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Who knows what we will discover beneath the 37m tonnes of rubble? Yet this will be the most vital work I have ever done
Amid the many horrors unfolding in my Gaza homeland, there is one that, for now, is hidden but threatens to blight hopes for recovery long after the bombs have stopped falling.
Gaza is one of the most densely populated places on Earth. And, tragically, it could now be one of the most densely contaminated in terms of unexploded munitions. This is a deadly legacy that will claim lives and hamper attempts at reconstruction for years to come.
Haniya Albaioumy is a Gaza emergency response manager for the Mines Advisory Group
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Контракт Цель Поддержка/сопротивление
Нефть Brent $86,29 поддержка $85,09/$84,47/$83,35
Пальмовое масло (3 мес) 3.876/3.830 ринггитов сопр 3.951/3.989 ринггитов
WTI* $83,23 поддержка $81,61/$81/$80,17
Спотовое золото $2.352 сопр $2.377/$2.387/$2.393
Медь LME (3 мес)* $9.772/$9.710 сопр $9.921/$10.051
Алюминий LME (3 мес)* $2.478/$2.461 сопр $2.488/$2.505/$2.521
Соя CBOT (ноябрь) $10,61-3/4, $10,52-1/4 сопр $10,73-1/4, $10,80-1/2
Кукуруза CBOT (сентябрь) $4,02-1/4, $4,06-3/4 поддержка $3,95-1/2, $3,91
Пшеница CBOT (сен) $5,55-1/2 сопр $5,65, $5,70-1/4
Кофе на Нью-Йоркской бирже $2,4870/$2,5375/$2,5690 поддержка $2,4365/$2,4050/$2,3760
(сен)
Какао на Нью-Йоркской $8.399/$8.674/$8.843 поддержка $7,955/$7,785/$7,582
бирже (сен)
* Анализ основан на данных, полученных с задержкой, что может сказаться на прогнозе. Для
получения графиков используйте код TECH/C, чтобы получить исходные сообщения.
** Ван Тао является техническим аналитиком Рейтер по сырьевым и энергетическим рынкам и
выражает собственное мнение. Информация в данном сообщении не является рыночной, финансовой либо
юридической рекомендацией. Читателям следует обращаться к консультантам в отношении продуктов,
упомянутых в данном аналитическом материале
Оригинал сообщения на английском языке доступен по коду:
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By Charles A. Ray
(FPRI) — The COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to the human toll and negative economic impact in sub-Saharan Africa, also contributed to a decline in democracy. According to a May 26, 2021, article from the Council on Foreign Relations, more Africans were living under fully or partially authoritarian states than at most points in the previous two decades.
Citizen discontent with leaders’ attempts to remain in power through circumvention of the electoral process has led to political instability, demonstrations, and violence even in relatively democratic countries like Kenya and South Africa. While the average level of democracy across the continent remains relatively stable in 2024, the continual incidents of military takeovers and conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Cameroon, pose challenges to consolidating democracy. Despite continuing progress in countries like Gambia and Zambia, and with nine African countries in the top fifty in the world in levels of democratic participation, the continental averages in representation and rule of law have declined over the past five years.
The region of sub-Saharan Africa demonstrating the most severe decline in democratic governance has been the Sahel, the semi-arid belt connecting North Africa across the Sahara Desert with the tropical savannahs to the south.
Since 2020, there have beenfour coup d’etatsand three attempted coups in West Africa and the Sahel. The four military takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, were ostensibly because of economic stagnation and continuing insecurity and were initially received positively by the civilian populations. That support seems to continue despite thejuntas not delivering on promises to improve security. Themedian ageof populations in the Sahel ranges from fourteen to twenty-six, and one would think that such a youthful population would be a seed-bed for popular uprising as it has been in other regions of the world, but this has not happened. The security situation in the countries of the Sahel has worsened, and despite being one of the world’s richest regions in terms of natural resources, in April 2023, the United Nations estimated thatfood insecurity and malnutritionwere on track to reach a ten-year high. Some 45,000 people were at risk of experiencing “catastrophic levels of hunger.” Up to 80 percent of the people of the Sahel live on less than $2 a day, withpovertymore widespread than in most other parts of Africa.
While there has been a distinct shift to the right and autocracy in a number of regions, the Sahel leads the way in unconstitutional and attempted takeovers since 2020. Between 2020 and 2023, there were eight combinedsuccessful and attempted coups in the Sahelin six countries, from Guinea on the Atlantic to Sudan on the Red Sea.
Of the five coups that Mali has suffered since gaining independence in 1960, two of them were in 2020 and 2021. The country has faced an insurgency by the Tuareg (a minority ethnic group), jihadists, and criminal gangs since 2012, with limited success despite years of US, French, and other international support to strengthen Mali’s national army. In 2020, a colonel who had been trained by US, French, and German forces overthrew the elected president. This led to France withdrawing its forces from Mali and the junta subsequently toppling its own appointed civilian president, then turning to Russia’s Wagner Group for security support. This move has not lessened the insurgency and has led to massive human rights abuses against the civilian population.
