Day: October 15, 2025

In June 2021, we emphasized the need for a partial return to the Soviet-era practice of restricting the entry of Russians into Western countries. to block and withdraw Russian bribery funds from the Western economy. The RLI analysts said that risks of infiltration and missions by Russian intelligence operatives had also increased, as Europe opened its door for the Russians to come. However, extrapolation of the situation to the Cold War period indicates that, despite the threats, the Iron Curtain enabled to prevent Russians from performing their activity on the territory of Europe.  This is particularly important in the context of active Russian operations involving sabotage, the use of drones for reconnaissance, and the testing of NATO air defense systems — especially in areas where strategic facilities are concentrated.

14 October 2025. At the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg, Estonia’s Interior Minister Igo Taro drew colleagues’ attention to a growing problem: the rising number of Schengen visas being issued to Russian citizens, which in the long run constitutes a threat to a united Europe.

Context: The Estonian interior minister stressed that Russia’s non-democratic regime is a significant source of threat to the Schengen area and EU member states, and therefore it is extremely important to prevent the infiltration of participants in the war against Ukraine and of people sympathetic to the Russian regime into the societies of EU member states. As I. Taro emphasized, relevant agencies across the EU must act jointly to ensure a unified political stance among all member states on this issue. The Estonian interior minister proposed the coordinated introduction of strict limits on Schengen visas and residence permits to impede the free movement across Europe of persons useful to the Putin regime. I. Taro argued that EU states should harmonize and standardize information-sharing on threats, since it is quite plausible that Moscow, using Russian intelligence services, employs such people to conduct hybrid operations against Schengen countries and the European Union.

Visa restrictions are part of the sanctions pressure on Russia because of its aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid operations against EU members. They are a way to reduce the comfort of citizens of the aggressor state without resorting to military action. Such a step signals condemnation of the war. EU member states fear that persons linked to Russian intelligence services could travel under the cover of diplomats or tourists; some EU countries—such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—have already limited or completely stopped issuing Schengen visas to Russians. Others, like Germany or France, until recently took a more cautious position, underlining the need to preserve options for humanitarian and educational travel.

It is likely that the next (19th) EU sanctions package will include a provision introducing strict controls on the movements of Russian diplomats within EU member states. Under a proposal by the EU’s external action service, if a Russian diplomat based, for example, in Brussels wants to travel through Luxembourg to The Hague, he or she would first have to notify Luxembourgish and Dutch authorities at least 24 hours before crossing their borders. They would also be required to provide the make, model and license-plate number of their vehicle, the planned border-crossing points, and dates of entry and exit. If the Russian diplomat intends to fly, take a train or a bus, they must declare the carrier and route code or its equivalent. Any EU country would be able to ban or require a permit for such travel or transit through its territory for the Russian applicant. The rule would apply not only to diplomats but also to Russian consular, administrative-technical and service staff of diplomatic missions and their family members. This measure is planned in response to the rise in Russian hybrid actions and subversive activities directed against Western states.

More and more EU countries are calling for restrictions or a complete ban on so-called “golden visas” for Russians, especially in the current geopolitical and security context. “Golden visas” are programs in various EU countries that allow foreigners to obtain residence rights or citizenship in exchange for substantial investments in the economy (real estate, business, government bonds, etc.). Golden-visa schemes enable Russian businessmen to legalize capital and evade sanctions. Through golden-visa routes, persons linked to Russian intelligence services acting under commercial cover can enter the EU.

The European Commission is preparing new recommendations on golden-visa programs, to be published by the end of 2025. These will foresee stricter criteria for Russian nationals, including limits or bans on access to investment visas. Some countries have already acted unilaterally: Ireland and Portugal have closed their golden-visa programs, and several other EU states are reviewing their eligibility conditions. Our assessment is that Russian intelligence actively uses jurisdictions such as Italy, Spain and Cyprus for infiltration and for legalizing covert intelligence operatives, including illegals.

• In Cyprus, Russians have received 8,478 golden visas under its investment program since 2014. 

Here are some reliable data points about how many golden visas or “golden passports / residencies by investment” have been granted to Russians (or residents of Russia) in certain European countries. The picture is patchy, and programs change frequently, but these are among the better-sourced figures:

• Portugal also saw €450.6 million in Russian investment via the Golden Visa program in 2024, signaling a surge in Russian participation. 
• Reports suggest the Portuguese Golden Visa program has quietly reopened to Russians and Belarusians after a suspension following the war in Ukraine. 

• Some news reporting suggests that in “Europe over the last decade,” as many as 4,000 Russians obtained “golden passports” (i.e. citizenship by investment) via European programs. Data indicate that demand for “golden visas” increased after 2014 — that is, following the annexation of Crimea, the introduction of sanctions, and the deterioration of relations with Moscow. This most likely suggests that the demand for such visas was artificially stimulated at the initiative of Russian intelligence, with the aim of maintaining a channel for transferring intelligence-linked individuals abroad.

Thus, the desire of some European governments to secure an inflow of “easy” financial resources from Russia has opened channels for Russian intelligence infiltration, increasing the risks to the EU’s security and defense sector.

More on tis story: The Iron Curtain reborn as the only way to stop expanding Russian aggression

More on this story: Increased Russian activity since the Cold War days requires tougher response