Georgia, with 72% of Georgians expressing distrust in them.

Source: EU NeighboursEast, Annual Survey 2025, Georgia, p.16

However, the same poll shows that Georgians take an increased interest in issues that affect their lives. For them, the most pressing problems include unemployment, poverty, low salaries and pensions, and issues related to territorial conflicts, security, and war. A credible majority of Georgians also thinks that democracy is the best form of government compared to others. Despite apathy and distrust, there is space for political actors to convince Georgians that democracy and EU accession can best improve their lives.

Tackling Challenges, Sustaining EU Integration

In the face of an anti-democratic, Eurosceptic ruling party, pro-democracy and pro-EU actors need to grapple with public attitudes and adapt their strategies accordingly.

Recognizing the problem is the first major step. While the Georgian public supports democracy and EU integration, they express disbelief in the effectiveness of the existing system of governance, particularly in addressing the public’s core security and economic concerns. On the positive side, Georgians view the EU as a source of both security and economic prosperity. Any articulation of a political alternative to Georgian Dream by pro-democracy and pro-EU actors should therefore place the public’s security and economic concerns at the core of the agenda and emphasize how EU accession contributes to them. They must also present a clear vision for addressing top public fears related to EU accession: emigration, effects on relations with Russia, and the perceived loss of traditions, culture, and national freedom.

Any alternative to Georgian Dream by pro-democracy and pro-EU actors should place the public’s security and economic concerns at the core of the agenda.

Upon recognizing these issues, pro-democracy and pro-EU actors must update their political engagement strategies to regain citizens’ trust.

First, political parties must foster greater internal democracy, with unpopular leaders stepping aside to create space for new leadership to emerge.

Second, despite autocratic pressures – or perhaps because of them – political actors must urgently set aside personal differences and design a rules-based process that facilitates the emergence of a unified political front and a vision that delivers on the agenda of security, prosperity, and democracy.

Finally, political actors must engage directly and regularly with voters in both rural and urban areas, offering credible solutions to their everyday problems. Genuine, consistent face-to-face interaction demonstrates that politicians understand the multitude of public concerns and are committed to addressing them. Trust is not built in a day or through television appearances alone; it requires authentic and sustained engagement with citizens.

Acknowledging and tackling the root causes of Georgia’s protracted political crisis is the best way for pro-democracy and pro-EU actors to counter authoritarianism and Euroscepticism. Failure to address these issues would likely lead to the gradual erosion of the democratic foundations essential to Georgia’s future integration with the EU.

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