Military officers seized power in Chad in 2021 after the death of President Idriss Deby, who had taken over in a coup in 1990. Deby had ruled for thirty years as a hardnosed autocrat but enjoyed US and western support because he’d aligned himself with international counterterrorism efforts. The leader of the coup was Deby’s son, Lieutenant General Mahamat Deby. Although the junta allowed national dialogue and a transition to democracy, there are signs that it is repressing opposition and taking steps to improve relations with Russia andeject US militarytrainers from the country, in a move to retain power indefinitely. Insurgencies continue in the north and south of the country.
A US and French trained officer led a coup in 2021, overthrowing the corrupt eleven-year rule ofPresident Alpha Conde, who had come to power under questionable circumstances after the country had suffered decades of autocratic rule with a promise to restore democracy. However, once in power, he proceeded to undermine it. Conde’s decision to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in office was very unpopular and the main reason stated by the junta for the takeover.
Between January and September 2022, Burkina Faso suffered two military takeovers. On January 24, 2022, soldiers ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, replacing him with Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Then, on September 30, Damiba was removed from his post and replaced by Captain Ibrahim Traore. Demonstrators supporting Traore attacked symbols of French presence in the country. After Traore’s installation as “transitional” president, he ordered the removal of French troops and approached Russia and Mali for security support. In September 2023, theelectionsintended to restore democracy to the country, which had been scheduled for July 2024, were deemed “not a priority” and indefinitely postponed. Increased violence in the capital Ouagadougou have fueled rumors that the country might be edging closeanother coup.
Niger had five coups after independence in 1960 but had experienced a decade of relatively stable progress toward democracy until July 2023, when a group of soldiers overthrew democratically elected President Mohamed Bazourn, who had held office since 2021. The coup leaders’ excuse was the continuous deterioration of the security situation. The army had received training from the United States and France and was home to a US drone base and 1,100 American military troops engaged in counterterrorism operations. Subsequently, the junta ended its military agreement with the United States, demandedwithdrawal of American troops, and invited Russian military “advisers” into the country.
After independence in 1955, Sudan suffered six coups and fifty-three years of military rule. Popular protests in 2019 motivated army officers to overthrow the autocratic ruler General Omar al-Bashir and work with civilian activists to transition to democracy. That transition was junked in 2021 as thecoup leaders began fightingover who would control the country. The conflict between General Abdel-Fattah Burhan, commander of the Sudanese military, and General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has cost the lives of many civilian noncombatants, created a humanitarian crisis, and forced many nations, including the United States, toevacuate their embassies.
With Russia moving into the region to fill the void left by the departure of US and French military forces, the short- and medium-term prospects for democratization of the Sahel seems exceedingly dim.
According to a June 6, 2023, Rand Corporationarticle, the Sahel is now the epicenter of global terrorism, accounting for 43 percent of deaths attributed to global terrorism in 2022. Burkina Faso and Mali accounted for 73 percent of terrorism-related deaths in the Sahel in 2022 and 52 percent of all such deaths in sub-Saharan Africa. With both terrorism and coups on the rise, the United States needs to take a new look at its policy towards the Sahel. Washington must move away from the security-first approach of providing weapons and tactical training, which has not worked, to a policy of institution building with a focus on civilian control and responsible use of military forces.
Such a policy should be uniformly implemented across the entire region, without exception, with human rights and laws of warfare violators held accountable for their actions. Rather than defaulting to a tactical response to extremist movements, the primary focus should be on identifying and addressing the root causes of such extremists. While it will be difficult in the short-term future to work with Sahelian militaries that have engaged in unconstitutional power grabs, when the United States can re-engage, the emphasis should be on good defense governance, development of proper doctrine, and establishment of effective civil-military relations, with a view to building effective, professional military forces that serve the nation rather than specific interest groups or those who seek power.
The American response to coups of any kind should be consistent and definite. The US government should condemn all takeovers and immediately suspend all military assistance and apply visa restrictions on coup leaders regardless of the motivation for the coup or the level of prior cooperation in US counterterrorism operations.
This fundamental shift in Washington thinking will not be easy to implement and will require a long-term focus rather than the short-term, quick results focus that unfortunately characterizes much of current US strategy. The United States should also be willing to stay for the long haul and not be turned off by lack of short-term success of its strategy. While it must be aware of other external players in this long game, some who will oppose the States and others who are ostensibly on the government’s side, it should be wary of over-estimating competitors or outsourcing to putative friends. The US approach should be based on what’s in the best interests of the country first, and the people of the specific African country secondly. It must be prepared to present itself as a reliable and consistent partner in the long-term economic and political development of the Sahel and be a desirable alternative to the current cast of characters aiding the region.
The long-term objective should be the development of professional, democratic, stable partners in the interest of peace and prosperity for everyone involved.
The post Prospects Dimming For Democracy In The Sahel – Analysis first appeared on The South Caucasus News.