Mass Killings in Russia
Based on official statistics, Russia’s overall homicide rate declined significantly in the 2000s, but this masks persistent issues with mass violence, both large-scale and individual. Between 2000 and 2025, mass killings in Russia have been driven by terrorism originating from the Chechen wars, an increase in school shootings, and domestic military and criminal violence. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Mass killing statistics (2000–2025) • The Russian government’s official homicide rate has been a subject of debate. Though authorities claimed a rapid decrease in the 2000s, some researchers argue that official figures minimized the true rate of violent crime.
• A 2023 dataset on mass shootings in Central and Eastern Europe identified Russia as the location for the majority of incidents, with 53 of the 76 total cases. [1, 6, 7]Analysis of mass killings by typeChechen terrorism (2000s) The Second Chechen War, which began in 1999, resulted in a campaign of terrorism that extended into the Russian mainland and defined much of the mass violence of the early 2000s.
• 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis: Chechen terrorists took 850 people hostage in a Moscow theater. The rescue operation resulted in the deaths of at least 170 people, including 129 hostages who succumbed to a chemical agent used by Russian forces.
• 2004 Beslan school siege: A Chechen-led group seized a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, taking over 1,000 hostages. The siege ended with a chaotic and deadly raid that killed more than 300 people, most of them children.
• 2004 aircraft bombings: Simultaneous suicide bombings on two passenger planes departing Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport killed a total of 90 people. [3, 8, 9, 10, 11]School shootings (mid-2010s onward) While historically uncommon in Russia, school shootings have seen a notable increase since 2014, with at least 16 incidents between 2015 and 2021.
• 2018 Kerch Polytechnic College attack: An 18-year-old student at a college in Kerch killed 20 people in a gun-and-bomb attack before killing himself.
• 2021 Kazan school shooting: An armed attacker killed nine people, including seven children, at a school in Kazan.
• 2022 Izhevsk school shooting: A gunman killed 18 people, including 11 children, at a school in Izhevsk. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]Military and criminal violence • 2000s military violence: An early case of mass violence was a 2000 shooting in the Russian military, where a soldier killed eight others. Military-related incidents of mass violence continued into the early 2000s.
• 2006 Moscow market bombing: A far-right, neo-Nazi organization was responsible for a bombing at Moscow’s Cherkizovsky Market that killed 13 people.
• 2024 Moscow concert hall attack: A group linked to the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on a concert hall that killed at least 133 people. [3, 4, 17]Origins and contributing factorsChechen wars • The Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2000) bred extreme brutality, radicalization, and lasting animosity between Chechens and Russians.
• Russia’s victory was costly, leaving the region impoverished and fueling resistance that extended into mainland Russia through terrorist attacks. [8, 18, 19]Influence of foreign and online trends • A growing number of Russian school shooters have drawn inspiration from foreign attacks, notably the 1999 Columbine High School massacre in the U.S..
• Online social networks have facilitated the radicalization of Russian teenagers, providing platforms to express grievances and plan attacks. In some cases, officials failed to respond to online threats made by future shooters. [5, 20, 21, 22, 23]Socioeconomic and psychosocial factors • Studies comparing Russian and U.S. school shooters found similar underlying motivations, including social isolation, bullying, and difficult family relationships.
• Russian shooters, in particular, showed a strong association with economic hardship and exhibited self-aggressive behaviors.
• Bullying is a significant problem in Russian schools, with studies showing 16% of students report being victims. [5, 20, 24]State violence and repression • The Russian state’s response to mass violence, particularly terrorism from the Chechen wars, resulted in a crackdown on civil liberties and the media.
• Experts suggest that the rise of militarism and authoritarian state practices may contribute to the culture of violence.
• Since the rise of school shootings, the Federal Security Service (FSB) has adopted invasive surveillance of teenagers deemed at risk, and there have been reports of fabricating cases against potential shooters. [5, 8, 25, 26, 27]AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] researchgate.net/publication…‘
[2] researchgate.net/publication…‘
[3] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terror…
[4] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o…
[5] globalpsychiatry.co.uk/artic…
[6] jmvr.org/2023/02/do-mass-sho…
[7] france24.com/en/europe/20230…
[8] ebsco.com/research-starters/…
[9] daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/…
[10] jerseyeveningpost.com/morene…
[11] wftv.com/news/trending/mosco…
[12] rferl.org/a/russian-teenager…
[13] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Izhevs…
[14] operationalsupport.un.org/en…
[15] aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/7…
[16] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_s…
[17] npr.org/2024/03/23/124047296…
[18] media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/2…
[19] usip.org/publications/2025/0…
[20] researchgate.net/publication…
[21] scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ball…
[22] sci-result.de/journal/articl…
[23] openscreensjournal.com/artic…
[24] pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/article…
[25] themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/2…
[26] fairplanet.org/editors-pick/…
[27] css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz…
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Mass Killings in Russia 2000 – 2025: Statistics, Analysis, and origins – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mass+Kil…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 1, 2025
Month: October 2025
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The Karaj Dam’s water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran. The dam is currently only 15 percent full. The Karaj Dam is one of five dams that supply Tehran with drinking water.
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The post MORE: Iran’s worsening water and energy crisis could gradually increase the Iranian public’s frustrations with the regime and compound existing challenges to regime legitimacy.⬇️ The Karaj Dam’s water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran. The dam is currently only 15 percent full. The Karaj Dam is one of five dams that supply Tehran with drinking water. ISW-CTP assessed in August 2025 that the regime will likely not be able to meaningfully improve its water crisis if it does not address underlying issues, including mismanagement and unsustainable dev first appeared on JOSSICA – jossica.com.